

## **Executive Summary**

The City of Los Angeles has had a violence crisis for over 20 years. Beneath the relative citywide safety and tranquility, extraordinary violence rages in Los Angeles' high crime zones. A former World Health Organization epidemiologist who studies violence as a public health problem concluded that, "Los Angeles is to violence what Bangladesh is to diarrhea, which means the crisis is at a dire level requiring a massive response." Moreover, Los Angeles is the gang capital of the world. Although only a small percentage of the City's 700 gangs and estimated 40,000 gang members engage in routine violence, the petri dish of Los Angeles' high crime neighborhoods has spawned "a violent gang culture unlike any other...." The violence from this subset is at epidemic levels: almost 75 percent of youth gang homicides in the state of California have occurred in Los Angeles County, creating what experts have concluded is a regional "long-term *epidemic* of youth gang homicide and violence," to which the City is the major contributor.

This epidemic is largely immune to general declines in crime. And it is spreading to formerly safe middle class neighborhoods. Law enforcement officials now warn that they are arriving at the end of their ability to contain it to poor minority and immigrant hot zones.

After a quarter century of a multi-billion dollar war on gangs, there are six times as many gangs and at least double the number of gang members in the region. Suppression alone—and untargeted suppression in particular—cannot solve this problem. Law enforcement officials now agree that they cannot arrest their way out of the gang violence crisis and that their crime suppression efforts must be linked to competent prevention, intervention, and community-stabilizing investment strategies. This report is about those strategies.

The City's small and isolated gang prevention programs cannot reverse an entrenched epidemic. Comprehensive, neighborhood-based, schools-centered strategies for effective prevention, intervention, and community development will be needed in order to substantially reduce gang activity and violence in high crime areas, keep "tipping point" areas from tipping into routine violence, pull "sliding communities" with emerging violence back to safety, and keep safe areas safe.

**In short, Los Angeles needs a Marshall Plan to end gang violence.**

### **The Critical Concepts**

There are over 100 recommendations and action items in this report, but no City strategy will sustain reductions in gang activity or neighborhood violence without addressing the core issues at the heart of those recommendations:

1. Top political leaders must issue a strong, unanimous, and sustained political mandate to remove the drivers and conditions that spawn gangs and neighborhood violence.
2. City approaches must stop focusing on isolated, tiny programs that address less than five percent of the problem and must begin to confront the size and scope of the gang problem.
3. City approaches must address the conditions in neighborhoods and the unmet needs of children that allow gangs to take root, flourish, and expand.
  - a. The strategies must focus on the ecology of neighborhood violence using the public health and healing, child development, job development and community development models that address the major underlying drivers of violence and gang proliferation. In order to achieve this, the City must develop comprehensive, coordinated, multi-jurisdictional, schools-centered, neighborhood-based saturation strategies that do not leave children to fend for themselves on the streets. These strategies must be linked to problem-solving community policing that is designed to dovetail with neighborhood efforts. Comprehensive strategies have to be carefully and skillfully implemented to have any chance of avoiding chaos and achieving measurable reductions in gang activity and violence.
  - b. City approaches also must address the precursors to violence that may originate in the home, such as domestic violence, negative parenting, and tolerance of gang culture.
  - c. The general approaches described above that are aimed at underlying community conditions will be insufficient to satisfy the specialized and carefully targeted strategies needed to focus on gangs. In addition to the general comprehensive neighborhood-based strategies, an entire repertoire of carefully defined programs designed to address the special circumstances of gangs—gang specific risk factors, structures, and group processes should be developed. Service programs targeting gang prone youth cannot be so badly designed that they inadvertently increase gang cohesion and validate gang identity. Programs also must be aimed at providing sufficient resources to those who want a safe exit and transition

from gang life and/or aimed at reducing the violence of hard core gang members who are unlikely to leave gang life before age 25.

4. The City must get documented results for current monies spent and generate new resources by ending unnecessary and costly City practices.
  - a. Stop the dissipation and lack of impact with current funds by placing small and isolated programs into comprehensive and coordinated neighborhood violence reduction strategies that are efficient and generate results.
  - b. Find and end practices that consume hundreds of thousands of dollars for relatively little benefit to the public—for example, the costs of subsidizing take-home City cars for hundreds of City workers, unnecessary round-the-clock staffing, wasteful overtime practices, and idle City owned properties—and redeploy those dollars into a gang activity and violence reduction strategy.
5. After eliminating wasteful and ineffective approaches, the City should obtain new streams of funding for general prevention, intervention, and suppression and gang specific prevention, intervention, and suppression.
  - a. Additional funds will be needed but should not be sought until competent strategies, rigorous oversight, and accountability frameworks for expenditure of new funds are in place.
  - b. The City should seek joint funding as well as joint action with the State and County government to solve the gang violence problem. The City's gang crime costs taxpayers and crime victims over \$2 billion a year, with many of those costs paid from State and County coffers. A joint investment among entities of the State, County, City and the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) will increase the pooled funding and effectiveness for all government agencies.
6. Create accountability for reducing gang violence through a powerful, centralizing, entrepreneurial City entity with the institutional and political clout needed to streamline bureaucracy; command cooperation across City departments, external jurisdictions, and LAUSD; and execute neighborhood-based violence prevention and reduction plans. If this new entity does not document substantial and sustained reductions in gang activity and violence in selected high crime neighborhoods within set time periods, the City should eliminate it and/or change strategies.
  - a. This entity—whether it is a new entrepreneurial department or another structure—cannot succeed within the reactive culture and constraints of traditional bureaucracy. In order to execute the comprehensive, multi-faceted strategies that comprehensive gang violence reduction will require,

the entity charged with accountability for doing so will have to be creative, agile, proactive, results-oriented, and freer to contract with specialists, use technology, experiment to find out what works, and hire specially skilled staff that civil service tests are unlikely to identify.<sup>1</sup>

7. The leadership of the entrepreneurial entity will have to be bold, unafraid to take responsible risks or experiment, have extraordinary political skills, have credibility with sectors ranging from law enforcement to gang interventionists and academics, and possess working familiarity with areas of contention in the relevant disciplines ranging from gang culture and domestic violence to evaluation and program design.
8. Reap the “prevention dividend” by substantially increasing investment in gang focused prevention and intervention programs, and by creating gang focused prevention programs for two important groups: girls and young children who are trapped in high crime, gang dominated neighborhoods. (The City has only one gang prevention program involving elementary school age children now: the Gang Alternatives Program in the Harbor area.)
  - a. Substantially increase investment in improved training and oversight for gang intervention programs, and link them to jobs and wraparound activities that create safe exit ramps out of gangs.
  - b. Create specially targeted but carefully developed programs for elementary school children living in gang saturated communities and for the increasing numbers of girls involved in violence.
9. Create a state of the art Research, Evaluation, and Policy Institute.
  - a. The City must get competent data, evaluation and program design in order to accurately measure results. Accurate and regionally standardized definitions of gang, gang membership, and gang crime are essential. This Institute can be built through joint venture agreements with universities, foundations, and think tanks.
  - b. The City must move from politically driven policy to research driven policy, and must build evaluation into all programs.
10. A regional strategy that is countywide will be essential to solving both the City’s and region’s gang activity and violence problems.
  - a. Gangs and gang violence are a regional problem that requires a regional strategy.

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<sup>1</sup> Sonenshein, Raphael J., *The City at Stake: Secession, Reform, and the Battle for Los Angeles*, Princeton University Press, 2004.

- b. Other government sectors including the County and State must meet City efforts with equivalent strategic commitment.
  - c. A regional entity that coordinates State, County, and City efforts will be needed once a new and robust funding stream is created.
11. Law enforcement, prosecution, and juvenile justice strategies must dovetail with comprehensive neighborhood-based prevention and intervention strategies.
- a. As part of the citywide strategy and in collaboration with other City entities, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) should accelerate cultural reforms and expedite its transition toward problem solving community policing even without enough officers. LAPD should examine its gang suppression strategies for long term effectiveness and to determine if they are meeting emerging gang trends. LAPD should expand its targeted suppression that focuses on the most violent and develop ways to coordinate crime fighting with competent neighborhood violence reduction plans. Finally, LAPD should develop, with outside experts and the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (LASD), competent regional gang data. Currently such definitions are not employed consistently across jurisdictions and are subject to interpretation of individual law enforcement agencies and personnel.
  - b. Prosecutors need help getting substantially increased funds for extensive witness protection and other retaliation reduction measures and should relax enforcement of injunctions where competent community strategies require it.
  - c. The County and City need to authorize an emergency task force to expedite and immediately implement comprehensive reforms of County probation services, youth detention facilities and juvenile adjudication processes.
12. LAUSD will be a key institution in any neighborhood based comprehensive strategy. The District will have to radically change its role to become a strategic asset in neighborhood violence reduction strategies. LAUSD facilities will be important centers for any neighborhood violence reduction strategy. LAUSD must develop strategies to prevent and interrupt campus violence, as Santee High School has done. LAUSD also must co-pilot the joint efforts of City, County, and neighborhood institutions to develop comprehensive neighborhood safety plans. The City and LAUSD must also vastly increase investment in after school resources and expand and replicate programs like LA's Best.
13. Public campaigns against violence and youth access to guns involving broad sectors of Los Angeles will be important. The public's sustained engagement will be pivotal in a region-wide strategy to end neighborhood violence.

- a. Los Angeles' civic and faith-based sectors should be funded to lead a public campaign against violence and against youth access to guns—a civic movement against the culture of destruction that is engulfing LA's poorest areas will be essential to turning this problem around.
- b. Los Angeles' philanthropic sector should help fund the formation of the independent Research, Evaluation, and Policy Institute, intervention training, and programs that develop neighborhood leadership and community organizations dedicated to creating violence-free, healthy neighborhoods.
- c. The region's universities, think tanks and academic experts should contribute policy and evaluation expertise for the City's comprehensive strategy and policy, including the formation of the Research, Evaluation, and Policy Institute.
- d. The Business sector can help provide jobs and technical assistance to the City as it moves to create a competent, entrepreneurial model of government.
- e. The entertainment and media sector should offer substantial help in countering the glorification of gangs, violence and guns that fuels attraction to gang life, by helping to design and fund public campaigns against violence and youth access to guns.

These are the concepts that will have to be incorporated and addressed if the City is to develop competent approaches that have the capacity to sustain reductions in neighborhood gang activity and violence. How these ideas are achieved can be negotiated, but whether they are achieved has to be a given.

### **Conclusion**

This is the third time that the Los Angeles City Council has officially asked the question, “Why are City gang reduction strategies failing?” And it is the third time that experts have recommended that smarter suppression be linked to comprehensive prevention and intervention and that—above all—the City end the conditions that spawn and sustain gangs and neighborhood violence. The City did not fully enact those prior recommendations and gang activity and violence continued unabated, forcing today's City Council leaders to repeat the same question in 2005.

In the meantime, residents of Los Angeles' most dangerous neighborhoods continue losing children to senseless violence, and residents of safe areas are beginning to see that the threat could spread to them. In over 20 community meetings conducted for this assessment, public anger over the City's failure to find a competent approach to this problem came through loud and clear.

**Angelenos do not want to hear about another study. They want to see the problem solved. Now.**

Ultimately, it is a question of leadership's will to overcome the inherent political aversion to confronting complex issues, and the inevitable bureaucratic, union and community based organizations' resistance to the changes that will be needed for comprehensive, non-bureaucratic approaches. The solutions require cross-silo creativity, bold leadership, smart strategy, and sustained focus.

**The challenge is not what to do, but finding the will to do it.**

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## **Introduction**

In November 2005, the Los Angeles City Council and its Ad Hoc Committee on Gang Violence and Youth Development released an RFQ for an outside consultant to develop a comprehensive citywide gang reduction strategy. The Advancement Project (AP) proposed, and the City accepted, a three phase Gang Activity Reduction Strategy Project to be carried out over a nine-month period, from March 29 to December 29, 2006.<sup>1</sup>

In Phase I, the Advancement Project and its team of experts<sup>2</sup> assessed the City's current efforts to reduce gang activity, and concluded that despite examples of gang intervention and prevention programs that have helped individuals and shown short term impact, the City's gang reduction strategy had no capacity to address the size or nature of youth violence, had the wrong paradigm for the problem, and lacked the political will to solve it.

In Phase II, the Advancement Project researched best and promising violence prevention and reduction practices nationally and locally and found examples of programs that reduced youth and/or gang violence for short periods of time. This research confirmed elements of approaches that should be used to form the far more comprehensive and extensive strategy needed to address the LA region's tenacious gang and youth violence problem.

This final report for Phase III builds upon the findings of Phases I and II, sets out the changes in paradigm, operation, and strategy needed to replace the City's current efforts. If the City is serious about reversing the scale and severity of the gang violence problem, it will have to replace its current efforts with a comprehensive, multi-sectored, multi-disciplined, schools-centered and highly coordinated, carefully targeted neighborhood-based gang and violence reduction system for the Los Angeles region. It will have to use the public health,<sup>3</sup> child development, and community development models—approaches designed to reverse the underlying driving conditions that spawn and fuel neighborhood violence problems, of which gangs are one factor.

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<sup>1</sup> On March 7, 2006, City Council approved the selection of the Advancement Project as the contractor for a six-month period from March 29 to September 29, 2006. On July 21, 2006, City Council approved an amendment to the contract for a three-month extension for a total of nine months.

<sup>2</sup> Father Greg Boyle; Gila Bronner, The Bronner Group; Maria Casillas, Families in Schools; Way-Ting Chen and Jennifer Li Shen, Blue Garnet Associates; Patti Giggans and Cathy Friedman, Peace Over Violence; Megan Golden and Jena Siegel, Vera Institute of Justice; Peter Greenwood, Ph.D.; Jorja Leap, Ph.D.; David Marquez, JHDM Consultants; Bill Martinez, MCRP; Cheryl Maxson, Ph.D.; Ali Modarres, Ph.D., The Pat Brown Institute, CSULA; Sgt. Wes McBride; Cecilia Sandoval, The Sandoval Group; Howard Uller; Billie Weiss, MPH, Southern California Injury Prevention Research Institute, UCLA.

<sup>3</sup> The public health approach uses a four-level social-ecological model to better understand violence and the effect of potential prevention strategies. This model takes into consideration the complex interplay between individual, relationship, community, and societal factors. It allows us to address the factors that put people at risk for experiencing or perpetrating violence. For a more detailed description of the public health model, see "Violence: A Global Public Health Problem," World Report on Violence and Health, World Health Organization, 2002.

## **The Context for This Report**

This report explains the failure of the City's current approach to preventing and reducing gang activity and violence and makes the case for a rapid transition to a comprehensive strategy that has the capacity to begin solving the problem. This report is not a formal evaluation of individual programs run by the City or its contractors; it is not a review of any individual's job performance; and the solutions suggested in this report are not aimed at specific programs or individuals. There are many people who work tirelessly and with great courage to save children from "La Vida Loca,"<sup>4</sup> and nothing in this report should be read as disparaging their efforts. There also are serious shortcomings in the City's existing gang prevention and intervention programs that should be fixed, but until the City adopts a competent overall strategy that is capable of reducing gang activity and violence, it would be unproductive to focus extensively on problems in the few existing programs. The City's approach to gang reduction is not competent; indeed, it is structured to fail.

Accordingly, this report focuses on that macro-strategic level—the big picture—which has to be correctly diagnosed and addressed before even the best program can begin to show impact on the ground—or the worst program can be properly replaced.

### **Los Angeles is Unique**

Many other cities also have wrestled with the problem of preventing and reducing gang activity and neighborhood violence. This report discusses such efforts in four jurisdictions including New York, Boston, Chicago, and Alameda County, California. These examples provide promising practices that can inform LA's strategy. However, Los Angeles is unique, in its diverse demographics, in its vast geography, and in the scale and entrenched culture of its violence. Indeed, it is the gang capital of the world. Therefore, no one city's strategy can be transplanted here wholesale for implementation. Instead, Los Angeles must construct its own solutions, taking successes from other cities, from the best research, from effective local operations, and from the City's own carefully designed experiments that it should develop to document what works.

### **Los Angeles Has a Crisis**

Los Angeles has a violence crisis, and a youth gang homicide epidemic.<sup>5</sup> For over 20 years, the City has tolerated in its high crime zones extraordinary levels of violence as normal for two reasons. First, until recently, the City's long standing law enforcement strategy of suppression containment has been successful in keeping gang violence primarily located in poor, disorganized minority and/or immigrant neighborhoods. And second, because Los Angeles is so large, the violence crisis gets subsumed by both the vast geography and the larger citywide crime statistics that recently have shown steady declines in crime and overall increasing public safety. In other words, at the same

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<sup>4</sup> "La Vida Loca" or in English, The Crazy Life, refers to the chaotic destruction and violence of street gang existence. See, e.g., *Always Running, La Vida Loca: Gang Days in L.A.* by Luis J. Rodriguez.

<sup>5</sup> California Attorney General's Office, "Gang Homicide in LA, 1981-2001," February 2004.

time that most middle class and all privileged Los Angeles communities are relatively safe, many poor areas *endure persistently high crime rates and levels of violence that in some cases are extraordinary*.

But law enforcement warns that the containment bargain is beginning to unravel. Gang crime in Los Angeles, particularly the youth gang homicide rate, often does not follow citywide declines. And after decades of fighting gangs, police estimate there are twice as many gang members, six times as many gangs, and an emerging increase of girls joining gangs. The problem is not receding.

*The Political Will is the First Hurdle to a Solution*

This is the third time that the Los Angeles City Council has officially asked the question, “Why are City gang reduction strategies failing?”<sup>6</sup> It is the third time that experts have recommended far more strategic suppression linked to comprehensive approaches that focus on intense prevention, targeted gang intervention, and—above all—removing the conditions that spawn and sustain gangs, violence, and other threats to neighborhood safety. The City did not fully enact those prior recommendations and gang activity and violence continued unabated, prompting yet another group of City Council leaders to repeat the same question in 2005.

In the meantime, the residents of Los Angeles’ most dangerous neighborhoods continue losing children to senseless violence and those in safe areas are beginning to see that the threat could spread to them. In over 20 community meetings conducted for this assessment, public anger over the City’s failure to find a competent approach to this problem came through loudly and clearly. Angelenos do not want to hear about another study. They want to see the problem solved. Now.

Ultimately, it is a question of the leadership’s will to overcome the inherent political aversion to confronting complex issues and the inevitable bureaucratic and community based organizations’ resistance to moving from the current programmatic boxes to a comprehensive strategy and a new kind of governance model.

The challenge is not what to do, but finding the will to do it.

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<sup>6</sup> This effort is the City’s third attempt to respond to escalating gang violence over the last 25 years. The first attempt was the creation of Community Youth Gang Services (CYGS) in 1982; the second was the 1996 Ad Hoc Committee on Gangs and Juvenile Justice. See “City of Los Angeles Gang Activity Reduction Strategy – Phase I Report,” July 2006, pp. 4-5.

### **The Critical Concepts**

There are over 100 recommendations and action items in this report, but no City strategy will sustain reductions in gang activity or neighborhood violence without addressing the core issues at the heart of those recommendations:

1. Top political leaders must issue a strong, unanimous, and sustained political mandate to remove the drivers and conditions that spawn gangs and neighborhood violence.
2. City approaches must stop focusing on isolated, tiny programs that address less than five percent of the problem and must begin to confront the size and scope of the gang problem.
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4. The City must get documented results for current monies spent and generate new resources by ending unnecessary and costly City practices.
  - a. Stop the dissipation and lack of impact with current funds by placing small and isolated programs into comprehensive and coordinated neighborhood violence reduction strategies that are efficient and generate results.
  - b. Find and end practices that consume hundreds of thousands of dollars for relatively little benefit to the public—for example, the costs of subsidizing take-home City cars for hundreds of City workers, unnecessary round-the-clock staffing, wasteful overtime practices, and idle City owned properties—and redeploy those dollars into a gang activity and violence reduction strategy.
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6. Create accountability for reducing gang violence through a powerful, centralizing, entrepreneurial City entity with the institutional and political clout needed to streamline bureaucracy; command cooperation across City departments, external jurisdictions, and LAUSD; and execute neighborhood-based violence prevention and reduction plans. If this new entity does not document substantial and sustained reductions in gang activity and violence in selected high crime neighborhoods within set time periods, the City should eliminate it and/or change strategies.
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<sup>7</sup> Sonenshein, Raphael J., *The City at Stake: Secession, Reform, and the Battle for Los Angeles*, Princeton University Press, 2004.



7. The leadership of the entrepreneurial entity will have to be bold, unafraid to take responsible risks or experiment, have extraordinary political skills, have credibility with sectors ranging from law enforcement to gang interventionists and academics, and possess working familiarity with areas of contention in the relevant disciplines ranging from gang culture and domestic violence to evaluation and program design.
8. Reap the “prevention dividend” by substantially increasing investment in gang focused prevention and intervention programs, and by creating gang focused prevention programs for two important groups: girls and young children who are trapped in high crime, gang dominated neighborhoods. (The City has only one gang prevention program involving elementary school age children now: the Gang Alternatives Program in the Harbor area.)
  - a. Substantially increase investment in improved training and oversight for gang intervention programs, and link them to jobs and wraparound activities that create safe exit ramps out of gangs.
  - b. Create specially targeted but carefully developed programs for elementary school children living in gang saturated communities and for the increasing numbers of girls involved in violence.
9. Create a state of the art Research, Evaluation, and Policy Institute.
  - a. The City must get competent data, evaluation and program design in order to accurately measure results. Accurate and regionally standardized definitions of gang, gang membership, and gang crime are essential. This Institute can be built through joint venture agreements with universities, foundations, and think tanks.
  - b. The City must move from politically driven policy to research driven policy, and must build evaluation into all programs.
10. A regional strategy that is countywide will be essential to solving both the City’s and region’s gang activity and violence problems.
  - a. Gangs and gang violence are a regional problem that requires a regional strategy.
  - b. Other government sectors including the County and State must meet City efforts with equivalent strategic commitment.
  - c. A regional entity that coordinates State, County, and City efforts will be needed once a new and robust funding stream is created.
11. Law enforcement, prosecution, and juvenile justice strategies must dovetail with comprehensive neighborhood-based prevention and intervention strategies.

- a. As part of the citywide strategy and in collaboration with other City entities, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) should accelerate cultural reforms and expedite its transition toward problem solving community policing even without enough officers. LAPD should examine its gang suppression strategies for long term effectiveness and to determine if they are meeting emerging gang trends. LAPD should expand its targeted suppression that focuses on the most violent and develop ways to coordinate crime fighting with competent neighborhood violence reduction plans. Finally, LAPD should develop, with outside experts and the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (LASD), competent regional gang data. Currently such definitions are not employed consistently across jurisdictions and are subject to interpretation of individual law enforcement agencies and personnel.
  - b. Prosecutors need help getting substantially increased funds for extensive witness protection and other retaliation reduction measures and should relax enforcement of injunctions where competent community strategies require it.
  - c. The County and City need to authorize an emergency task force to expedite and immediately implement comprehensive reforms of County probation services, youth detention facilities and juvenile adjudication processes.
12. LAUSD will be a key institution in any neighborhood based comprehensive strategy. The District will have to radically change its role to become a strategic asset in neighborhood violence reduction strategies. LAUSD facilities will be important centers for any neighborhood violence reduction strategy. LAUSD must develop strategies to prevent and interrupt campus violence, as Santee High School has done. LAUSD also must co-pilot the joint efforts of City, County, and neighborhood institutions to develop comprehensive neighborhood safety plans. The City and LAUSD must also vastly increase investment in after school resources and expand and replicate programs like LA's Best.
13. Public campaigns against violence and youth access to guns involving broad sectors of Los Angeles will be important. The public's sustained engagement will be pivotal in a region-wide strategy to end neighborhood violence.
- a. Los Angeles' civic and faith-based sectors should be funded to lead a public campaign against violence and against youth access to guns—a civic movement against the culture of destruction that is engulfing LA's poorest areas will be essential to turning this problem around.
  - b. Los Angeles' philanthropic sector should help fund the formation of the independent Research, Evaluation, and Policy Institute, intervention training, and programs that develop neighborhood leadership and community organizations dedicated to creating violence-free, healthy neighborhoods.
  - c. The region's universities, think tanks and academic experts should contribute policy and evaluation expertise for the City's comprehensive strategy and policy, including the formation of the Research, Evaluation, and Policy Institute.

- d. The Business sector can help provide jobs and technical assistance to the City as it moves to create a competent, entrepreneurial model of government.
- e. The entertainment and media sector should offer substantial help in countering the glorification of gangs, violence and guns that fuels attraction to gang life, by helping to design and fund public campaigns against violence and youth access to guns.

These are the concepts that will have to be incorporated and addressed if the City is to develop competent approaches that have the capacity to sustain reductions in neighborhood gang activity and violence. How these ideas are achieved can be negotiated, but whether they are achieved has to be a given.

### **Methodology**

The team of consultants that produced this report includes experts in community conditions that spawn violence, violence as a public health epidemic, education strategies that reduce violence, job strategies that reduce gang violence, violence against women and girls, juvenile crime, gang intervention, gang prevention, anti-gang law enforcement, community development, effective government, demography, budget analysis, and crime costs. The team examined 45 City programs, 12 City departments as well as County, LAUSD, and other externally provided services related to youth development and gang violence reduction. The team conducted over 250 interviews of City, County and private sector experts, and visited three cities with nationally recognized gang reduction and violence prevention strategies. In addition to reviewing the volumes of City documents and materials on current and past gang programs and assessments, the team conducted a survey of research on gangs, juvenile crime, and violence reduction. In the nine months of this contract the team produced one preliminary report, [http://www.advanceproj.com/doc/gang\\_phase1.pdf](http://www.advanceproj.com/doc/gang_phase1.pdf), an interim status report on best practices, and this final report. This is the final report. It sets out the recommended elements for a comprehensive gang activity and violence reduction strategy.

## **I. Gang Gestalt: The Scope and Contours of the Problem**

### **A. Surface Diagnosis of Declining Crime**

On the surface, Los Angeles' crime statistics tell a story of declining crime rates. In 2006, the fifth year of overall crime decline in the City continued with a further eight percent<sup>8</sup> drop. Nationally, Los Angeles was one of the few large cities to escape a recent spike in violent crimes in the last 18 months.<sup>9</sup> Despite the fear generated in the 1990s about anticipated surges of youth violence, the juvenile felony rate has plummeted 61 percent from 1970s levels.<sup>10</sup>

*If Crime is Declining, What's the Problem?*

So if general crime trends are down, why should the City even worry about gangs or gang violence?

Because *gang* crime does not follow general crime trends. In spite of recent declines in citywide crime rates; *gang* crime and violence in Los Angeles are up. It is a problem because it destroys the lives of thousands of children and the quality of life in hundreds of neighborhoods. It is also wasteful; Los Angeles gang crime costs taxpayers and crime victims over \$2 billion every year. Finally, it is a problem because gang violence and crime are beginning to impact neighborhoods and schools that until recently have been gang free. The bottom line is that, while citywide, state and national declines for general crime rates are encouraging, LAPD statistics show consistently high levels of violence in high crime zones and LAPD gang officers report significant increases in gang crime in the San Fernando Valley and a few other areas of Los Angeles.<sup>11</sup>

### **B. Beneath the Surface: Diagnosis of Danger**

#### *Neighborhood Conditions Have Created Entrenched Gang Dynamics*

If these officers are correct, the conclusion to draw is disturbing: the neighborhood conditions that spawn LA's most dangerous gangs are so formidable that LA gang crime is immune from overall declines. That's the conclusion of the California Attorney General's 20 year study of gang homicides in Los Angeles County: "[W]hat truly sets Los Angeles apart from the remainder of California is not a general propensity for violent behavior, but rather... a specific milieu that has fostered the development of a violent gang culture unlike any other

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<sup>8</sup> Los Angeles Times, "Crime down for 4<sup>th</sup> year, Bratton says," December 6, 2006, and "L.A. crime decreases for 5<sup>th</sup> year," December 27, 2006. Also see LAPD Online.

<<http://www.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/cityprof.pdf>>

<sup>9</sup> Police Executive Research Forum, "Chief Concerns: A Gathering Storm – Violent Crime in America," October 2006.

<sup>10</sup> Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice, "California Youth Crime Declines: The Untold Story," September 2006. <<http://www.cjcj.org/pubs/index.php>>

<sup>11</sup> Los Angeles Daily News, "'State of Siege' in Valley LAPD steps up war against gang violence, vowing to bring in FBI," October 21, 2006. In a report to the Police Commission, Deputy Chief Michael Moore was quoted as saying, "While overall crime is down throughout the Valley for the fourth straight year, gang crime is up 40 percent."

gang culture in the state.”<sup>12</sup> Indeed, for over 20 years, LA’s disproportionately high youth gang homicide rate has persisted regardless of the larger crime trends, establishing what the Attorney General describes as an “enduring...long term epidemic of youth gang homicide and violence” that will require “long-term strategies supported by community-wide planning, participation, data collection, and investment.”<sup>13</sup> While the Attorney General’s analysis focused on LA County, the City can take credit for at least 50 percent of the trends described in this study.<sup>14</sup> The most compelling reason to address the conditions that give rise to LA’s deadly gang culture is seen in the communities that suffer from it.

The City of Los Angeles should take no comfort in its overall crime declines that mask and subsume the alarming violence on the ground in scores of Los Angeles communities saddled with gangs, gang violence, and the neighborhood conditions that fuel them. Diminishing federal support, the current shortage of police officers, and the City’s “thin blue line” public safety model preclude providing safety in the poorest and most violent areas of Los Angeles; instead City strategies contain the violence and fail to stem its causes. In these areas of the City, violence is too frequent an experience to be ignored. In the Los Angeles Police Department’s (LAPD) West LA Division, the risk of suffering a violent attack is 1 in 399;<sup>15</sup> in Hollenbeck, it is an alarming 1 in 153;<sup>16</sup> and in Southeast Division, it is an astonishing 1 in 51.<sup>17</sup>

Families in these areas of the City cannot take solace from the surface diagnosis that overall citywide crime is declining. Gang dynamics in these areas also are beginning to reflect and exacerbate existing ethnic divides in the City, increasing the likelihood that innocent residents will suffer from racially motivated gang violence. Indeed, violent crime remains concentrated at such distressingly high levels in some areas of poor African American and Latino neighborhoods that officers refer to some of these high crime areas as “Kill Zones.”

### **C. Conditions in High Crime Zones Are No Longer Ignorable**

Both statistics and anecdotes from neighborhoods beset by high levels of crime and violence further tell the story of the extraordinary conditions in LA’s high crime areas. Despite overall decreases in crime, for example in 2006, LAPD’s Newton division in South LA saw a five percent increase in violent crime, and Hollenbeck Division in Boyle Heights reported a five percent increase.<sup>18</sup> According to the Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD), in 2005

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<sup>12</sup> California Attorney General’s Office, “Gang Homicide in LA, 1981-2001,” February 2004.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid, 2.

<sup>14</sup> The City has an estimated 50 percent of the County’s total gang members.

<sup>15</sup> According to the LAPD’s Statistical Digest Summary (2004), 234,701 residents live within the West LA Division’s geographic boundaries. LAPD PACMIS/COMPSTAT data report that 588 violent crimes occurred in West LA Division during 2005. To calculate the chance of being a victim of a violent crime in the West LA Division, we divided the population by the number of violent crimes.

<sup>16</sup> Same source and methodology as Footnote #15. The Hollenbeck Division serves 214,812 residents and the number of reported violent crimes in the division in 2005 was 1,396.

<sup>17</sup> The Southeast Division serves 139,229 residents and the number of reported violent crimes in the division in 2005 was 2,714.

<sup>18</sup> LAPD COMPSTAT Newton Area and Hollenbeck Area Profile.

<[http://www.lapdonline.org/crime\\_maps\\_and\\_compstat](http://www.lapdonline.org/crime_maps_and_compstat)>

there were over 1,400 shooting related 911 calls in South LA, over 200 calls in East LA, over 400 calls in Central LA and over 300 calls in the Valley.<sup>19</sup> In 2005, just one division in the South Bureau, the Southeast Division, had more murders than the total murder count in 15 states.<sup>20</sup> The South Bureau as a whole had more murders than ten states combined.<sup>21</sup> In the last 30 years, more than 100,000 individuals were shooting victims in South Bureau.<sup>22</sup> And there is no end in sight. LAPD statistics from 2006 show that the level of gun related violence may not be waning despite declining crime statistics, as a majority of LAPD divisions are reporting a spike in number of gun shootings and shooting related victims.<sup>23</sup>

Young male residents of high crime areas in Los Angeles face especially high risks of homicide,<sup>24</sup> but the conditions in these areas subject all residents to relatively higher risks of violence and murder. As the following chart shows, a resident in LAPD's West LA Division faces a 1 in 78,000 chance of being murdered.<sup>25</sup> In the Southeast Division of LAPD, the chances are 1 in 2,200 or almost nine times higher than the national average.<sup>26</sup> In the Hollenbeck Division of East Los Angeles, the chances are 1 in 6,100, nearly 12 times higher than relatively safer areas.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> 2005 LAFD data shows that South LA had a total of 1,430 shooting related 911 calls (Battalions 3, 6, and 13); East LA had 222 calls (Battalions 2 and 7); the Valley had 381 calls (Battalions 10, 12, 14, 15, and 17); and Central LA had 430 calls (Battalions 1, 5, and 11).

<sup>20</sup> In 2005, the Southeast Division had 64 homicides. Across the country, fifteen states had 64 or less homicides. Those states were: Alaska (32), Delaware (37), Hawaii (24), Idaho (35), Iowa (38), Maine (19), Montana (18), Nebraska (44), New Hampshire (18), North Dakota (7), Rhode Island (34), South Dakota (18), Utah (56), Vermont (8), and Wyoming (14). State murder statistics are from the U.S. Department of Justice.

<[http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/05cius/offenses/standard\\_links/state.html](http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/05cius/offenses/standard_links/state.html)>

<sup>21</sup> The four divisions in South Bureau had a total of 209 homicides in 2005 (77<sup>th</sup> Street, Southwest, Southeast, Harbor). Ten states—Alaska (32), Delaware (37), Hawaii (24), Maine (19), Montana (18), New Hampshire (18), North Dakota (7), South Dakota (18), Vermont (8) and Wyoming (14)—had a combined total of 195 murders in 2005. National murder statistics are from the U.S. Department of Justice.

<[http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/05cius/offenses/standard\\_links/national\\_estimates.html](http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/05cius/offenses/standard_links/national_estimates.html)>

<sup>22</sup> AP interview with LAPD expert, November 16, 2006.

<sup>23</sup> See LAPD COMPSTAT, West Valley Division shooting victims and shots fired 10/22/06 – 11/18/06 and Wilshire Division shots fired 10/22/06 – 11/18/06, and shooting victims 11/19/06 – 12/16/06.

<[http://www.lapdonline.org/crime\\_maps\\_and\\_compstat](http://www.lapdonline.org/crime_maps_and_compstat)>

<sup>24</sup> California Attorney General's Office, "Gang Homicide in LA, 1981-2001," February 2004.

<sup>25</sup> According to the LAPD's Statistical Digest Summary (2004), 234,701 residents live within the West LA Division's geographic boundaries. LAPD PACMIS/COMPSTAT data report that 3 homicides occurred in the West LA Division during 2005. To calculate the chance of homicide in the West LA Division, we divided the population by the number of homicides.

<sup>26</sup> Same source and methodology as Footnote #25. Southeast Division serves 139,229 residents and 64 homicides occurred in 2005. According to Brian M. Jenkins, from the RAND Corporation, the average American has about a 1 in 18,000 chance of being murdered.

<sup>27</sup> Same source and methodology as Footnote #25. Hollenbeck Division serves 214,912 residents and 35 homicides occurred in 2005.

Figure 1: Chance of Homicide and Violent Crime in Los Angeles<sup>28</sup>

LAPD Division	Chance of Homicide	Chance of Violent Crime
West LA	1 in 78,233	1 in 399
Van Nuys	1 in 21,420	1 in 233
Hollenbeck	1 in 6,137	1 in 153
Southeast	1 in 2,175	1 in 51

Crime statistics and population from LAPD PACMIS/COMPSTAT.

In high crime areas, fear of violence grips all facets of life. Even in areas where there have been marked improvements, such as in the Rampart Division, a storeowner recently took matters into his own hands after being robbed ten times in a span of months. Even though he tracked down the robbers and gave the information to the police, he remained too afraid to allow his name or store location to be published.<sup>29</sup> When asked about the situation, the owner, speaking from behind bulletproof glass said, “We don’t just have to work here, we have to survive.”

### 1. Frequent Exposure to Violence Devastates Children

The largest impact of violence in highest crime areas is on the children and youth who live there. Many of these children do not play in their front yards, do not go to the library, do not go to the park, and too often, do not go to school because they are afraid. In the City of Los Angeles, approximately 850,000 children live in violent crime areas. Of these children, over 290,000 live in high gang crime areas.<sup>30</sup> Most of them never come close to joining a gang and try to steer clear of those who do, and of LA’s hundreds of gangs and thousands of gang members, most do not engage in the routine violence and killing done by a hard core subset. Nonetheless, the violence by that minority inflicts substantial damage on the health and quality of life for the hundreds of thousands of children living in high crime zones. A study by the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) that surveyed 4,000 children found that *90 percent* of them living in high crime areas reported being exposed to violence either as a victim or witness. Of these exposed children, 27

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<sup>28</sup> The *chance of homicide* and the *chance of violent crime* were calculated by dividing the division’s population by the number of homicides and violent crimes that occurred in 2005 according to the LAPD. Population figures are from the LAPD’s Statistical Digest Summary 2004.

<sup>29</sup> Los Angeles Times, “L.A. Merchant Dares to Stand Up to Gangs,” October 11, 2006.

<sup>30</sup> Calculated by population within zip codes that were 1 or more standard deviations above the mean in gang related violent crimes. Crime data is based on 2005 LAPD PACMIS/COMPSTAT data where the mean was 7 and standard deviation was 8.1, and population data is from Census 2000.

percent showed symptoms of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), with 16 percent testing as clinically depressed.<sup>31</sup> Violence in these neighborhoods is making children sick.

A few of these children will pay the ultimate price for joining a gang or simply for living in a high gang crime neighborhood. On September 24, 2006 in broad daylight, a gang member shot point blank into the chest of three-year old Kaitlyn Avila in a gang related shooting in Baldwin Village.<sup>32</sup> Both the fact that the shooting was prompted by a misidentification of Kaitlyn's father as a gang member and the fact that Kaitlyn seemed to have been intentionally shot in the chest fuels the fear in this community that gang violence is random and vicious. In December 2006, The Los Angeles Times reported that the number of at-risk children under County care who died of homicide more than doubled, with almost all of the killings attributed to gang activity.<sup>33</sup> Other examples of children caught in cross fire, retaliation, initiation, or mistaken identity shootings, or other violence—showcase how families, civic organizations, schools, City, and County programs fail to prevent, intercept, or otherwise protect LA's most vulnerable victims from its violence epidemic.

- Before he was murdered, Trevon was a good student and a rising star on his school's baseball team. He showed promise as an athlete and looked forward to being recruited to play college baseball. Trevon had a brother who was convicted of a crime and sentenced to the California Youth Authority. Upon his brother's release, his old gang began pressuring him to re-join their crews. Wanting to get a new start on life, he refused. Soon after, the gang shot and killed Trevon to send a message. Trevon's brother subsequently re-joined the gang.
- Jordan Downs, along with three other housing complexes in the area, is one of LA's most intense high crime gang zones. Children frequently do not go to school for fear of crossing gang boundaries. Gangs control many aspects of life including who may or may not use the gym which is owned and operated by the City's Housing Authority. The Grape Street Crips confronted one 14 year old Jordan Downs resident and commanded him to join their crew. A few days after he refused, gang members handed him a videotape. It showed the gang rape of his 11 year old sister. He joined the gang the next day. The sister subsequently attempted suicide and the brother landed in prison.
- Mario, grew up in Hazards territory in East LA surrounded by multi-generational gangs. His grandfather, father, and uncles all belonged to the same gang; for Mario, not joining was unimaginable. He knew nothing else. So when he was 10, a cousin taught him to tag and how to be a look out; by 12 he had graduated to auto theft; and

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<sup>31</sup> Stein, Bradley D., Jaycox, Lisa H., Kataoka, Sherly H., Wong, Marleen, Tu, Wenli, Elliott, Marc N., Fink, Arlene, "A Mental Health Intervention for School Children Exposed to Violence," *Journal of the American Medical Association*, Vol. 290, No. 6, August 6, 2003, pp. 603-611.

<sup>32</sup> Los Angeles Times, "Police Call Killing of Girl Intentional," October 10, 2006.

<sup>33</sup> Los Angeles Times, "Killing of Youths Tied to Child Protection System Soar in 2006," December 23, 2006.



by 13, they had taught him to shoot and kill. Mario died before his 14th birthday in a retaliation shooting. The principal at his junior high denied that gang recruiters operating on his campus were the school's responsibility.

When we hear these tragic stories, our first response is to ask, "How did this happen?" and "Who is responsible?" The answer is that many entities and individuals failed to protect these children from violence. The *families* of these children failed to keep them safe or seek appropriate help; *communities* in which these children lived have failed to organize against the culture of violence; *schools* failed to be sufficiently engaged in the lives of these children to ensure that they are thriving and learning and provide campus services and after-school safety plans; *law enforcement* failed to stem gang dominance or earn the trust of the community needed for effective community policing; the *City* failed to coordinate its resources and programs with County services to create a safety net for the most vulnerable families; juvenile justice entities like CYA, Probation and the Courts failed to rehabilitate the youth they imprison or to provide safe community re-entry strategies; and child advocates and other civic groups, thus far, have failed to galvanize a competent response to the problems or a satisfactory answer to the question, "Why can't we keep all children safe from gangs and violence?"

## **2. Gang Crime is Spreading to Previously "Safe" Areas**

In addition to the unique attributes of the region's persistently high youth gang homicide rates and the alarming levels of violence in high crime areas, there is another reason that citywide declines in crime do not negate the need for comprehensive attention to gangs and gang violence: gang crime and violence are now affecting previously safe areas. The City's strategy of containing gangs and gang violence is no longer working.

As Chief William Bratton said, "No Los Angeles resident is safe as long as gang violence continues unabated. But too many in 'safe' neighborhoods close their eyes to the threat mistakenly believing it is a gang-on-gang problem that can be contained to certain sections of the City. But residents of the City areas once considered havens from violence are being attacked in increasing numbers as gangs and other violent criminals expand their territory..."<sup>34</sup>

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
<sup>34</sup> LAPD, *State of the Department: Plan of Action for the Los Angeles That Is and the Los Angeles That Could Be*, Book II, October 28, 2004, p. 5.

Data supports Chief Bratton's observation. An examination of crime trends shows that areas with high gang crimes in 2005 experienced increases in gang crime from 2000 to 2005. Also notable in this analysis is that additional areas, such as Central Los Angeles, experienced the greatest increases in violent gang crimes.<sup>35</sup>

**Page 16: Map of Violent Gang Crimes Change, 2000 to 2005**

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<sup>35</sup> In 2005, LAPD changed its guidelines for reporting assaults of domestic violence nature to bring the Department's reporting of Aggravated Assaults inline with the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform Crime Reporting guidelines. As a result, Spousal and Child Abuse Simple Assaults that had been categorized as Aggravated Assaults prior to 2005 are now categorized as Simple Assaults. Thus, it is likely that there would be more violent crimes in 2005 if LAPD had used the same guidelines as in 2000.



**Violent Gang Crimes  
Change from 2000 to 2005**

- Decreased by more than 10
- Decreased by less than 10
- No Change
- Increased by 5 or less
- Increased by 6 to 10
- Increased by more than 10

Reports of recent spikes in gang crimes in the San Fernando Valley that are attributable to tagging crews ramping up to more hardcore gang activity also support the conclusion that gang activity continues to evolve and expand into new areas. Easy access to guns means that youth violence easily escalates into homicides. Indications are beginning to emerge that some entrenched street gangs have graduated to more highly focused, organized criminal enterprises. Several LAPD gang experts have noted that a few street gangs have successfully transitioned to more sophisticated crimes such as identity theft and other on-line “white collar” crimes targeting middle and upper class families.<sup>36</sup> Residents in areas that do not currently have high levels of visible gang violence will increasingly bear the risk of becoming the victims of the new “invisible” gang crimes.

## **II. The Problem**

### **A. The Drivers of Youth and Gang Violence: Major Risk Factors<sup>37</sup>**

The Petrie dish of conditions that cultivates gangs and neighborhood violence is rich. The following risk factors associated with gang membership and violence are not determinative that a child or youth will become a gang member or violent. However, analysis of risk factors and exposures helps define the sub populations that are more likely to need targeted prevention strategies and may identify populations of youth that have not been captured into law enforcements data banks.

#### **1. Lack of Jobs for Youth**

A major reoccurring theme throughout AP’s youth forums was the necessity for gainful alternatives to gang membership.<sup>38</sup> The only major epidemiological study of factors that reduce gang violence in Los Angeles confirms the motto of Father Greg Boyle’s Homeboy Industries: “Nothing stops a bullet like a job.” This 1997 UCLA study of gang crime in Los Angeles and its relationship to various community level socio-economic factors found that the only two factors having a significant correlative relationship with the level of violence in an area were per capita income and proportion employed.<sup>39</sup> In other words, areas with lower per capita incomes and higher youth unemployment rates exhibited higher levels of gang violence. Based on this finding, the

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<sup>36</sup> LAPD interviews, summer and fall of 2006.

<sup>37</sup> According to Irving A. Spergel, while there have been case studies and theories on why young people join gangs, there have been few quantitative research studies. Spergel, Irving A., *The Youth Gang Problem: A Community Approach*, Oxford University Press, 1995. The studies that have been done conclude that some of the factors include known association with gang members, presence of neighborhood gangs, having a relative in a gang, failure at school, delinquency record, and drug abuse. According to Malcolm W. Klein and Cheryl L. Maxson, in addition to those listed above, another risk factor is a “youth’s experience of a series of negative life events”. Klein, Malcolm W., Maxson, Cheryl L., *Street Gang Patterns and Policies (Studies in Crime and Public Policy)*, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 148.

<sup>38</sup> See Appendix 3, Community Engagement.

<sup>39</sup> Kyriacou, Demetrios N., et al, “The Relationship Between Socioeconomic Factors and Gang Violence in the City of Los Angeles,” *Journal of Trauma: Injury, Infection, and Critical Care*, Vol. 46, No. 2, February 1999.

report recommended community based economic development and job creation programs as key elements of any effective gang prevention strategy.

Despite the pivotal role that youth employment plays in reducing gang involvement and gang violence, Los Angeles has no comprehensive, large scale youth jobs strategy. In the summer of 2005 the City arranged for only 3,000 summer jobs for youth and managed to double that in the summer of 2006.<sup>40</sup> When the multi-track schedules of 16 senior high schools return to traditional calendars in 2008, there will be approximately 65,000 students with idle time in the summer. This group will join the already existing 93,000 16 to 24 year-olds who neither attend school nor work.<sup>41</sup> Immediate attention to creating jobs and recreational activities will be necessary to counter a potential surge in gang or other destructive activity by unoccupied youth.

## **2. Poverty Compounded by Social Isolation**

All major research literature on gangs and community structure has noted poverty and declining income levels as significant factors contributing to the concentration of gangs.<sup>42</sup> Maps in the Phase I Report also documented the high correlation between the rate of poverty and low per capita income with the concentration of gang crime.

**Page 19: Map of Poverty by Percent (2000)**


**Page 20: Map of Estimated Per Capita Income (2005)**

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
<sup>40</sup> <<http://www.hirelayouth.com/summerprogramcomponents.htm>>

<sup>41</sup> Fogg, Neeta, and Harrington, Paul, "One Out of Five: A Report on Out of School and Out of Work Youth in Los Angeles and Long Beach," Center for Labor Market Studies, Northeastern University, November 2004.

<sup>42</sup> Klein and Maxson, pp. 213-217. Ethnic composition and social stability as the other two important factors.







In the larger picture, changes in the regional economy between 1990 and 2004 resulted in an absolute decrease in manufacturing jobs, the jobs that could support a family with benefits that workers without advanced degrees could get. Some of these jobs have been replaced by service sector jobs, but service sector jobs often do not pay well. Regionally, six of the ten jobs with the highest growth rate in the next six years, pay less than \$10 per hour, leaving many working families poor enough to qualify for government assistance.<sup>43</sup> Slightly less than a quarter, 24 percent, of City residents, worked at jobs that did not pay a living wage.<sup>44</sup>

Even with lower paying service jobs, growth in the total number of jobs never matched the growth in working age population. In 2003, the City's unemployment rate was relatively high at eight percent with 136,000 people who wanted jobs unable to find one. This number does not account for the thousands of individuals who experience such chronic unemployment that they are no longer actively searching for jobs. This obscures the even more dire state of joblessness in underclass neighborhoods where multi-generational unemployment, low educational attainment, and felony records are formidable barriers to employment.

This chronic economic deprivation is disproportionately concentrated in South LA, Central LA, East LA, and the East San Fernando Valley. The average wage and salary incomes in the Central, East, South, and Harbor areas are less than the City's average of \$34,566. Workers in South LA are paid the lowest average wages in manufacturing jobs and lowest wages in the City overall.<sup>45</sup> Regional inequity with the City is also mirrored ethnically. "Compared to European American families, African American families are 286 percent more likely to have an income under \$15,000, Latino families are 230 percent more likely, and Asian American and Pacific Islander families are 169 percent more likely."<sup>46</sup> Similarly, compared to European Americans, African Americans are 153 percent more likely to be unemployed, Latinos 156 percent more likely, and Asian American and Pacific Islanders, 134 percent more likely. Chronic unemployment, lack of opportunities in the formal economy, and high incidence of poverty generate a sense of hopelessness in the community, destabilize the civic infrastructure, and undermine family cohesion.

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<sup>43</sup> According to the 2006 Children's Scorecard released by the LA County Children's Planning Council, in 2005 a single parent with two children needs to earn \$25.97 per hour to support the family's basic needs. A two parent family must earn a combined hourly wage of \$30.32. A four person family, according to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, is only at poverty level if their income is less than \$23,000 per year (almost 2 ½ times less than the living wage in Los Angeles County of \$63,000 per year).

<sup>44</sup> Burns, Patrick, Flaming, Daniel and Brent Haydamack, "LA Labor Market Strengths and Weaknesses," Economic Roundtable, December 2005, p. 1.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid, p. 5.

<sup>46</sup> Flaming, Daniel, "Poverty, Inequality and Justice," Economic Roundtable, March 2006, p. 4.



### **3. Domestic Violence**

A number of studies have identified clear links between childhood experiences of violence and later violence, antisocial behavior and gang membership. Domestic violence and child abuse, in addition to poverty, community violence, and a low degree of commitment to school, strongly correlate with violent behavior among juveniles.<sup>47</sup> Children, who routinely are exposed to violence in the home, incorporate this behavior into their lives as an acceptable means of dealing with conflict. Domestic violence, therefore becomes a critical risk factor for developing youth. High proportions of adult male felons who are incarcerated have a history of family violence.<sup>48</sup> Keeping in mind the systemic and likely high undercounting of reported child abuse and spousal abuse, LAPD made over 14,000 arrests for these family violence offenses in 2005.<sup>49</sup>

### **4. Negative Peer Networks**

A negative peer network—hanging out with the wrong crowd—is a strong risk factor for gang membership especially during adolescence because peer influence plays a critical role in shaping youth attitudes and behavior. Having delinquent friends increases the chance that a youth will join a gang by replacing socialization by a positive caretaker with street socialization that dictates how the youth spends time, with whom s/he associates and reorients his or her aspirations toward gang or other destructive activity. Certainly the likelihood that a youth would encounter and engage in a negative peer network is increased when gangs are a dominant aspect of a neighborhood culture. As one Probation youth put it, “Gangs are my family. They are part of the neighborhood. That’s all there is.”<sup>50</sup>

### **5. Lack of Parental Supervision**

Parents play a critical role in the lives of children and youth and lack of parent supervision, particularly in neighborhoods with few opportunities for constructive activities, increases the risk of gang membership. Even well-intentioned parents with good parenting skills, but who do not have the appropriate support systems to counter pervasive neighborhood gang problems, may not be able to prevent their children from becoming involved with gangs. Parental supervision may be lacking for a variety of reasons including long working hours, major crisis events, and unfamiliarity with local institutions. Many male gang members interviewed cite the absence of their fathers and lack of attention from positive father-figures and role models as a central deficit in their lives. In addition to neighborhood based activities that offer alternatives to gang and

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<sup>47</sup> Hill, Karl, et al. “Childhood Risk Factors for Adolescent Gang Membership: Results from the Seattle Social Development Project.” *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, Vol. 36, No. 3, August 1999.

<sup>48</sup> Weeks, Robin and Widom, Cathy Spatz, “Self-Reports of Early Childhood Victimization Among Incarcerated Adult Male Felons,” State University of New York, Albany, June 1998.

<<http://jiv.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/13/3/346>>

<sup>49</sup> See LAPD COMPSTAT, Citywide Profile 11/19/06 - 12/26/06.

<[http://www.lapdonline.org/crime\\_maps\\_and\\_compstat](http://www.lapdonline.org/crime_maps_and_compstat)>

<sup>50</sup> Interview with probation youth at Camp Gonzales, December 13, 2006.

other destructive activity, parents need support and help in developing the skills needed to effectively engage their children and monitor their activities.

## **6. Nondelinquent Problem Behavior**

Early intervention is important for children and youth who exhibit non-delinquent problem behavior which is a risk factor for gang membership. These behaviors include aggressiveness, impulsivity, and inappropriate reactivity. Assessment for these behaviors and enrollment in effective treatment programs would mitigate this risk factor. This risk factor highlights the overwhelming importance of mental health services as a prevention tool, not just as a post-violence recovery resource.

## **7. Early Academic Failure and Lack of School Attachment**

Gang members and other troubled youth are typically behind in school or are drop-outs.<sup>51</sup> Problematic school environments including overcrowding, school violence, lack of competent counseling, inadequate resources, and disengaged teaching push academically frustrated youth out of schools. Once out of school, youth are more prone to participate in delinquent activities and associate in negative peer networks that include gang membership. Using the proxy of high school graduation rates to indicate levels of school attachment, the significant numbers of youth in the City of Los Angeles who have dropped out and are not working—over 93,000, comprise a high risk group warranting special programs to divert them away from gangs and back to education and legal employment.<sup>52</sup> It is encouraging to note that gang youth and other out of school youth often return to educational settings seeking to obtain their GED.<sup>53</sup>

Figure 2: Risk Factors for Violence and At-Risk Population in Los Angeles<sup>54</sup>

➤ Poverty	294,029 children living in poverty
➤ Community Violence	851,268 children living in violent crime areas
➤ Domestic Violence	14,000 child and spousal abuse arrests

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<sup>51</sup> Spergel, pp. 118-119.

<sup>52</sup> Fogg, Neeta P., Paul E. Harrington, “The Teen Disconnection in Los Angeles and its Neighborhoods,” Northeastern University, November 2004, p. 26.

<sup>53</sup> Spergel.

<sup>54</sup> Calculated by population within zip codes that were 1 or more standard deviations above the mean in gang related violent crimes. Crime data is based on 2005 LAPD PACMIS/COMPSTAT data where the mean was 7 and standard deviation was 8.1, and population data is from Census 2000. See also LAPD COMPSTAT, Citywide Profile 11/19/06 - 12/26/06.

<[http://www.lapdonline.org/crime\\_maps\\_and\\_compstat](http://www.lapdonline.org/crime_maps_and_compstat)>

Figure 3: Risk Factors for Gang Membership and At-Risk Population in Los Angeles<sup>55</sup>

➤ Peer Network	293,148 children living in Gang Hot Zones
➤ Lack of parent supervision	120,645 children living in Gang Hot Zones and in poverty
➤ Poverty	
➤ Lack of school attachment	79,690 LAUSD suspensions

## What Approaches and Strategies Counter These Risk Factors And Reduce Gangs?

### III. Models in Violence Prevention

#### The State of the Research

The research reviewed for this report reveals many apparent paradoxes and unresolved debates that will require careful parsing and further analysis by a permanent body of experts who can help the City synthesize the best programmatic approaches and find the best balance of the risks inherent to the ongoing quest to find out what works. Examples abound of research problems with everything from basic definitions of “gang,” to what the few longitudinal studies of gang intervention show. Also common are examples of how failure to understand the complexities of gangs or the need for nuanced responses can backfire. For example, gang focused law enforcement strategies and intervention programs that fail to account for specific gang structures, culture and group processes, or that engage gangs in ways that unnecessarily validate gang identity and cohesion, can actually increase gang activity. Programs that fail to distinguish sufficiently between general delinquency and street gang involvement can increase both. And programs and suppression that allow crime control to obscure adolescent development and the need for mental health and safe environments that help traumatized youth to exit and heal from gang involvement also will fail in their goals.

Indeed, gang reduction strategies developed solely in response to the understandable fear of the minority who are responsible for the deadly violence have created a bias in favor of programs overly driven by crime control which undermines any possibility of successful alternation.<sup>56</sup> This precarious “mixing of crime prevention motives and social service methods” turns into crime control that destroys the premises of universal access and success that make education and social investment programs work.<sup>57</sup> And the risks of targeting at-risk or delinquent youth

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<sup>55</sup> Calculated by population within zip codes that were 1 or more standard deviations above the mean in gang related violent crimes. Crime data is based on 2005 LAPD PACMIS/COMPSTAT data where the mean was 7 and standard deviation was 8.1, and population data is from Census 2000. See also LAUSD.

<<http://search.lausd.k12.ca.us/cgi-bin/fccgi.exe?w3exec=spi3&info=8614>>

<sup>56</sup> For a more detailed description of alternation, see Appendix 5, Gang Prevention and Intervention.

<sup>57</sup> Zimring, Franklin, E., *American Youth Violence*, Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 194.

for social programs require equally nuanced consideration: too much or the wrong kind of targeting can drive youth away or deeper into gang life. Yet gang involved youth must be identified and provided special efforts, or those who need and are ready for the most help will get none.

These are just a few examples of the vagaries, nuances and complexities that run throughout the research on gangs and youth violence. The City must develop the expertise needed to identify and distinguish among the needs of different youth cohorts and deliver developmentally appropriate programs and services to them without singling them out, increasing gang cohesion or counter productively casting the programs in the crime control mold.

In sum, despite decades of research into gangs and violence, there is no single, definitive formula for success in reducing either.<sup>58</sup> Even federal authorities who have invested heavily into gang suppression strategies note, “Although thousands of programs have been implemented..., the ongoing difficulties with youth gangs make one lesson very clear: there are no quick fixes or easy solutions for the problems that youth gangs create or the problems that create youth gangs.”<sup>59</sup> And leading gang researcher Malcolm Klein recently noted that the quest for how to end gang activity and violence remains largely unanswered.

Easy solutions do not exist, but that does not mean that no solutions exist or that some solutions do not carry more potential than others. The City of Los Angeles has never even tried to declare that in a specific neighborhood not another ten year old will join the local gang—and then organized the resources and strategies to make it happen. As the quotes above suggest, the most common approaches to gang activity reduction are deficient, but they fail for obvious reasons, including not even trying to set aggressive goals or pursue competent strategies. An expert review of 58 programs in multiple jurisdictions found the following:

- 62 percent of the programs were too narrow in scope and insufficiently comprehensive to deal with the complex factors contributing to formation of gangs.
- A majority of the programs targeted individual transformation without addressing the negative dynamics in the individual’s neighborhood.
- Very few programs addressed the community context of gangs and almost none address the group processes of gangs.
- The most widely used approach was suppression with little or no prevention and intervention.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> Klein, Malcolm W., Maxson, Cherly L., Miller, Jody, *The Modern Gang Reader*, Roxbury Publishing Co., 1995, p. 249.

<sup>59</sup> Wyrick, Phelan, Howell, James C., *Strategic Risk-Based Response to Youth Gangs*, *Juvenile Justice Journal*, OJJDP, September 2004, p. 21.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

The solutions with the highest potential for reducing gang activity—comprehensive public health approaches that address the causative conditions, gang structures, group processes, and neighborhood contexts—require meticulous and careful implementation. There are only a few strategies that encompass the full spectrum of prevention, intervention, and suppression efforts necessary to reduce gangs and gang violence.

One approach that has gained support from experts and has shown success in places like Chicago, is the public health approach. The public health approach uses a four-level social-ecological model to better understand violence and the effect of potential prevention strategies. This model takes into consideration the complex interplay between individual, relationship, community and societal factors. It allows us to address the factors that put people at risk for experiencing or perpetrating violence.<sup>61</sup>

The one comprehensive model that addresses individual change as well as the ecology of violence and the social processes of gangs, and that has had multiple implementations across the country is the Spergel Model, named after Irving Spergel, a professor of Social Administration at the University of Chicago.

#### **A. The Spergel Model: Comprehensive Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression**

Ironically, this model largely resulted from the Office of Juvenile Justice Delinquency Prevention's (OJJDP) visit to Los Angeles in the mid 1980s and the observation of what came to be labeled the "LA Plan." In contemplating replication of the "LA Plan" in other cities, however, OJJDP concluded that the "LA Plan" was less a coordinated strategy and more a series gang suppression efforts by law enforcement agencies with no involvement from the community and minimal impact. As a result, OJJDP contracted with Spergel to develop some alternative strategies for gang control. What resulted is the Spergel Model, technically known as the Comprehensive Community-Wide Approach to Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression program.

After a pilot implementation in the Little Village section of Chicago, this model was implemented in five additional sites in 1995.<sup>62</sup> Various versions of the Spergel model have

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<sup>61</sup> Prevention strategies should include a continuum of activities that address multiple levels of the model. These activities should be developmentally appropriate and conducted across the lifespan. This approach is more likely to sustain prevention efforts over time than any single intervention. The following describes each level. *Individual*: The first level identifies biological and personal history factors that influence how individuals behave and increase their likelihood of becoming a victim or perpetrator of violence. Some examples include age, education, income, substance use, or prior experience with abuse. *Relationship*: The second level looks at close relationships such as those with family, friends, intimate partners and peers. It explores how these relationships increase the risk of becoming a victim or perpetrator of violence. *Community*: The third level explores the community contexts in which social relationships occur such as schools, workplaces, and neighborhoods. This level identifies the characteristics of these settings that increase the risk of violence. *Societal*: The fourth level looks at the broad societal factors that help create a climate in which violence is encouraged or inhibited. These include social and cultural norms. Other large societal factors include the health, economic, educational and social policies that help to maintain economic or social inequalities between groups in society. For a more detailed description of the public health model, see "Violence: A Global Public Health Problem," World Report on Violence and Health, World Health Organization, 2002.

<sup>62</sup> The sites were Mesa and Tucson, Arizona, Riverside, California, San Antonio, Texas and Bloomington, Illinois.

also been implemented at 31 additional sites with support from the U.S. Department of Justice and Bureau of Justice Assistance.

There are five major strategies under the Spergel Model:<sup>63</sup>

1. **Community Mobilization:** Developing and maintaining an interacting set of public and private agencies, groups, and residents to organize a comprehensive program responsive specifically to the gang problem.
2. **Social Intervention:** Developing outreach contacts with gang members and those at higher risk of gang membership. Most typically, this refers to the use of street workers who both counsel targeted youth and provide useful bridges between them and the schools, social services, and criminal justice agencies. Outreach can also be provided by probation, police, and treatment workers.
3. **Opportunities Provision:** Providing gang members access to employment, job training, educational, and cultural opportunities as alternatives to gang activity.
4. **Organizational Change and Development:** Bringing about changes in the policies and practices of public and private agencies to reduce their tendency not to respond positively to gang youth, to help them adopt strategies that will enhance their responsiveness, and to increase interagency collaboration.
5. **Suppression:** The use primarily of police, probation, parole, and the courts to hold youth accountable for their criminal activities. This goes beyond the “normal” criminal justice operations to include special anti-gang practices, such as police gang units, the use of gang court injunctions, and specialized gang intelligence operations. Other agencies and outreach workers can also become involved in suppression activities.

The model places great emphasis on having direct, continuing involvement of community leaders; careful selection and targeting of gang and high-risk youth; and developing adequate gang data and case management systems useable across agencies. After ten years of implementing comprehensive strategies, preliminary results from three of the five original sites, as well as an additional site in St. Louis, have been disappointing. The interim reports document key obstacles that each of these programs encountered and failed to overcome:

1. Resistance of local agencies, particularly law enforcement and schools to participating in a coordinated strategy.
2. Unclear articulation of the model leading to different and conflicting understandings among participating partners.
3. Resistance to the use of gang intervention workers who were ex-gang members.

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<sup>63</sup> Klein and Maxson, pp. 120-121.

4. Technical difficulties associated with data collection and a common data system.
5. Divergent interests among the wide variety of collaborating partners including schools, employment agencies, grassroots organizations, community based youth agencies, community mobilization groups, law enforcement, prosecution, judiciary, probation, corrections, and parole.
6. Inability to clearly target gang and high-risk youth.
7. Devolution of the strategy into a series of services supported through a single stream of funding rather than a “well-integrated web of interventions in which information, decision making, and youth are shared in a seamless manner across programs.”
8. Tendency for suppression efforts to dominate.

These and other shortcomings resulted in limited impact on reducing the number of gangs or gang members and, in some cases, lack of significant improvement even for those enrolled in special programs. Given these preliminary results, some experts have warned against trying to manage the complexity of a comprehensive gang control effort and urge more cautious, limited approaches. But other experts note that if the mistakes documented can be remedied, and careful implementation can be carried out, the Spergel model could be made to work.<sup>64</sup>

### **1. Reasons to Implement a Comprehensive Community Model**

There are several reasons why the Comprehensive Community approach should be pursued in Los Angeles.

- a. Articulation of the Model:** The model is much better articulated now than it ever was, particularly compared to those early sites that began in 1995. In 1998, the Spergel team and OJJDP staff drafted an official articulation of the model and then in 2000 issued a comprehensive explanation of how the five basic components work together. Evaluation and analysis models are also now available. Although the comprehensive Spergel model is complex, any new implementation efforts based on its framework can rely on these new resources and learn from the mistakes of prior implementation efforts.
- b. Existing Elements:** Many of the elements needed for the approach already in Los Angeles. For example, multi-jurisdictional suppression coordination already exists in several task forces, and a network of gang intervention street workers would not be difficult to create. Although both need to be expanded and the level of coordination between the two strengthened, the basic infrastructure and experience developed over the last ten years offer a solid base for further development. In addition, significant strides have been made in recent years to bridge the divergent interests of potential

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<sup>64</sup> Klein and Maxson.

collaboration partners including LAPD, LASD, LAFD and other City departments—all of which have had to learn to cooperate on the board that oversees the City’s Emergency Preparedness Department.<sup>65</sup>

- c. **Cross Sector “Meeting of the Minds”:** Joint efforts are increasingly viewed as necessary by all sectors. In the Advancement Project’s survey of City departments, County agencies, and community groups, AP found consensus that the task of reducing violence and ensuring safety and vitality of children and youth could not be achieved by any one group alone, and that achieving this goal would require all entities to work together. This “meeting of minds” again provides a solid basis to begin the hard work of forging coordinated, jointly developed gang and violence reduction plans.
- d. **Law Enforcement Support:** Key changes in law enforcement are taking place that will make comprehensive strategies feasible. These include police leaders openly agreeing that the City needs a robust prevention system - that officers need to find productive ways to support that system and that law enforcement agencies need to increase public trust through community policing. In an important advancement of these trends, in January 2007 top LAPD officials publicly confirmed that the Department would participate in community strategies and work cooperatively with gang intervention workers.
- e. **Los Angeles Unified School District Support:** During this assessment, LAUSD Superintendent Brewer expressed strong commitment to support comprehensive strategies that reduce gang activity and increase campus and neighborhood safety. Noting that children who do not feel safe cannot learn, Superintendent Brewer has indicated that he would support a gang reduction strategy for all schools as part of a public-private endeavor to support transformative leadership at school sites.
- f. **Public Will:** Finally, but most importantly, the public wants effective prevention. The California Wellness Foundation’s “2004 Voters Survey Fact Sheet” reports that 8 out of 10 voters, including 70 percent of Republicans and 85 percent of Democrats, say that state spending on violence prevention and youth safety programs is as important as spending for law enforcement and prisons. Furthermore, the survey reports that, when given an explicit choice, 8 out of 10 Californians prefer investing in violence prevention and youth safety programs over building more prisons.<sup>66</sup>

## 2. Barriers to Implementation of a Comprehensive Model

### a. Identifying High Risk Youth

One of the greatest barriers to effective implementation of a comprehensive model in Los Angeles will be the City’s difficulty in targeting services to gang and high-risk

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<sup>65</sup> <<http://www.lacity.org/epd/epdeoeeob1.htm>>

<sup>66</sup> <<http://www.preventviolence.org/events/materials/factsheetfinal.pdf>>



youth. Three programs in the LA region have demonstrated success that is encouraging on this issue.

First, the efforts of the Orange County Probation Department in implementing their “8% model” provide a good example of how services may be organized to target a group of youth who are at the greatest risk of becoming chronic offenders. After several years of research validating the hypothesis that youth who commit multiple offenses have identifiable risk factors, the Orange County Probation Department found that eight percent of probation youth 15 ½ years or younger were at the greatest risk of becoming a repeat offender. The department isolated the 8 percent group by identifying those having at least three of the four risk factors which are problems in family, school, pre-delinquency, and substance abuse. This group then receives a multidisciplinary collaborative day treatment program at a single site known as a Youth and Family Resource Center. After five years of implementation, the program has found that the youth who participate in the “8 % Early Intervention Program” have significantly fewer serious new offenses. While Los Angeles may not want to emulate the entire Orange County model, its success in developing a system-wide assessment strategy that effectively targets services to those most in need can be adapted for Los Angeles.<sup>67</sup>

Second, the launching of Targeted Community Action Planning (TCAP) in selected council districts, a result of coordination between the City and the U.S. Department of Justice presents an opportunity to test and refine current practices for targeting services to a high risk youth population.<sup>68</sup>

Third, new interactive data platforms like the Healthy City Project ([www.healthycity.org](http://www.healthycity.org)) offer sophisticated mapping and data tools to locate high risk populations and understand their specific health, demographic, educational and other characteristics. Along with its comprehensive database of health and human services throughout the region, HealthyCity.org can also be used to identify what existing resources can be further leveraged or complemented to better serve these high risk populations.

#### **b. Coordination and Community Mobilization**

Perhaps the most difficult aspects of the Spergel model are the needs for high levels of coordination and community mobilization. This report addresses the issue of coordination in the next section under governance, but here points to four examples of successful community engagement used in comprehensive gang and youth violence reduction strategies.

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<sup>67</sup> Schumacher, Michael, Kurz, Gwen A., *The 8% Solution: Prevention Serious, Repeat Juvenile Crime*, Sage Publications, Inc., 2000.

<sup>68</sup> AP interview with Community Development Department and TCAP personnel, November 27, 2006.

## **B. Boston's Operation Ceasefire**

Boston's now famous Operation Ceasefire or the Boston Gun Project achieved remarkable success in reducing youth homicide rates to nearly zero and keeping them there for several years. The strategy was coordinated by a working group consisting of representatives from the Boston Police Department, Probation, the District Attorney and U.S. Attorney's office, many other criminal justice agencies, social service agencies, ministers from neighborhood churches (known as the "Boston TenPoint Coalition"), researchers from the Kennedy School of Government, a long standing coalition of local violence prevention practitioners, and the local public health community. The key elements of Operation Ceasefire included:

- Regular working group meetings that were used to analyze data on gang violence and develop plans for reducing it;
- Announcing and publicizing the Ceasefire, and plans to enforce it;
- Enhanced enforcement by all agencies against gangs found to have violated the Ceasefire;
- Mobilization of community support for the strategy, particularly by the TenPoint Coalition that regularly walked the neighborhoods;
- Mobilization of community services for youth who desired to give up their gang activities.

Despite on-going debate about how much of the reduction in violence was directly attributable to Operation Ceasefire, there is no question that the collaboration among the police department, the small faith based organizations and the public health community was an integral part of Boston's success in reducing youth gang violence and crime. The effort, however, faltered after several years when the leadership of key institutions and community groups changed and when resources were pulled. Boston's rates of youth violence once again began to climb. To counteract this reversal, Boston leaders recently reactivated the collaboration in 2006 and faith leaders reengaged by launching negotiations to stabilize the violence through a peace agreement between two warring gangs.<sup>69</sup> As one TenPoint leader noted in an interview about why the effort faltered, no one built the program into the operations of the participating institutions, so it could not become permanent or sustainable and it relied too heavily on existing leadership without developing new leadership as replacements.

## **C. CeaseFire Chicago**

The second example of demonstrated effectiveness in marshalling the community to reverse entrenched dynamics of violence is found in CeaseFire, a program based in Chicago where homicide is the number one cause of death of young people between the ages of 1 to 34.<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>69</sup> See Appendix 13, National Site Visits: Boston.

<sup>70</sup> <<http://www.ceasefireillinois.org>>

CeaseFire is a public health intervention campaign against violence based on an epidemiological model of violence as a disease. This model was developed by Dr. Gary Slutkin, a former World Health Organization official. Just as public health initiatives seek to change the behavior that triggers a disease, interrupt transmission of the disease and inoculate against it, CeaseFire deploys ex-offenders and former gang members to interrupt the transmission of violence and alter the norms and expectations of the group dynamics that foster violent behavior in each of the several CeaseFire Zones within the City. Outreach workers work with clergy and police to turn the community against violence and conduct public communication campaigns against shooting and killing. By convincing gang members and others to refrain from retaliation violence in the wake of a killing or shooting, and by working to change the thinking of young people who practice a culture of violence, CeaseFire has reduced levels of neighborhood violence.

CeaseFire is metrics driven and has an evaluation component built into it to document how many conflicts are mediated, how many likely shootings are prevented and the impact of the program on crime trends. CeaseFire does not negotiate truces or use schools as a center of their strategies, nor does it go beyond violence interruption and reducing shootings and killings to include community development or to change the underlying conditions that permit violent lifestyles and dynamics to take root in a community. It nonetheless is an excellent enactment of the public health approach to violence reduction and offers several elements, particularly the metrics and public anti-violence campaign, that should be incorporated into Los Angeles' strategies. This report recommends a CeaseFire Chicago-Los Angeles Collaborative for the two strategies in the cities with the most virulent violence problems to jointly learn from the experiences of the other and to forge advances in violence reduction strategies.

#### **D. New York City's Harlem Children's Zone and Beacon Centers**

In addition to violence prevention for its high crime and gang zones, Los Angeles needs to consider a wrap-around community saturation strategy—around the clock programs that will keep children and youth safe while offering them meaningful opportunities for enrichment and support. One of the best known comprehensive neighborhood transformation projects is New York's Harlem Children's Zone (HCZ). NY HCZ is a comprehensive place-based continuum of services to develop healthy children and a healthy community at the same time. All programs are geared toward a 24-block area within Harlem and include preschool, parenting education, youth development, after school, health services, child welfare services, employment services, and physical revitalization of the area. By 2009, 10 years into program operation, HCZ is projected to have served 24,000 adults and children.

HCZ operates two of 80 Beacon Centers in New York. Beacon Centers are funded by a New York City initiative created to re-build communities of support for children and youth in urban neighborhoods. These Beacons are school-based community centers offering a wide range of services and activities during after school, evening and weekend hours, and during

summer and other school vacations for an average of 10-12 hours a day. Beacons focus on five core areas of programming:<sup>71</sup>

- Youth development including educational enrichment, cultural arts, sports and recreation, youth leadership, community service, and career education;
- Parent involvement and family support;
- School-community linkages to increase academic achievement;
- Building of safe and supportive neighborhoods for child and youth development; and
- Employment.

The mix of services vary from community to community and are approved by a community advisory board. Beacons also serve as the site for community meetings and social activities.

The geographically compact nature of New York makes a school-based community center such as a Beacon or a place based strategy such as HCZ particularly attractive because community access is relatively assured. In Los Angeles, where communities are defined by miles rather than blocks, thought must be given to transportation needs to ensure community access. Despite such challenges, the Advancement Project highlights these two models because they represent a “coherent youth and community development initiative” that sees community rebuilding as a key to not only reducing violent conditions but also developing healthy children with many positive options. The one caveat from NY’s HCZ is that program leaders did not have the capacity or community development plans needed to capitalize on the avalanche of resources that its tremendous success triggered. Nonetheless, it is one of the urban transformation success stories that offers rich lessons for LA.

## **E. Alameda County Blueprint for Violence Prevention**

In July 2005, Alameda County adopted a comprehensive violence prevention plan, “A Lifetime Commitment to Violence Prevention: The Alameda County Blueprint.” The initiative began in 2003 and involved a variety of stakeholders including political leaders, public and private funders, cities, school districts, county agencies, law enforcement, faith based groups, businesses, and community based organizations. In the assessment phase, the need for unified leadership, increased accountability, a venue for coordination and greater understanding of effective violence prevention were identified as key areas of focus and accepted some key principles including the notion that violence prevention is a vital part of public safety. As the first set of steps, the County implemented a multi-jurisdictional, multi-sector leadership council that began working on the following several action areas:

- Implement a violence prevention curriculum in schools

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<sup>71</sup> < <http://www.nyc.gov/html/dycd/html/services-afterschool-beacon.html>>

- Build and strengthen reentry programs
- Implement a comprehensive and targeted services in five neighborhoods with high rates of violence
- Engage the business sector as stakeholders in prevention
- Compile and analyze data to determine needs and best practices
- Develop funds and other resources

Although different in its implementation strategy, it is encouraging to note that other jurisdictions have begun to act on a regional strategy involving key stakeholders to achieve the long-term goal of violence prevention and are investing resources into the effort.<sup>72</sup>

## **F. City and LAUSD Programs That Showcase Elements of the Comprehensive Community Model**

Fortunately, several City initiatives and programs already use elements of the comprehensive model to one degree or another. Because of the problems with City gang reduction operations and approaches to the problem detailed in the Phase I Report, none have reached their potential for sustained, neighborhood level impact in reducing gangs or gang violence.

### **1. Summer of Success**

In the summer of 2003, then-Councilmember Martin Ludlow launched a comprehensive, neighborhood wrap-around strategy called “Summer of Success” in a crime ridden neighborhood known as “The Jungle” that regularly accounted for half of all violent summer crime in the area. Summer of Success produced remarkable results in reducing neighborhood violence. The idea was relatively simple: violence would decline if youth who normally only had access to gangs were offered meaningful alternative activities scheduled round the clock. During nine weeks of that summer, local basketball courts stayed open past midnight for tournaments and games. Youth had paid internships to conduct outreach to the community. Gang intervention workers from the Amer-I-Can collaborative negotiated with local gangs for safe passage and no violence agreements. Safer Cities community police officers cooperated with the program (but unfortunately, other LAPD officers refused to cooperate with the effort). Neighborhood community groups collaborated to offer computer games, tutoring, and as many other program opportunities as possible during the 8 pm to 3 am hours when most of the violence was occurring. Also, a prominent radio station featured the program throughout the summer. The results were stunning. Compared to a similar period the year before where the neighborhood experienced numerous homicides, there were 0 homicides, a 20 percent

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<sup>72</sup> As a consultant for the Alameda Blueprint, a member of AP’s leadership team, Billie Weiss, helped incorporate the LA Violence Prevention Coalition (VPC) model into the Blueprint. Orange County’s VPC is based on LA’s model as well. <<http://www.preventioninstitute.org/alameda.html>>

reduction in aggravated assaults and a 17 percent reduction in all violent crimes.<sup>73</sup> The Los Angeles Times' editorial pages declared Summer of Success a success and a talk radio touted it as one of the few smart ideas to come out of City Hall in a long time. To make this happen, City departments, community based organizations, council offices, and many other entities worked together like they have never worked before or since. Unfortunately, when the program ended, so did the success.

## **2. Santee High School**

Shortly after its opening, Santee High School experienced a two-day large scale violent eruption that resulted in 34 students being arrested and 10 being hospitalized.<sup>74</sup> The school continued to be the number one campus for crime in LAUSD until a new leadership began its transformation. Principal Vince Carbino who became the sole leader of the school on July 1, 2006 conducted a thorough assessment of the student, teacher, administrator and community cultures. He then systematically developed action plans to address the factors contributing to the school's culture of violence and ineffectiveness. It was not one single thing, but a combination of both simple and complex changes.

Principal Carbino canvassed the neighborhood and interviewed families, gang members, business owners and others to seek agreement to keep the school a neutral safe zone. He made a special effort to engage parents, giving every parent the number of at least one of his multiple and ever-ringing cell phones and hosting "Coffee with Carbino" in the evenings. He put together funding for a large team of mental health counselors, social workers and academic counselors who conduct thorough case conferences about individual students' mental health and academic needs. Community partners were engaged and empowered to work with the school to provide enrichment opportunities and services. All 9<sup>th</sup> graders were taken to California State University, Dominguez Hills for several days of off site orientation, leadership development, violence prevention, conflict resolution and academic achievement focus. Natural leaders among students were identified and a Peace Committee formed which was largely responsible for avoiding a student walk out during the immigration rallies. Focus shifted from the 10 percent of the students causing the problems to the 90 percent who wanted to learn—and most importantly, Principal Carbino singled out the troubled 10 percent not for punishment and targeting, but for affirmation, encouragement, diagnosis of learning disabilities, positive social interventions and mental health treatment. (Principal Carbino states that mental health treatment is by far the most important aspect of his turnaround platform.) The bell schedule was changed to minimize the number of students roaming the campus. In addition to parents, Principal Carbino gave out his cell phone number to every teacher and student. To improve instruction he consulted students and invested in teacher training.

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<sup>73</sup> Chief of Police William J. Bratton, "Request for City Expanding the 'Summer of Success' Youth Program," June 6, 2005 (OCOP #2005-02-02A).

<sup>74</sup> Los Angeles Times, "Fight Spoils New Campus' Hopes," December 11, 2005.

The results are stunning. Campus violence is almost non-existent on a campus that a year ago was one of the District's most dangerous. Now the stage is set for the school to work on how to improve learning, not through a deficit model like most schools, but from a strength and assets model where every student is evaluated for their potential. Learning could not begin until safety was ensured. Most importantly, Principal Carbino sees the school as an institution that plays a central role for the revitalization of the entire community. **"The community changes when students are prepared and part of the community - The capacities that we are building within the kids they take back into the community and empower from within...Ultimately what we want at Santee is that we are transforming a community through a school's very existence."**

### 3. MacArthur Park Transformation

The transformation of MacArthur Park from a generator of local crime to a model park has been well documented and recognized for its success. LAPD officers of the Rampart Division used a community collaboration model to galvanize intra-departmental contributions, win corporate contributions of cameras for park security systems, community cooperation in park clean up, and consultation with schools and other civic organizations. Approaches to gangs in the area were professional and fair—even in the view of the gang members themselves and area gang intervention workers. Within six months, park crime plunged 45 percent and the park was clean to the point that families felt safe enough to dance to music in the dark under the new lights that awaited money to be turned on.<sup>75</sup>

### 4. Other Strategies Exhibiting Elements of Comprehensive Approaches

In addition to the transformative examples cited above, there are small programs within the City that successfully use elements of the comprehensive model that are not used in the majority of City programs. Some of the programs below are gang intervention programs that provoke mixed responses. This report acknowledges the complaints of some law enforcement officers and gang researchers who conclude that many gang intervention programs are ill-conceived and improperly monitored. The programs below are singled out as examples implementing aspects of the comprehensive strategy, and a few are noted for more comprehensive success.

#### a. Youth Opportunity Movement Watts Students for Higher Education Program

The Youth Opportunity (YO!) Movement has been a bright spot in the City's youth employment effort for many years. With a grant from the Department of Labor, the City was able to build a network of Youth Opportunity centers to provide career, education, and supportive services to youth. There are currently three YO! centers in Watts, Boyle Heights and the San Fernando Valley. Of these, YO! Watts, in collaboration with the County Probation Department, County Office of Education,

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<sup>75</sup> Blue Ribbon Rampart Review Panel, *Rampart Reconsidered: The Search for Real Reform Seven Years Later*, July 2006, p. 10.

and Los Angeles Trade Technical College, is piloting the Students for Higher Education Program and stands out as a stellar effort at collaboration, meaningful intervention, and mission driven dedication.

While the collaboration among City, County, and higher education institutions is in and of itself to be applauded, the program works with a troubled population that others avoid—highest risk youth many of whom are already in gangs and all of whom are in a probation camp. As a pilot, the program currently operates at Camp Gonzalez with 50 youth who receive a mix of case management, mentoring, leadership development, access to college credit courses, vocational training, and intensive transition services. The stated goal is to reduce recidivism rates among these youth, but the program does much more. For many of these youth, the idea that they could even think about attending college, let alone secure up to seven college credits while they are at camp was unimaginable. Some of the youth participate in the culinary training program learning real-life vocational skills that can help them to secure jobs when they exit from the camp. The most important component of this program, however, is that there is intensive transition support for youth by YO! case managers who regularly visit them at the camp and follow up with them immediately after their release. After being released, YO! case managers take the youth to Los Angeles Trade Technical College to enroll them and provide financial support for basic necessities and school supplies. They continue to track the youth for the next 12 months by mentoring, giving support, and helping them solve problems.

The targeted services to high risk youth, mixing of opportunities with support services, intensive transition support from probation camp, and case management follow-up over a significant period of time are all part of a successful strategy that should be replicated elsewhere. The program is also a reminder to the City that while prevention is the best strategy for most youth, intervention strategies, even with those youth who are gang involved, are not only possible but already being implemented successfully.

#### **b. Gang Intervention Programs**

**Homeboy Industries** is an East LA based non-profit that “offers free support services to any individual seeking a way out of gang life.” Focusing on individuals who are ready to exit the gang life, it offers jobs, job placement, job preparation, education services, computer training, tattoo removal, counseling and case management, and help in “transitioning from detention to productive living.” Headed by Father Greg Boyle, the help offered includes addressing the spiritual and psychological needs of troubled adolescents and other young adults served by the programs. The industries run by this award winning enterprise include a bakery, clothing store, a silkscreen business, and a landscaping operation. Since gainful opportunities are one of the most important factors in reducing gang violence, Homeboy Industries’ success in creating jobs for gang involved and other troubled youth, particularly in light of many employers’ reluctance to hire these youth, is important to replicate citywide if serious gang activity and violence reduction is to be accomplished.



In addition to Homeboy Industries, there are several other important gang intervention efforts in Los Angeles employing promising practices. Both **Toberman Settlement House** and **Communities in School** offer a comprehensive array of gang prevention and intervention services targeting youth most at-risk of joining a gang. From school based prevention to crisis intervention, both agencies have a strong group of staff who demonstrate extraordinary dedication and expertise. Both organizations work collaboratively with a broad range of partners including law enforcement, other service providers, and schools.

Working with the incarcerated population and troubled residents of high crime neighborhoods, **Amer-I-Can's** unique Life Skills Management curriculum has trained over 25,000 adult and juvenile inmates in over 30 correctional institutions in California and other states since 1989. Through a 60 to 90 hour engagement, the program helps individuals examine their past misconduct and to systematically develop the skills and outlook needed to reverse the negative thinking and attitudes that lead to violent, criminal, addictive, and other problematic behavior. A survey of the post-incarceration records of inmates who had graduated from the course offered at the County's Pitchess Detention Center showed that the program transformed troublesome prisoners into mediators and after they left, reduced their likelihood of resuming criminal behavior or returning to jail.

Finally, a key institution supporting the work of gang intervention workers is the **Youth and Gang Violence Intervention Specialist Program** at the Pat Brown Institute, California State University, Los Angeles. Building professional capacity among gang intervention workers not only strengthens their individual ability to perform but also builds a common base of knowledge and professional standards within the community of gang intervention workers. The program offers a solid basis upon which more advanced professional development activities can be added.

**c. Gang Alternatives Program (GAP)**

Only one gang prevention program focuses on keeping elementary school children trapped in gang dominated neighborhoods from succumbing to the inevitable pressures of joining “La Vida Loca”: Gang Alternatives Program (GAP). Through classroom based curriculum implementation, GAP directors reach every 4<sup>th</sup> grader in 43 elementary schools. The program is designed to counteract the strong acceptance of gangs as a social norm and to fortify young children against their overwhelmingly negative, gang permeated milieu. GAP is a unique effort to incorporate younger age children in the violence prevention strategy and has established effective collaboration with the schools.

**d. Gang Reduction Program, Boyle Heights**

The Mayor's Office of Homeland Security and Public Safety began the Gang Reduction Program (GRP) in Boyle Heights as one of four pilot sites funded by the

U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention in 2004. The extensive planning process undertaken involved a wide range of community stakeholders, schools, City departments, City Council offices, and law enforcement. In addition, the project also began with a good understanding of the assets and resources in the community through the creation of the Boyle Heights Community Resource Inventory.

Designed to coordinate the delivery of services addressing four strategic needs including primary prevention, secondary prevention, intervention and gang suppression, the GRP model offers a framework for developing a data-driven, collaborative strategy on a targeted neighborhood. Although the planning was intensive and thorough, an implementation process that utilizes the best assets and resources in the community is equally important and essential. An effective implementation that shows positive impact and measurable outcomes will be needed to support the sustainability of the effort.

**e. The Los Angeles Urban League's Crenshaw Initiative**

Another promising neighborhood and schools initiative aimed at reducing violence and crime, increasing academic achievement, and sparking community development is being launched by the Los Angeles Urban League with the LAPD, the LAUSD, the City Attorney's Office and residents. This civic group's joint venture with the school district and City law enforcement will initially offer wrap-around services and safe passages strategies to end violence and change conditions for students.

**f. CLEAR**

The Community Law Enforcement and Recovery Program (CLEAR) is a collaboration of seven suppression and criminal justice agencies across jurisdictional boundaries including the Los Angeles Mayor's Office, District Attorney, LAPD, the Sheriff's Department, Probation Department, City Attorney and California Department of Corrections Parole. This high level City-County-State collaboration model was unique in the Advancement Project's survey of gang reduction programs. The co-location of representatives of the five City and County law enforcement agencies facilitates coordination, joint planning, and collaboration. The team also engages community stakeholders in identifying quality of life issues through the formation of Community Impact Teams. CLEAR is currently located in six targeted geographic areas with high concentrations of gang violence.

CLEAR presents the possibility that multi-jurisdictional collaboration can contribute to achieving neighborhood safety. Moreover, the role of law enforcement is even more enhanced when CLEAR's model of coordinated suppression tactics is integrated into a comprehensive prevention and intervention strategy such as the Gang Reduction Program being implemented in Boyle Heights.

**g. CLASS Parks**

The Los Angeles City Department of Recreation and Parks created a program called Clean and Safe Spaces (CLASS) parks in the fall of 2000 as a part of a community revitalization effort. Initially, CLASS parks were focused on the relatively narrow and park-focused mission of providing a clean and safe outdoor gathering place for communities. Over time, however, CLASS parks evolved and expanded into a youth development centered mission that emphasizes asset building and creating linkages between youth and communities. CLASS parks operates in 47 of the 175 City parks.

This initiative is particularly important, because it shows how a traditional City department with a massive share of City resources re-deployed its facilities as strategic assets for building the City's youth development infrastructure and contributing to community revitalization. This reorientation occurred because the department's leadership became concerned about neighborhood conditions in high crime areas, and broadened Recreation and Parks' mission to address the violence that interfered with public enjoyment of the department's facilities. This kind of mission transformation will be necessary in other City departments. Every department will have to bring its resources to bear on the solutions to gangs and violence and on the mission of achieving better outcomes for the children and youth of our City. Although many in the Department of Recreation and Parks still would rather see their mission narrowly defined to the "brick and mortar" of maintaining parks facilities, CLASS parks has gained the support of the Department's leadership and is leading the way in engaging public, private and research entities to promote the healthy development of youth.

These and other promising practices within the City offer examples of the engagement and collaboration with communities, multi-jurisdictional coordination, data driven planning, and mission alignment that research shows is necessary to keep safe areas safe, return slipping areas to safe conditions, keep tipping point communities from tipping and in high crime areas, aggressively counter the conditions that permit violence and gangs to flourish. Yet these localized and siloed efforts will not be able to adequately address what is a citywide and regional problem. Their effectiveness is limited because they address a small geographic area, as in the case of CLEAR and GRP, and may push violence into other areas that do not have the same infusion of resources, or because their efforts are not leveraged and coordinated with other resources, as in the case of CLASS parks. Sustainability is a challenge for transformative efforts at places like Rampart Division and Santee High School when the entrenched norms and culture of the broader institutions do not change. Finally and most importantly, these efforts by themselves are no match for the complexity and the scale of the problem of violence in our communities.

#### **IV. From Elements to Completion: What's Needed to Implement A Comprehensive Gang Activity Prevention and Reduction Strategy in LA**

##### **A. A Strong Political Mandate to Move from Small Scale Programs to the Comprehensive Model**

The greatest failure of the City's approach to gang reduction is that it fails to offer a comprehensive system with the capacity to reduce gang activity and violence. It does not work with neighborhoods and schools through highly coordinated, research-based programs that are jointly carried out by the residents, City, County, and school district to end the conditions that fuel gang membership and violence. As a result, the City has no ability to deliver timely prevention and intervention services to children most exposed to the dangers of violent neighborhood conditions, or any capacity to reverse gang expansion.

##### ***Current Practice that Blocks Achievement of this Element:***

When confronted with a large, complex issue, the common City practice is to quickly respond with a small, non-research based program that fits existing budget constraints, instead of developing the systemic approach that will be needed to solve the problem.<sup>76</sup> In addition, political imperatives dictate avoiding difficult issues that require changes in City operations, or taking on long term problems that cannot deliver short term credit.

##### **B. Comprehensive Solutions Must Address the Scale of the Problem**

In the Phase I Report, AP set out the consequences of the City's failure to design gang prevention and intervention programs in reference to estimated numbers of youth in gangs, youth engaged in chronic delinquency, and other cohorts of troubled adolescents and children.<sup>77</sup> If programs do not contemplate the scale of the problem, it is not possible to determine whether programs reduce gangs, abate violence or improve conditions for children.

##### ***Current Practice that Blocks Achievement of this Element:***


Almost all programs operated and administered by the City to address gang activity reduction are too small and isolated to impact the scale of the problem.

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<sup>76</sup> See "City of Los Angeles Gang Activity Reduction Strategy – Phase I Report," July 2006, pp. 5-9.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid, p. 5.

Figure 4: Scale of the Problem



The only City program that directly targets gang members and gangs receives less than \$4 million a year. This solitary City investment into hardcore gang intervention is the equivalent of spending 31 cents a day per gang member. The City spends more (\$4.8 million) to provide care and shelter for animals.<sup>78</sup> The sum total specifically budgeted for gang prevention and intervention programs is \$25.8 million.<sup>79</sup> That is less than \$90 per year for each of the almost 300,000 children living in high gang crime areas—or about 24 cents a day. LAPD estimates that the City has 40,000 gang members. Yet, the City’s targeted efforts at reducing gang activity, only reach 8,800 youth. Of these, only 1,400 or so receive intensive case management towards exiting gangs. There are 720 gangs in the City. But there are only 61 gang intervention workers in the streets.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>78</sup> City of Los Angeles, “Budget for the Fiscal Year 2006-07,” April 2006, p. 32. The \$4.8 million figure represents Animal Services expenditures on Field Operations.

<sup>79</sup> City Administrative Officer (CAO), Chief Legislative Analyst (CLA), “Report Back on Gang Prevention and Intervention Survey,” April 8, 2005.

<sup>80</sup> Community Development Department, “Report Back Regarding The Needs for Gang Violence-Related Services,” August 7, 2006.

### **C. Comprehensive Solutions Must Address the Regional Nature of the Problem**

Violence and the conditions that breed violence in Los Angeles are a regional problem. Crime, gangs, and violence do not stop at City or County jurisdictional boundaries. Neighborhoods that have rival gangs contesting territory routinely overlap both City and County boundaries, particularly in the East Los Angeles, Watts and Pacoima areas. Many school attendance areas straddle City/County boundaries. Children and youth are involved with multiple systems across cities, the County and school districts. For example, there are over 6,000 children in the City involved in foster care and over 2,000 City youth involved with County Probation, but few City programs prioritize or track how many foster and probation youth they serve even though these youth are often the highest risk cases for violence or gang membership.<sup>81</sup>

#### *Current Practice that Blocks Achievement of this Element:*

City programs are rarely planned or implemented in ways that account for these cross-jurisdictional dynamics. Employees from disparate systems are not rewarded for multi-jurisdictional planning or joint ventures with other entities.

### **D. An Effective Execution of a Comprehensive Strategy Will Require Centralized Accountability with Sufficient Power**

The reason that City Councilmembers cannot get coherent answers to their questions about gang activity reduction is because no single City entity, employee or contractor is responsible for the leadership, design, and implementation of citywide gang reduction strategies or the coordination among all City efforts needed to combat gangs and gang violence. The scatter shot nature of City gang activity reduction efforts precludes accountability. And no current program or department has a strong enough political mandate, the requisite power, or command over resources to implement a citywide comprehensive gang activity reduction strategy. The City needs to create accountability for reducing gang violence through a powerful, entrepreneurial City entity with the institutional and political clout needed to streamline bureaucracy, command cooperation across City departments, external jurisdictions, and LAUSD, and execute neighborhood-based violence prevention and reduction plans. Without a sufficient robust political mandate, sustained institutional clout and resources, any new entity created to reduce gang activity and violence would become marginalized and isolated.

This entity also cannot be a traditional, risk averse bureaucracy. It will have to be entrepreneurial, meaning creative and agile, and it will need to be led by extraordinary talent with specialized expertise and broad political skills that the civil service system is unlikely to

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<sup>81</sup> Raw data from the Education Coordinating Council's *Data Match Results Los Angeles Unified School District, Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services, and Los Angeles County Probation Department*, April 2006. See also Councilmember Jose Huizar's motion (06-0824), April 12, 2006 and Report of the Chief Legislative Analyst, "Survey of City Departments That Service Youth In the Foster Care and Probation System," August 4, 2006.

provide. While many City employees offer expertise that should be welcome in the new entity, broad latitude to hire specific experts will be needed. The mission of this entity or department should embrace the needs of all communities and should be able to:

1. Keep **Safe Areas** Safe;
2. Pull **Sliding Communities with Emerging Violence** Back to Safety;
3. Strategic Intervention in **Areas at Tipping Point** to Achieve Safety; and
4. Saturate **Violent Hot Zones** to Achieve Stabilization and Pave the Road to Revitalization.

*Current Practice that Blocks Achievement of this Element:*

Obstacles include bureaucratic aversion to change, opposition to streamlining the bureaucracy, and fear of losing programs if siloed programs are merged into a larger strategic initiative.

**E. Mandatory Citywide Mission for All Departments**

Along with cross-jurisdictional efforts, all City departments will have to contribute to the mission of reducing community violence, including gang activity, citywide. The only effective way to compel existing departments to realign their resources to serve a new mission is through the budgetary approval process. The City should form a robust oversight entity that monitors City departments to achieve the goals of the comprehensive gang activity and violence reduction strategy.

*Current Practice that Blocks Achievement of this Element:*


Departments operate to achieve narrowly defined goals and currently do not see their resources and facilities as strategic assets in a citywide gang activity and violence reduction mission that leads to community revitalization. As a result, even when departments operate programs with the potential to improve conditions in the community, the efforts are siloed and ineffective.

**F. Streamlined Bureaucracy and Effective Intra-Departmental Coordination**

Under a coherent citywide strategy, coordinated programs should reduce bureaucratic duplication and conflict, and improve the results of gang activity and violence reduction strategies at the neighborhood level. Improved communication, and well established venues for collaboration and coordination should increase the impact of current dollars expended.

**Page 45: Diagram of City and County Programs**

# Diagram of City and County Programs





*Current Practice that Blocks Achievement of this Element:*

There is no consistent coordination between the programs shown in the diagram and it is common to find two programs working with the same target population not having joint strategic planning, let alone sustained communication. These programs often compete with each other for annual funding and turf issues undermine any sustained effort at coordination.

**G. Develop Reliable Data, Good Research, and Evaluation through the Creation of an Independent “Research, Evaluation, and Policy Institute”**

The City must obtain good data, which currently, it does not have. Definitions of gang, gang membership, and gang crime are incompatible across the region and inconsistent with best research. Interventions and programs are repeatedly designed without reference to important research on trends and patterns in local communities, and often reflect commonly held notions of youth development or political needs rather than what research shows as best or promising practices. All efforts to reduce gang activity and neighborhood violence must have competent data collection, fair metrics, and appropriate evaluation built in, in order to accurately assess performance and impact. Reliable data, competent evaluation and expert research would also enable the City to produce cutting edge research of its own.

A regional body that provides expert data collection, protocols, database maintenance, research, evaluation and policy analysis, and that coordinates with City data personnel will greatly aid these goals and ensure reliable evaluation and real accountability.

*Current Practice that Blocks Achievement of this Element:*

The region’s various gang intervention and law enforcement agencies resist standardizing protocols for data collection, data definitions, metrics standards and joint analysis with outside experts. Most entities also resist discussing data problems or suggestions by research that current policies may be counter-productive.

**H. Solutions Must Address Each Neighborhood’s Conditions**

Somewhat counterintuitive to the notion that violence and gangs are a regional problem is the equally important need to conduct a neighborhood by neighborhood assessment, develop specific violence prevention plans with neighborhood leaders, County providers and school officials. Two factors necessitate this. First, it is the negative conditions in neighborhoods and families that fuel the formation and sustain the operations of street gangs.<sup>82</sup> Gangs develop in a specific, local community context with specific ethnic, cultural and social norms, and develop symbiotic relationships with the community. In addition, traditional gangs not only identify themselves with certain neighborhoods but also vigorously defend “their turf.” Given the distinct make-up of neighborhoods throughout Los Angeles, any

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<sup>82</sup> Klein and Maxson, p. 237.

attempts to specifically target community factors contributing to gang formation will require a neighborhood level understanding and strategy. Second, the importance of community involvement, particularly in developing what experts have termed “collective efficacy,”<sup>83</sup> or the capacity of a community to mobilize, organize and exercise control over what happens in the neighborhood, cannot be overstated. In this sense, it is critical for community stakeholders to be actively engaged in identifying the problem and community resources and in implementing a solution. Successful gang reduction requires focus on the local neighborhood conditions and dynamics that spawn and sustain gangs.

The challenge for each community with troubled youth in gangs is how to transform community conditions so that no child is forced into destructive lifestyles and to create alternatives so compelling that no child chooses to enter a gang.

*Current Practice that Blocks Achievement of this Element:*

City approaches to this problem focus primarily on suppression, injunctions, and arrests. Some law enforcement factions oppose investment in prevention and intervention on the grounds that gang members are not “redeemable.” Too little research on competent approaches to gangs informs City gang reduction strategies, so neighborhood conditions have never become the focus of City programs.

**I. Bureaucratic Culture Must Be Transcended**

The entity that is charged with the mission of preventing and reducing gang violence will have to be agile, creative, unafraid to find new answers, and unafraid to learn from its mistakes.

*Current Practice that Blocks Achievement of this Element:*

While traditional bureaucracy can help achieve higher levels of coordination among gang activity reduction programs, the constraints and incentive structures of traditional bureaucracies would prevent them from leading a comprehensive violence reduction strategy. In addition to the innate bureaucratic resistance to change and aversion to risk, missing from all bureaucracies are the regulatory freedom and the mission-driven, “can do” outlook. Current City programs are siloed and small, while problems are entrenched and big. Moreover, programs are designed to acknowledge but not solve the larger problem. Yet, political leaders and the public demand that the problems be solved with minimal investment into limited programs. With unstable funding, every program fights to retain its funding. The civil service system sometimes prevents the deployment of people with the most relevant expertise into leadership positions. Innovation and evaluation, except in a few cases, is not encouraged because failure, in the context of turf driven dynamics, means loss of funding. All of these dynamics have persisted in the City

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<sup>83</sup> Sampson, Robert J., Raudenbush, R. W., Earls, Felton, “Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy,” *Science* 277, August 1997, pp. 918-925.

over many administrations and now have become barriers to even thinking about doing things differently.

**J. Reap the Prevention Dividend: Substantially Increase Investment in Gang Prevention Programs and Create a Prevention Network Reaching Children and Youth of All Ages**

Comprehensive gang activity reduction approaches will require the City to substantially increase its investment in prevention programs. It is important to increase the impact of existing resources and programs that reduce violent conduct and other destructive behavior by strategically linking existing programs, networks and assets, and using best prevention practices in neighborhood-based strategies. Most current gang prevention programs focus on older children and adolescents, but in neighborhoods with entrenched, multi-generation gang cultures that have gang membership as a social norm, it is critical to reach very young children with focused gang prevention programs to counter that norm. In addition, most programs focus on males, which is important to do. But with the rapid increase in the rate at which girls are joining gangs, it is extremely important to develop a strong set of programs targeted and focused on the unique strategies needed to divert girls from destructive or violent choices.

*Current Practice that Blocks Achievement of this Element:*

The little investment that is made into violence prevention is heavily allocated toward suppression. As noted in the Phase I report, of the \$82 million CAO and CLA identified as gang reduction spending in the City, \$56 million or nearly 68 percent of the total investment was in suppression efforts.<sup>84</sup> While increased law enforcement capacity is needed to achieve citywide public safety, the failure to invest as heavily in competent prevention programs precludes reaping the prevention dividend: for every dollar spent on prevention, seven dollars are saved in future violence related costs.<sup>85</sup> In addition, current programs fail to focus on young children and girls in high gang activity areas.

**K. Substantially Increase Investment in Improved, Hard Core Gang Intervention**

While a larger focus on community conditions, delinquency and other destructive or violent youth behavior should be pursued to change community norms and remove the grist for gangs, the best research finds that reducing gang activity requires “very careful targeting of programs and clients” with specific focus on the unique culture of particular gangs.<sup>86</sup> Effective gang prevention and reduction strategies also will require substantially increased investment in, and improved training and oversight for gang intervention programs that are linked to jobs and wrap-around activities that create safe exit ramps out of gangs. Important aspects of neighborhood gang activity reduction strategies and violence prevention strategies require dealing with hard core gang members. The only credible, authentic and effective interveners with hard core gang members are former members. After careful consideration

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<sup>84</sup> CAO, CLA, “Report Back on Gang Prevention and Intervention Survey,” April 8, 2005.

<sup>85</sup> Karoly, Lynn A., et al, *Investing in Our Children*, RAND, 1999.

<sup>86</sup> See Appendix 5, Gang Prevention and Intervention: Cheryl Maxson.

of the research that documents how some hard core intervention tactics and some crime fighting strategies actually have increased the cohesion of traditional gangs and their activity, the City should invest in a well designed infrastructure to support productive gang intervention activity and intervention workers. The professionalization, education, compensation and support systems needed to further develop this cadre of former gang members and ex-offenders who will continue to be needed throughout the region. Rigorous protocols for oversight and fair evaluation of intervention activities need to be developed to ensure the integrity of the controls and checks needed to reduce the risks of this kind of work.

*Current Practices that Block Achievement of this Element:*

The current gang intervention effort is under funded and, therefore, can only reach 3 percent of gang members in the City and 25 percent of gangs. In addition, gang intervention programs are straddled with additional programmatic components that are not adequately compensated. Oversight, at times, appears lax and unable to provide adequate technical assistance.

**L. New Funding and the Regional Strategy**

Achieving the scale and the coordination required to carry out comprehensive neighborhood violence reduction plans is a daunting task in a region as large and as diverse as Los Angeles. Marshalling the resources necessary to match the scale of the problem will require time. The number of independent jurisdictions in the region, including the City of Los Angeles, County of Los Angeles, LAUSD, 100 other school districts, and 88 cities, means that a regional strategy will require replicating the coordination and cooperation of the joint task forces that the region's various law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies have already established. Therefore, initial steps toward a solution must begin with the City considering its role in this context and making the necessary changes to eventually become a part of a regional strategy that other entities will join.

In the following sections, this report sets out the framework needed to move toward neighborhood-based, comprehensive and integrated prevention, intervention, and suppression strategies.

## **V. Options for Levels of Response to Gang Activity and Neighborhood Violence**

In order to reduce gang activity and violence in high crime areas and inhibit the growth of these problems into new areas, this report recommends that the City move from a small scale gang prevention paradigm to a comprehensive neighborhood public health model. The comprehensive model will require a highly skilled team of experts in City operations, budgets, gang and violence prevention, and other areas to chart operations and implementation steps. The changes needed in the City's systems and practices to achieve the transition must be implemented in phases because the level of transformation requires long term commitment.

If the City declines the recommended paradigm shift, there are other options that can at least improve the current limited programmatic model. The following matrix sets out a seven level spectrum of those options that offer escalating levels of response, impact, and scale.

### **Page 51: Options for Levels of Response to Gang Activity and Neighborhood Violence**

## Options for Levels of Response to Gang Activity and Neighborhood Violence

	Level 1	Level 2	Level 3	Level 4	Level 5	Level 6	Level 7
<b>Approach to Problem</b>	Let the problem fester.	Disconnected programs assigned to existing department not designed for violence prevention. Funding not to scale.	All of Level 2, plus a Gang Taskforce to increase intra and inter departmental coordination. Funding and programs are still not to scale.	End ad hoc approach and create a department designed to reduce gang and other violence through citywide neighborhood-based revitalization strategies. Implement strategy in hot zones.	All of Level 4, plus develop a regional strategy and entity that move beyond violence stabilization to violence reduction. Create neighborhood action plans.	City entity works with regional entity and neighborhoods to achieve coordinated, funded programs and services that produce results that can be seen and felt in formerly violent neighborhoods.	Achieve citywide public safety.
<b>Goals of Approach</b>	No goals.	Reach a small percentage of youth with scattered prevention and intervention services without proof of results.	Attempting to coordinate existing programs to patch gaps in communication and collaboration by forming a Gang Taskforce. Higher quality of programs achieved through better coordination, but no increase in the number of youth reached.	Violence stabilization in hot zones. Restructure current resources into one City entity to coordinate services. A majority of children in hot zones will receive prevention services. Qualitative and quantitative evaluations of programs for constant improvement.	Improved school performance and reduced drop out rates. Move beyond violence stabilization to violence reduction by creating jobs for young people and expanding intervention and prevention services. Close entrance ramps and create exit ramps for youth into and out of gangs. Creation of new entity to manage funding and regional coordination.	Significant reductions in violence in high crime zones, gang presence recedes. Increased programming reaches almost 100% of young people. Move to a standard that provides basic safety in most neighborhoods.	Lower hot zone crime rates to the City average rate. All children would have access to constructive and healthy alternatives and would not be at risk of witnessing violence. Organized communities that are full partners in revitalization. Stable funding stream.
<b>Consequences of Approach</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Not to scale</li> <li>• No strategy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Not to scale</li> <li>• Lack of substantive expertise in leadership</li> <li>• Uncentralized, uncoordinated, and ad hoc efforts</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Not to scale</li> <li>• Only qualitative results</li> <li>• Insufficiently robust to develop community specific solutions.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Not to scale</li> <li>• Implemented only in high crime areas with partial reach to at risk youth</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Not fully to scale</li> <li>• Implemented in high and emerging crime areas</li> <li>• Insufficient funding for need</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Not all neighborhoods are 100% safe from violent gang crime</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Completely to scale</li> </ul>
<b>Scale</b>	Not to scale.	Fewer than 5% of gang members reached for intervention. Less than 7% of the almost 300,000 children living in high gang crime areas receive prevention services.	Same scale reached as Level 2, but quality of programs is higher and more focused because of coordination.	Reach at least 40% of high risk youth for intervention services and 25% of at risk youth for prevention services.	Reach at least 75% of high risk youth for intervention services and 50% of at risk youth for prevention services.	Reach at least 90% of high risk youth for intervention services and 100% of at risk youth for prevention services.	100% of youth in need of services would have access to prevention and intervention programs.
<b>Structure</b>	None.	Traditional department.	Gang Taskforce—slightly improved coordination	Entrepreneurial department with oversight.	Planning of regional and neighborhood strategy. New entity for regional collaboration and funding management.	Regional and neighborhood strategy in place.	Regional and neighborhood strategy.
<b>Funding</b>	Only suppression.	Insufficient and unbalanced.	Insufficient to need. Taskforce has no authority over funds.	Restructure existing resources. Insufficient funding for need.	Plan for dedicated stream of funding.	Dedicated funding stream.	Dedicated, stable funding stream.
<b>Evaluation</b>	None.	No evaluation, data collection, or database planning.	Incorporated with limited data	Improved data collection and evaluation.	Permanent research entity within regional body.	Permanent research entity within regional body.	Permanent research entity within regional body.
<b>Community</b>	No engagement.	Hot zones are riddled with violent crime.	No change in community.	Stabilization of crime in hot zones	Reduction in gang violence and membership in hot zones.	Significant reduction in hot zone crime rates. Most neighborhoods have basic safety.	Hot zones' crime levels at a Westside rate. Community in partnership with City and regional leaders.
<b>Youth</b>	No programs.	Some unevaluated programs available to limited numbers of youth.	Slightly higher quality programs for limited numbers of youth.	Most young people in high crime areas have access to prevention programs.	High crime areas have access to coordinated intervention and prevention programs. Youth's school performance improves and drop out rates lessen.	All children in hot zones have access to intervention and prevention programs.	All children have access to constructive and healthy alternatives.

In the levels described, the Advancement Project places current City efforts at Level Two, where less than five percent of the estimated number of gang members receives any type of intervention services and less than seven percent of the almost 300,000 children living in high poverty, high gang crime zones receives prevention services. From this point to Level Seven, there are four options to consider. (At Level One, the City could opt to do nothing but suppression). We briefly discuss each of the option levels here and delve further into the detail of components of the options.

**A. Level Three: Improve Coordination within the City for Existing Programs. No Increase in Scale and Minimal Impact in Level of Neighborhood Violence.**

The third option, Level Three, contemplates the prospect of improved coordination within the existing programmatic and governance structure and does not envision matching the scale of the problem as outlined in this report. Under the leadership of a City “Gang Task Force,” the City would improve coordination among existing programs so that overt gaps in communication and failures to conduct easy and obvious collaboration end. One example of this may be how Bridges I programs coordinate with Youth Opportunities programs to ensure some continuity in service during the transition from middle to high school.

Coordination with non-City entities should also somewhat improve since it may be initiated by the Gang Task Force, but still diffused throughout the City programs. External evaluation and research would be incorporated to the extent possible with the limited data that is available. The number of children and youth served would not change a great deal, although more of those receiving services might benefit from improved quality. Impact on the levels of neighborhood violence would continue to be minimal to non-existent.

**B. Level Four: Beginning of the Paradigm Shift – Targeted at Hot Zones. Creation of City Entity with the Ability to Measure Impact by use of Quality Data and Strategic Research.**

Level Four envisions implementation of a comprehensive neighborhood level prevention, intervention, and suppression strategy in the hot zones with the goal of violence stabilization in those areas. To achieve this, existing resources would be restructured and pooled into a single City entity with the authority and the capacity to initiate a highly coordinated service delivery model that works with schools and a few other external institutions as needed. The significantly increased levels of program and strategy coordination with schools, and the planned joint action with the Department of Recreation and Parks that should occur at this level, should result in the majority of children in these hot zones having access to meaningful prevention opportunities. In addition to working closely with neighborhood schools, the City also would initiate and maintain neighborhood level coordination with County juvenile justice departments, child welfare and mental health agencies for high-risk youth and their families.

Strategic research, data collection, and evaluation would yield performance measures and an internal data tracking system. The goal would be to reach at least 40 percent of the high-risk

youth and 25 percent of the at-risk children and youth in the City resulting in some stabilization of violence and reductions in gang membership over time.<sup>87</sup>

**C. Level Five: Moving from Violence Stabilization to Reduction. Citywide Expansion of Prevention and Intervention Infrastructure and Planning towards a Regional Strategy with a New Funding Stream.**

Level Five would broaden the basic infrastructure established in Level Four to implement prevention and intervention citywide, and maintain the comprehensive model level of coordination in neighborhoods. The goal at this level is to move beyond violence stabilization to violence reduction that leads to relatively low levels of gang presence, and then on to creating the infrastructure that will move the community and its residents to revitalization. At this level, the planning needed to create jobs as part of a regional economic development plan would be designed, so that even the most economically deprived and marginalized neighborhoods are set onto a path of physical revitalization, would be set in motion. Additionally, new streams of funding will be needed, such as a countywide measure to create a dedicated stream of funding for violence prevention and youth development. The initiative also should create a new regional entity that would administer the new stream of funding and manage multi-jurisdictional collaboration within the region. A permanent research entity would reside within the new regional entity to develop strategic partnerships with universities and other research institutions in the area around youth development and violence prevention.

The services would expand in capacity to reach 75 percent of highest risk youth and 50 percent of at-risk youth in the City. Reduction in gang violence and gang membership would result even in the hot spots, and communities should see improved school performances and reduced drop-out rates.

**D. Level Six: Working toward Citywide Public Safety. Implementation of a Regional Strategy.**

The City, as part of a regional strategy that proactively staunches emerging trends in violence and douses conditions that incubate threats, would move onto a standard that provides basic safety in most neighborhoods and provides drastically reduced levels of shootings and other violence in violent crime hot zones, such that they would look like today's communities that have tagging crews and one or two low level gangs engaged in non-violent gang activity.

Level Six would achieve stability and significant reductions in violence in high crime zones, see citywide gang presence significantly recede, and would begin to document reductions in gang recruitment and violence even for the five percent of gangs that are the most virulent, violent and entrenched. Coordinated comprehensive prevention, intervention and suppression strategies would reach 90 percent of highest risk youth and 100 percent of at-risk and other children trapped in high crime zones.

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<sup>87</sup> These are suggested goals for the city to reach, but requires further research with improved data or variables.



## **E. Level Seven: Safety and Vitality Ensured for All Children. Citywide Public Safety.**

The final option, Level Seven, would see today's average City crime rates in all current low crime neighborhoods, and the City would no longer be the gang capital of the nation. All children and youth in the region would have access to constructive and healthy alternatives and no child in any neighborhood would face high risk of witnessing or experiencing violent attacks—in contrast to the 90 percent of children in high crime zones who face that risk today. Communities would be organized and capable of exercising control over youth violence and become full partners in community revitalization efforts. The City and the region would be able to accomplish these goals because there is a stable and dedicated stream of funding to ensure the safety and vitality of all children, youth, and families. In short, LA would no longer see today's routinely high neighborhood violence levels, and the City's long term gang homicide epidemic would be over.

**The options from Level Three to Level Six should be viewed as steps in a process building toward stabilization and violence reduction, not as stand alone strategies. The limited measures in Level Three, for example, represent the first step to achieving Level Seven but should not be viewed as final goals.** The general idea is to set clear, measurable goals for reducing violence, reducing gang activity, and increasing the application of effective prevention, early childhood prevention, youth development, and hard core gang intervention programs citywide. The options also present a strategy of getting the City reorganized and ready to engage the County and other regional entities in regional efforts that eventually will be needed to end the full scope of gang and neighborhood violence. The regional effort also will need leadership in developing new streams of funding and in sustaining the new coordinated way of doing business.

## **VI. The Governance and Accountability Structure**

### **A. Leadership: The “Gang Czar”**

Many are calling for a “Gang Czar.” In light of the sad demise of the real Czars, and the abject failure of every federal “Drug Czar,” we are reluctant to use that title.<sup>88</sup> But the larger point is well taken: there is no doubt that the leadership of any effective gang and violence reduction enterprise will need to be high powered, have extraordinary political skills, and a Michael Jordan-like ability to transcend the drag of torpid bureaucracies. S/he will have to galvanize staff, other City departments, LAPD, the Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles (HACLA), the Community Redevelopment Agency of the City of Los Angeles (CRA/LA), LAUSD, foster care, Probation, County service agencies, LASD and dozens of other governmental agencies to jointly design with neighborhood residents the comprehensive, saturation strategies needed to prevent violence and gang activity from reaching safe areas, and to significantly reduce them in the hot zones.

In addition to forging this new King Arthur's Roundtable joint venture method of doing business, the leadership of this new department or entity, along with the Mayor and City

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<sup>88</sup> It also perpetuates the sole focus on the gang, which the best research and programs show is a mistake.

Council, will have to rally participation and contributions from the civic, philanthropic, business, academic, celebrity, and media/entertainment sectors. These resources will be essential to launch a strategically framed, permanent, public campaign against violence and to create a civic anti-violence infrastructure that deploys the scores of great resources in this region—from its universities and think tanks to the Getty and Museum of Tolerance.

The leadership also will have to have a command of the evolving policy debates about data, evaluation, violence as a public health epidemic, hard core gang intervention, crime fighting theory, child development, community fortification and many other unsettled substantive areas that determine whether the right methods and metrics are used to document real results in reducing violence and gang activity.

In short, the director and top staff of this new entity are unlikely to be found on a civil service list.

Charismatic, mission-driven, results-oriented leadership will be required. However, transformative talent at the top will not be enough. Great leadership of an entity whose structure and position in the bureaucracy are too weak to execute the mission will guarantee continued failure.

## **B. Structure and Power: What Kind of Entity is Needed?**

The power needed to carry out a mandate to end gang violence and execute multi-jurisdictional, interdisciplinary plans requires a governance structure that has enough muscle to command cooperation from other City departments and external entities. The entity created to achieve this mission will have to:

- **Streamline Bureaucracy:** The City must eliminate duplication and burdensome bureaucracy that hinders the development and implementation of a coordinated, effective, and efficient citywide strategy to violence prevention. Location of siloed efforts in multiple departments, often in competition with each other for funding, is unproductive and has minimal impact.
- **Show Results and Ensure Accountability:** The City must be able to show that competent plans are keeping safe areas safe and reducing violence, gang activity, and other destructive dynamics in areas that are not safe. The City must develop metrics systems that collect the right data and measure the right indicators of success.
- **Secure Cooperation and Participation from Other City Departments:** An effective citywide strategy to violence prevention requires the active participation of all City entities that are all striving to contribute to achieving the mission of ensuring safety and vitality of all children and youth.
- **Maximize Impact From Current Expenditures:** The City's uncoordinated, unstrategic and small investments into dozens of disparate programs results in almost no neighborhood impact in sustained violence reduction. Given the prospect of the City's \$250 million

shortfall for 2007, this is a particularly good time to end the inefficient investment of taxpayer dollars into marginally effective, diffused efforts. Instead, the City's multiple streams of funding towards violence prevention needs to be pooled and focused under a citywide strategy while also being leveraged to create a more stable and robust funding mechanism.

- **Find and Develop Internal and External Expertise:** Because programs are spread throughout the City's multiple departments and entities, there has been no systematic effort to tap both internal and external expertise or to incorporate promising and best practices.
- **Collect and Use Good Data, Evaluation, and Performance Measures:** Related to the issue of accountability, the City must be able to demonstrate its impact in concrete measurable terms. This cannot be done without collecting uniform data and consistent utilization of such data to evaluate performance.
- **Centralize Coordination:** Timely, strategic and effective coordination among all City departments, neighborhood leaders and external offices will be a required way of operating.

#### **1. Governance and Structural Options for a New City Entity Charged with Neighborhood Safety**

There are several structural options to consider in thinking about a City entity that has sufficient clout and the right positioning within the bureaucratic line up to carry out these functions and meet the violence and gang activity reduction mandate.

- **Task Force or Committee:** A task force of representatives from the Mayor's office, relevant departments and other entities could be formed. Although such a task force may adequately coordinate between existing programs across departments, it lacks the capacity and the authority to mobilize and leverage citywide resources scattered across departments. Accountability remains a problem as each participating department maintains vertical authority over their individual programs. A task force also could not effect coordination with and among non-City agencies, since they would still have to work through many different departments. A task force is an efficient structure for temporary initiatives, but less effective for long term problem solving. For example, a task force can lead the initial process to develop a more permanent structure, including the search for a leader. **However, a task force is not robust enough for an on-going, sustained transformation of how the City addresses a problem as entrenched as community violence and gangs.**

The limitations of a task force can be seen in Boston's task force-like working group that launched their Operation Ceasefire campaign. This working group successfully launched and sustained its effort over several years during which juvenile violence and crime rates plunged. However, when police leaders left the Working Group, it disbanded, the trust that was key to the success disappeared, the City's resources were diverted to other efforts, and the group lost its coordination capacity. The result was the resurgence of youth violence and homicide rates.

- **Non-Profit:** The City's sole example of a fully networked entity is LA's Best, which is an independent non-profit organization that provides after school enrichment programs. There are many merits to the non-profit approach. As an independent entity somewhat removed from the politics and bureaucratic structures of City government, a non-profit is nimble and flexible enough to implement innovative and experimental strategies. By its very nature, non-profits draw from multiple funding sources and envision an internal capacity to work with both the public and the private sector. As an entity somewhat independent of jurisdictional turf issues, a non-profit also can offer neutral ground where multiple governmental entities can work together.

However, its independence also is the non-profit's Achilles heel. While a strong, effective leader can produce exemplary results from a non-profit-government venture, **because it lies outside of the power structure of the City, ultimately, it lacks the authority and the institutional power to mobilize resources or mandate cooperation from the City and its departments.** Non-profits like LA's Best offer a compelling example of effective program delivery and innovative problem solving. But a non-profit agency does not have any ability to transform how the City performs from the inside. In addition, although the ability to garner private sector and philanthropic dollars is greater with a non-profit, a citywide strategy towards ensuring neighborhood safety will require public streams of funding already existing within the City.

- **Commission:** There are several commissions within the City, each with a different mission. Existing commissions are focused on a particular area of expertise and policy that would otherwise not be systematically addressed in other City departments such as the Commission on the Status of Women and the Human Relations Commission. The Commission of Children, Youth, and their Families, among all of the commissions, has the most expansive mission and oversees several venues, including the annual Children, Youth, and their Families Budget and the Interagency Taskforce for Kids (IT4K), for collaboration across City departments on issues related to children and youth. **While the commissions hold the potential to be a much more powerful structure, particularly with the integration of a broad sector of stakeholders as commissioners, commissions as they exist now lack the power and the authority to mobilize the cooperation of other departments.** This is partly attributable to the fact that the limited funding allocated to each commission supports only minimal capacity. In addition, there is no mechanism in place to hold other City departments accountable for the policy agendas of the commissions.<sup>89</sup>
- **Traditional City Department:** Most of the City's work occurs under traditional City departments that are managed by appointed officials and staffed by employees covered by the civil service system. Departments are either created by charter or by ordinance. Some are overseen by part-time, full-time, or advisory citizen commissions, in addition to reporting to the Mayor and the City Council. Within the culture of LA City

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<sup>89</sup> See Appendix 12, Governance Structures, "Governance Categories for Analysis of Structures and Options for Gang Reduction Study."

government, only departments command the joint attention of the Council and the Mayor's office, receive the lion's share of focus and money during the budgetary process, can seek responses from other City departments, and engage in inter-governmental activity at a high level. **However, the traditional City department is saddled with unconnected silos, incentive structures and risk averse culture that are formidable barriers to carrying out a creative, comprehensive prevention and intervention based citywide neighborhood strategy.**<sup>90</sup>

- **Proprietary City Department:** Citizen commissions oversee each of the three proprietary City departments: Airports, Water and Power, and Harbor. These entities are semi-autonomous both in governance and fiscal management. These entities operate critical assets in the City and are revenue generating. **The proprietary department structure is inappropriate for youth development and gang violence reduction strategy as these are not money generating activities.**
- **Entrepreneurial Department with Oversight and Advisory Board:** An entrepreneurial department represents a hybrid structure that would combine the power and institutional advantage of a department and the agility, creativity, results-orientated and mission-driven culture of effective non-profits and businesses. It would be created through ordinances that free it from unnecessary bureaucratic constraints and allow it to hire expert City and outside staff, and freely use technology in ways existing departments cannot. It would be monitored and overseen by a permanent oversight committee, and given policy guidance by an expert "Board of Advisors." Most importantly, it would be given an expedited, emergency mission of substantially reducing gang violence through comprehensive neighborhood strategies. And it would be designed with rigorous evaluation frameworks that will determine strategy impact. This entrepreneurial department should have a "perform or end" sunset clause: if after ten years the entrepreneurial department fails to show results, it should be ended.

Because traditional bureaucracies are not designed for rapid response, innovative, and cross-jurisdictional enterprises or suited to solving large scale entrenched problems, alternative structures like the entrepreneurial department become necessary. A concrete example of these dynamics can be drawn from the experience of LAUSD and its need to mount a massive school construction enterprise to build schools for over 80,000 students without seats. For 20 years, the District, a traditional and ponderous bureaucracy, failed to develop the comprehensive strategy that was needed to mount the largest school construction enterprise in the country. The solution came when innovative leadership from outside of the District created a quasi-independent, agile, rapid-response, expertly designed construction authority that was freed of District red-tape, given its own dedicated legal administrative and oversight functions, and freed to interact with State, County, and City and Federal jurisdictions without micromanagement from the District. Indeed, the new Superintendent recruited military personnel, specifically nine retired Navy engineers, as the high-powered, expert leadership, and managers of the complex and vast construction enterprise. District got

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<sup>90</sup> Sonenshein, Raphael J., *Los Angeles Structure of a City Government*, League of Women Voters of Los Angeles, 2006.


out of the way and competently executed its functions of eminent domain and oversight, but ceased the past, counterproductive micromanagement that produced the fiasco of the Belmont High School construction. As a result of creating an entrepreneurial, quasi-independent, and powerful entity, the LAUSD's construction enterprise went from catastrophic failure to the best-rated construction authority in the country. Voters who saw the competence passed State and local bonds exceeding \$21 billion dollars to fund the effort.

In summary, the task force, non-profit organization, and commission will not command sufficient influence to change internal City operations, sustain a long-term transformation of the City's violence and gang reduction efforts or operate effectively within a broader regional strategy. The traditional City department will not be able to break the decades of inertia which led to the current uncoordinated, unstrategic approach, and the proprietary department structure is inappropriate for a non-revenue generating activity.

The final structure, an entrepreneurial department with special oversight is a new entity with the institutional stature of a department, the added clout of a special oversight body charged with getting a high level of response and cooperation from other departments, and a creative, mission-driven culture that is the antithesis of traditional bureaucracy. It is this new, hybrid structure that this report recommends.

**Page 60: City Organizational Chart**

# City Organizational Chart



**a. Creating the Entrepreneurial Department with Oversight and an Advisory Board:**

In order to install the entrepreneurial department, the following issues should be addressed. The following measures are suggested as initial implementation steps:

**Oversight:**

- Designation of a New Deputy Mayor on Neighborhood Safety
- Formation of a Permanent Oversight Committee with Sufficient Clout to Ensure Cross-Departmental Mission Alignment

**Formation of the New City Department:**

- Measure Directing an Expert Action Committee Charged with Formation and Design of an Entrepreneurial Department for Neighborhood Safety
- Appointment of the Policy Advisory Board
- Appointment of Expert Teams to Develop a Research Institute, Gang Intervention Investment Plan and Public Campaign to End Violence
- Allocation of Resources to Support the Work of the Expert Action Committee and teams.
- Special Measures Creating the Exceptions and Waivers Needed for Entrepreneurial Operation
- Extension of Existing Service Contracts
- Evaluation Framework with Sunset Clause

**Policy Actions:**

- Policy Actions to Ensure Cross-Departmental Mission Alignment
- Policy Action for Expedited Job Creation
- A Measure Directing All Community Violence and Youth Development Related Legislation through the Entrepreneurial Department



## 1) Oversight

### **Designation of a New Deputy Mayor on Neighborhood Safety**

To ensure a clear line of accountability and sufficient attention to the mission, a Deputy Mayor or other equally or more powerful position needs to be created. Currently, public safety is a part of the Homeland Security portfolio. Public safety and homeland security obviously are related and should be closely linked at every level. However, each is a very demanding area. Homeland security—a job involving international, national, County, and City operations and millions of federal dollars waiting for programs—is an uncharted area still in formation, and needing 100 hours a week of attention from the Deputy Mayor of Homeland Security. Interviews with public safety and homeland security experts, City personnel, police officials and others establish that public safety has been overshadowed by the overwhelming effort to create new protocols, programs, policies and networks for homeland security. Similarly onerous hours will be required to meet the mandate of developing effective comprehensive strategies capable of drastically reducing neighborhood violence in hot spots and keeping safe communities safe. Assigning top leadership for each of the two missions would ensure that neighborhood safety will receive adequate attention and leadership in post 9/11 Los Angeles.<sup>91</sup>

### **Formation of a Permanent Oversight Committee with Sufficient Clout to Ensure Cross-Departmental Mission Alignment**

Both policy actions outlined above require a consistent and structured accountability structure. The Advancement Project recommends the establishment of a permanent Oversight Committee. The Committee would consist of representatives from:

- CAO;
- CLA;
- City Attorney Office;
- Deputy Mayor;
- Budget and Finance Committee;
- Public Safety Committee; and
- Ad Hoc Committee on Gang Violence and Youth Development.

This body would monitor and ensure that departments and City entities are complying with the policy actions set forth above. It is possible that the

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<sup>91</sup> New York Times, “Homeland Security vs. Hometown Security,” December 18, 2006.  
<<http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2006/12/18/homeland-security-vs-hometown-security/>>

“Expert Action Committee,” which will develop the new City department, transitions into this role with the addition of other members.

## **2) Formation of the New City Department**

### **Measure Directing an Expert Action Committee charged with Formation and Design of an Entrepreneurial Department for Gang Activity and Violence Reduction and Neighborhood Safety**

In order to implement the recommendation for a new department, the Advancement Project recommends a temporary Expert Action Committee. The Committee would include representatives from the Mayor’s office, the City Attorney, CAO, CLA, Ad Hoc Committee on Gang Violence and Youth Development, and external experts. The main charge of the Committee would be to develop the structure of the new department including its budget and staffing, and including the provision of exempt staff in key management positions, operational scope, and an implementation plan. The Committee, with outside help, also should conduct a search for a highly respected expert to head the new department.

Although final estimates of cost impact of the new department on the City are not available at this point and the work needs to be finalized, the Advancement Project anticipates that there will be start-up investment required to reorganize and establish the new department. However, projections indicate that the pooling of resources from existing departments and eliminating duplicative administrative functions spread out across several departments will result in cost-savings to the City over time.

Formation strategies could start with existing programs and commissions with the most salient areas of expertise: Community Development Department’s gang reduction programs and community development programs, the Commission on the Status of Women, Human Relations Commission, Commission on Children, Youth and their Families, LAPD, City Attorney’s Office, and others.

If the City concurs with this report’s recommendation to centralize and streamline programs addressing youth development, gang prevention and intervention, and family support services, then those resources should be pooled, coordinated and/or reorganized to function in the new service delivery system focused on gang activity reduction and achieving neighborhood safety.<sup>92</sup> At a second level, key departments and City-related entities with resources that more generally affect the neighborhood conditions that fuel

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
<sup>92</sup> In some of the cases that are identified in the Department of Neighborhood Safety Funding Chart, the City will need to work with decision making bodies, such as the Workforce Investment Board and funding sources, to facilitate the streamlining of various funds.

gang activity, like the Department of Recreation and Parks and LA's Best, need to form a three-way partnership with the new department to develop a seamless system of prevention services for children, youth and young adults.

**Page 65: Department of Neighborhood Safety Organizational Chart**

**Page 66: Department of Neighborhood Safety Funding Chart**


# Department of Neighborhood Safety: Organizational Chart



\*Note, this chart does not include all administrative, clerical and fiscal staff

\*Note, CVPCs will expand over time requiring additional Regional Directors and CVPC staff.

# Department of Neighborhood Safety – Funding Chart



The new department will be headed by a General Manager and assisted by two Assistant General Managers, each in charge of a division:

- **Administrative Division:**

This division is responsible for fiscal, personnel, compliance, and other operational elements of the department. This division would also oversee all contracting processes and ensure that there is consistency and adequate oversight over contract compliance across specific funding streams.

- **Program Division:**

The Program Division will have two sections under its purview:

- a. Strategic Research and Initiatives**

This section would be responsible for coordinating uniform data elements and data collection procedures and tools that support targeted strategies to reduce gang activity and violence, more general strategies that use youth development activities to divert delinquent and other troubled youth away from gangs, and help develop early childhood gang prevention programs in neighborhoods with dominant gang cultures. This section also would convene a team of experts charged with conducting on-going analysis of data collected and annual evaluation of programs, and recommending programmatic improvements based on data. This section would interact with a regional independent Research, Evaluation, and Policy Institute.

Research, data and evaluation must be an integral component of the overall program implementation strategy and incorporated in every step from planning to implementation to evaluation. Without this integration, the City will repeat its past mistakes of creating programs that cannot be accurately evaluated.

In addition to surveying existing and developing research in the relevant fields, the department would also engage in research projects to develop innovative strategies toward gang activity and violence reduction, and removing neighborhood conditions that fuel both. A key element of the Strategic Research and Initiatives section would be to enhance internal City expertise on issues of human relations, child development, adolescent development, family violence prevention, prevention of violence against women and girls, reversing the levels of girls in gangs, as well as data collection strategies. The Strategic Research and Initiatives section would also collaborate with existing groups like the Violence Prevention Coalition of the UCLA Southern

California Injury Prevention Research Center and the current Youth and Gang Violence Intervention Specialist Training Program at the California State University, Los Angeles Pat Brown Institute to further professionalize gang intervention workers.

This section would also work on policy initiatives to enhance community health strategies that focus on the co-factors of violence and destructive behavior. Some appropriate areas of action include reducing access to guns, teen pregnancy prevention, education and prevention on AIDS/HIV and STDs.

#### **b. Comprehensive Services**

The specifics of a reorganized service delivery model are described below in greater detail. Structurally, the comprehensive services section would oversee several regional directors who in turn would oversee several geographic areas, identified along high school clusters. Within each high school cluster, the City will operate and manage a “Community Violence Prevention Center” (CVPC) where a comprehensive strategy for violence prevention and youth development will be developed with community leaders. The leadership of the Program Division will also manage coordination and collaboration with County agencies, school districts, and other relevant external entities.

Finally, two specialized offices will handle citywide policy issues. The “Office of Family Violence Prevention” would oversee specific violence prevention programs related to domestic violence, sexual assault, and girls in gangs or at-risk of joining gangs. The “Office of Legal Affairs” will offer public education on expungement of records, gang injunction related legal issues including procedures to properly remove names from injunctions and gang data bases, understanding and navigating the juvenile justice system for youth and their families, how to prevent youth from entering the criminal justice system, and existing laws applicable to youth offenders.

#### **Appointment of the Policy Advisory Board**

Instead of a traditional commission that makes policy decisions, the entrepreneurial department should consult with a “Policy Advisory Board” who have expertise in all relevant areas, including gang intervention, gang prevention, violence as a public health problem, youth development, mental health services, law enforcement, job creation, community development, evaluation, and data collection.

### **Appointment of Expert Teams to Develop a Research Institute, Gang Intervention Investment Plan and Public Campaign to End Violence**

While the Expert Action Committee will be moving forward with work of determining the formation of a new structure for streamlining City's existing programs, three other expert groups will need to be appointed to simultaneously develop plans for the three key elements of the strategy:

- **Research, Evaluation, and Policy Institute:** Beyond the issue of structure, the City's new strategy must be guided by the best data and research, and have the capacity to conduct reliable evaluation from the beginning. This element cannot be an after thought but must occur from the very onset of a new strategy.
- **Gang Intervention Investment Plan:** Any strategy that the City adopts must consider how best to expand and deploy gang intervention resources to minimize the impact of existing gangs and gang members. A gang intervention investment plan will include a realistic assessment of resources needed, program design and standardization, and evaluation strategies.
- **Public Campaign to End Violence:** Broader community engagement is a key piece in many of the successful violence prevention strategies mentioned above. As the City attempts to build momentum toward improving its current efforts, it will also need to contemplate how to bring forth support and participation from the diverse communities of Los Angeles.

### **Allocation of Resources to Support the Work of the Expert Action Committee**

The Expert Action Committee and expert teams will require funds to engage external experts and to commission any additional research that must be conducted.

### **Special Measures Creating the Exceptions and Waivers Needed for Entrepreneurial Operation**

The new department will need exemptions from operational regulations that can hinder its ability to utilize all of the resources and tools necessary to tackle the enormous issue of community violence and gangs. Some of these exemptions will include but not be limited to the department's ability to hire civil service exempt staff, to hire professional services, to manage communication, and to build partnerships with non-City entities.



### **Extension of Existing Service Contracts**

The Expert Action Committee will need time to research and develop the formation plan for the new City entity. During this time, which the Advancement Project anticipates will be between a six to nine month period, the City must avoid creating gaps in delivery of services by extending existing contracts with service providers. The most relevant program to be affected by this process will be LA Bridges I and II, but there may be others also similarly impacted.

### **Evaluation Framework with Sunset Clause**

The entrepreneurial department's efforts should be designed with a rigorous evaluation framework that reviews the effectiveness of its efforts four and six years after launch, with a final evaluation of its effectiveness after ten years. If the new department has not demonstrated significant reductions in violence and gang activity in neighborhoods selected for comprehensive strategies, the City should end it.

## **3) Policy Actions:**

### **Policy Actions to Ensure Cross-Departmental Mission Alignment**

Although the reorganization of existing programs under a single City department and the appointment of a Deputy Mayor create more focus and coordination, the new department cannot house every effort in the City relevant to reducing gang activity and violence and ensuring safety and vitality of children, youth, and their families. For example, almost every department in the City has internship and skill development programs that could serve as opportunities for youth and young adults that seek a stable future away from gang life. Other departments seek to achieve physical revitalization, offer educational programs, enhance arts and culture, or build community civic infrastructure.

While the core missions of these departments will remain their main focus, ways to compel their participation in and contributions to a citywide mission of reducing gang activity and violence must be developed. In this regard, the Advancement Project recommends a policy action which will require all City departments to work with the new entrepreneurial department charged with gang activity reduction to develop resources and other contributions to the citywide mission of neighborhood violence reduction. The action would require each department to respond to the formulation of an "Annual Children, Youth, and Family Budget" with specific performance goals that are connected with the citywide comprehensive strategy. Allocation for those programs would then be reassessed on an annual basis depending on the

performance of achieving the goals set out during the previous year. Part of the performance measured would include the level of cooperation and coordination with the new City department.<sup>93</sup>

### **Policy Action for Expedited Job Creation**

The second policy action recommended revolves around the economic impact of the City's hiring and contracting capacity. The Ad Hoc Committee on Gang Violence and Youth Development as well as other City Council offices have already begun to examine the issue through pending motions and hearings. In the most recent Ad Hoc Committee meeting, Councilman Reyes noted that the City spends approximately \$1.4 billion on supplies, equipment and services, resulting in a \$3.5 billion impact on the region. Of this amount, 32 percent of \$1.1 billion flows to areas outside of Los Angeles County. Similarly, of the roughly 34,000 jobs created directly by the City's spending, over 10,700 were outside of Los Angeles County.<sup>94</sup>

The relationship between jobs and economic opportunities and violence reduction is clear. The City must do more to bring living wage jobs to those parts of the community where violence is rampant as is unemployment and poverty. The Advancement Project recommends diligent follow-up with the Ad Hoc Committee's request for the City Attorney to present a draft ordinance achieving a citywide policy for contracting and hiring that would prioritize local hiring, community benefits packages and set-aside quotas for high-risk youth and young adults.

On a related point, the Advancement Project recommends that the City review the possibility of eliminating or narrowing the scope of the criminal background question on applications for selected City positions allowing for youth and young adults with criminal records to qualify. A similar measure should also apply to City contracted services where appropriate. Not only does such a measure open up more opportunities for youth who are most in need of a job, but also makes program sense in specific circumstances. For example, as the gang intervention programs expand, the City will need to expand pool of trained gang intervention workers. As current practitioners in LA and Chicago have both remarked, gang intervention workers are most effective when they themselves have been in gangs and can gain street credibility based on that experience.

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<sup>93</sup> Los Angeles County has adopted a similar effort in the form of its "Performance Counts!"  
<<http://lacounty.info/Performance%20Counts.htm>>

<sup>94</sup> Patrick Burns and Daniel Fleming, "Public Outlays, Local Jobs: City of LA Local Purchasing Model 2006-07." November 2006.

### **A Measure Directing All Community Violence and Youth Development Related Legislation through the Entrepreneurial Department**

If the new department is developed as the accountable, central repository of the City's leadership and expertise in comprehensive gang prevention and intervention, it will be the appropriate City entity to handle the City's response to emerging incidents and concerns about violence prevention and intervention measures and to evaluate the usefulness of proposed measures from other entities. Centralizing the response coordination under the new entity will eliminate the current reactive responses that tend to produce short sighted and unstrategic actions, and it will increase efficiency.

## **C. Service Delivery Model**

Considering the City's existing array of programs and service delivery infrastructure, the literature and examples of promising and best practices locally and nationally, the Advancement Project proposes the following framework to implement a comprehensive neighborhood by neighborhood strategy. Necessarily, with the broad range of diverse communities represented in Los Angeles, the framework must be agile and flexible to adapt to specific neighborhood assets and needs.<sup>95</sup> Failure to work effectively with competent neighborhood leaders, faith based institutions, community based organizations, groups, and facilities must be avoided. While the service components described in this report are important, many communities already have existing providers who deliver these services. These providers should be incorporated into the new strategy.

### **1. Defining Service Areas by High School Attendance Boundaries**

To best allocate resources by need, the Advancement Project recommends defining priority areas through analysis of violence and risk factors in a defined area. The area can be defined in many ways such as council districts, planning areas, and neighborhood boundaries are defined. The Advancement Project recommends the use of high school attendance boundaries to define an area for several reasons.

First, high school clusters represent a likely pattern of progression from elementary to middle to high school for a group of children in a geographically defined area. Therefore, not only can services be targeted for a broad age group within a certain area, but the critical transition stages from elementary to middle to high school can also be targeted.

Second, schools can and should become the center of a community. Schools, especially the newly constructed schools, offer valuable multi-use facilities and recreational space that are lacking in most Los Angeles communities.<sup>96</sup> More importantly, creating a

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<sup>95</sup> See Phase I Report, pp. 60-63.

<sup>96</sup> In addition to joint-use agreements with the schools, in many communities, community based organizations and faith based institutions will play a key role to provide services and programs that best use the available school facilities.

stronger linkage between schools and the community and promoting parent involvement at the schools improves academic performance. New York relied on this strategy when they created the network of Beacons. This strategy may also promote school attachment among children and youth, and potentially reduce high drop-out rates of the hot zones. Therefore, a school centered community strategy makes not only logistical sense but also addresses one of the key risk factors for youth violence and gang membership.

Youth who have dropped out of school, are on probation, or in foster care span multiple high school clusters and will need to be served through the Community Violence Prevention Centers structure described below. Prevention components should be adequately available as a means of positively affecting the majority of those youth who are out school and out of work. A difficult issue under the current system of bussing children out of their neighborhoods to schools in other areas of the City must be addressed by determining the pool of students impacted by this practice and strategies for serving them. Finally, although the high school cluster concept can help to define most of the prevention services for an area, some services, most notably gang intervention services, will require more flexibility in determining service areas.

Key factors to consider in identifying priority areas are:

- **School performance** as indicated by API score
- **School size** with bigger schools receiving priority for over crowded conditions that hinders school attachment
- **Number of probation and foster youth** in the school as an indicator for identifying high risk youth who evidence several risk factors such as violence in the home, lack of parental supervision, and/or previous criminal activity.
- **Level of gang violence** in the attendance boundary
- **Level of violent crimes** in the attendance boundary
- **Proportion of population with less than a high school degree** in the attendance boundary which is highly correlated with gang activity
- **Proportion of population living below the federal level of poverty** in the attendance boundary which also is highly correlated with gang activity

A similar analysis was conducted by Mayor's Office to identify the lowest performing high schools in the City.<sup>97</sup> Additional factors such as the ones listed above can create a more robust analysis about the level of need and risk in a particularly cluster area. To adequately capture the complexity of such an analysis, a sophisticated research methodology will need to be employed in collaboration with experts in the field of

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<sup>97</sup> <[http://www.lacity.org/mayor/myreducation/mayormyeducation246140753\\_09292006.pdf](http://www.lacity.org/mayor/myreducation/mayormyeducation246140753_09292006.pdf)>

violence prevention, statistics and demographics. The Advancement Project highly recommends that the City conduct this research.<sup>98</sup>

#### **a. Risk Level and Services**

There are at least four risk levels of communities and four goals for the City to achieve through the new department:

- Keep **Safe Areas** Safe
- Pull Back Areas with **Emerging Violence** to Safety
- Strategic Intervention in **Areas at a Tipping Point** to Achieve Safety
- Saturate **Violent Hot Zones** to Achieve Stabilization and on the Road to Revitalization

Each will require a different level of engagement but none can be ignored. It is clear that the most violent communities of Los Angeles require saturation intervention to achieve even the most minimum level of stabilization. This will require the full force of all service and mobilization elements described below as well as strategic suppression measures. Communities where violence has reached a tipping point or those where violence is emerging as an issue will require a mix of prevention and intervention strategies to divert the community away from the trajectory of becoming a full-fledged hot zone. Even the safe communities, however, require attention to keep them safe. As Boston's example shows us, even when communities reach "safe" levels where there are no youth homicides for a couple years, they can easily slide back into a crisis level of violence when resources are pulled back, coordination is dismantled, and leadership transplanted elsewhere.

## **2. Community Engagement and Mobilization: Community Action Teams**

As in the case of GRP Boyle Heights and New York's Beacon Centers, community stakeholders must be involved in assessing local service needs and determining the priorities. Such a process establishes the foundation for community ownership of the strategy and for the development of a permanent neighborhood entity, "Community Action Team" (CAT), that will exercise local leadership on issues of safety and vitality of children, youth, and their families. The process must include youth voices in such a way that youths are viewed as actors in their own future.

Any effort to organize the community must be representative of those who live and work in the area. Despite the fact that immigrants comprise 47 percent of the City's population, they are often marginalized from key policy arenas. Despite the fact that youth are often the targets of City's programs, their voices are usually absent in

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<sup>98</sup> See Appendix 9, Demographic Analysis and Phase 1 Report for further detailed descriptions of areas with high concentrations of gang related crime and gang violent crime. A scientifically sound methodology identifying highest risk areas will be complex and consider multiple data variables and factors including the ones mentioned above and a ground level understanding of the specific dynamics and assets of a community.

discussions about program design and implementation. In most areas of Los Angeles, conscientious, culturally competent, and linguistically accessible efforts to reach and incorporate immigrant communities must be made. In all areas, youth groups must also have a seat at the table. Without doing the hard work of truly pulling together all impacted groups, communities cannot be united against violence.

The essential functions of a CAT would be grassroots level planning, implementation/coordination, and evaluation of violence prevention and intervention strategies, which incorporates and integrates the reality and challenges in the community. By involving a broad spectrum of stakeholders including school representatives, parents, residents, business owners, faith based institutions, and service providers, information sharing, joint planning, and shared resources would help streamline disparate and sometimes smaller and isolated efforts that exist within the neighborhood “system.”

There are local examples of such structures within the City such as the Boyle Heights Learning Collaborative, Watts Gang Task Force, some Neighborhood Councils, and the San Pedro Safety Collaborative that perform the type of function described here and could become the basis for a broader community engagement infrastructure. In other areas where there are no existing structures or where existing structures cannot transform to fulfill this role, considerable effort must be made to organize, develop leadership, and sustain such a group.

Finally, the CAT would be the primary mechanism for engaging and mobilizing community members to become active participants in violence prevention rather than passive recipients of services. Communities must engineer from within a **cultural transformation** to reject violence, to work collectively towards a solution, and to overcome differences that fuel conflict. The “not-in-my-backyard” mentality that blocks community based youth rehabilitation facilities from locating in certain neighborhoods; the black-brown strife dividing some of the most underserved areas; the fear that keeps neighbors from talking to other neighbors; service providers locked into the “this is the way it’s always been done” mentality; the fear of gangs that prevents witnesses from cooperating with law enforcement---these symptoms of a disintegrating and distraught community must be addressed and resolved to wage effective public campaign against violence.

In the end, no amount of government services alone can achieve or sustain community safety and vitality. Only when communities take ownership over the issue of violence prevention in their own neighborhoods can violence reduction efforts succeed.

### **3. Centralized Coordination of Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression Activities: Community Violence Prevention Centers**

A critical piece to promoting community engagement and City coordination of services is a centralized locus for the community. Advancement Project recommends the establishment of “Community Violence Prevention Centers” (CVPC) in each of the high school cluster service areas. The centers would be staffed with both City employees as

well as service providers contracted for particular services such as case management or mental health services. There will be three main ways in which the centers respond to individual and group needs:

- **Area Coordinators and Cluster Coordinators** will be responsible for monitoring service access and coordination for school based services. They will maintain a database of students enrolled in school based programs and handle all school based referrals for services.
- **Crisis Intervention Teams** will respond to all calls requiring a 24 hour response time including maintaining a case load of high risk youth and families requiring wrap-around services.
- **Gang Intervention Teams** will work closely with the crisis intervention team in responding to high risk cases with gang involvement but will also handle referrals related specifically to gangs and gang members. Gang Intervention Teams will also be working directly with gangs on building peace. This work is outlined below.


Each CVPC will convene a weekly “**Interagency Intervention Team**” (IIT) consisting of CVPC staff as well as representatives from schools, County agencies, law enforcement, and juvenile justice agencies. These meetings will focus on case conferencing, service integration and coordination, and information sharing. In many areas of the City, there are tables where multiple entities engage each other around general policy issues as well as specific individual case conferences. Some examples of these may be the Service Planning Area Councils across the County, Child Abuse Councils, some Neighborhood Councils and Family Preservation Community Advisory Councils. Connecting with these existing venues is highly recommended where the function of the IIT as a problem solving entity addressing local service barriers and specific needs of individual children, youth and their families can effectively be incorporated. On the issue of information sharing, we recognize that there are multiple barriers to information sharing between the entities participating in the Interagency Intervention Team. In this regard, we note the important work of the Education Coordinating Council that is in progress to remove some of these barriers and highly recommend the City’s active participation in this effort.

CVCP will have dedicated staff who will work with the Community Action Teams. They will conduct on-going community engagement, mobilization and organizing, including youth organizing with other community based groups and organizations.

**Page 77: Community Violence Prevention Center Organizational Chart**

**Page 78: Community Violence Prevention Center Service Delivery Model**


# Department of Neighborhood Safety: Community Violence Prevention Center Organizational Chart



\*Note, this chart does not include all administrative, clerical and fiscal staff



# COMMUNITY VIOLENCE PREVENTION: SERVICE DELIVERY MODEL



**a. Service Elements**

In each community, there are three categories of services to provide in a comprehensive violence prevention strategy: Prevention, Gang Intervention, and General Intervention Services. In addition, there are employment programs that span these categories and law enforcement services that remain outside of CVPC but require coordination. The following is a list of the services color coded for category of services.

**Page 80: Comprehensive Services**

# COMPREHENSIVE SERVICES

**SCHOOL BASED SERVICES**

- After-school
- College-prep
- Parent involvement in school
- Needs assessment (learning disabilities, assets)
- Remedial education
- Safe passage
- Transitions Institute
- Violence prevention curriculum

**COMMUNITY HEALTH**

- Teen pregnancy prevention
- Education on AIDS/HIV, STDs
- Gun removal program

**YOUTH ADVOCATES**

<b>Recreation &amp; Diversion</b>	<b>Community Service</b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Parks &amp; sports leagues</li> <li>- Drop-in centers</li> <li>- Youth leadership development</li> <li>- Mentoring</li> <li>- Annual calendar of community service projects</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Mandated hours supervision</li> <li>- Graffiti removal/ environmental projects</li> <li>- Other misc. community service projects</li> </ul>

**CASE MANAGEMENT**

- Need assessment of individual and family
- Coordination of services
- Information, referral and follow-up
- Family action plan and basic support services
- Differentiated protocol and expertise by referral source/risk of case
- Intensive transition services for youth

**CHILD WELFARE**

- Child abuse prevention, intervention and treatment
- Foster youth services
- Independent living program (emancipated youth)

**MENTAL HEALTH**

- Family counseling
- Individual counseling
- Parenting education
- MST/FFT for juvenile offenders

**SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT**

**GANG INTERVENTION**

- Peace Building
- Targeted case management for exit ramp
- Re-entry transition planning and case management
- Life skills development
- Graffiti removal

**STRATEGIC SUPPRESSION**

- Coordination with case management and gang intervention team
- Coordination with school police

**LEGAL SERVICES**

Public education on rights around arrest and children's rights, including:

- \* Expungement of records
- \* Gang injunction related legal problems resolution
- \* Juvenile court liaison

**COMMUNITY MOBILIZATION & ACTION TEAM**





- Network and coalition building among community based organizations, faith based institutions and other civic groups to enhance "social efficacy" to ensure safety and vitality of community
- Safe passage
- Youth council

**EMPLOYMENT**

- Training and workforce readiness and entrepreneurship programs
- Coordination with schools for vocational training and higher education
- Placement for paid internships, apprentice programs, and jobs

**WOMEN & GIRLS' SERVICES**

- Gender based violence prevention
- Domestic violence prevention
- Sexual assault prevention programs
- Shelters

-  Primary Prevention
-  Secondary Prevention
-  Tertiary/Intervention
-  Other

Each type of service, like school based services, has a list of suggested activities to be included in that type of service. Not all of the types of services necessarily need to be provided directly by the City. For example, Child Welfare and Mental Health services are largely County driven services. Nor will every area require full investment into every service type. For example, in “safe” neighborhoods where there are relatively low numbers of high risk youth and families, the City may choose not to have crisis intervention teams or gang interventions teams. It is important, to note however, that each area would have the basic infrastructure in place to deliver a neighborhood based violence prevention strategy. At its core, this means that the City has the capacity to ensure that the children and youth needing such services within the cluster defined areas are in fact receiving the services in a timely manner. In addition, the City also needs to build the capacity to respond quickly and appropriately to crisis cases, marshalling not only City resources but also school and County resources.

There is significant agreement among experts about evidence based prevention and intervention programs that have proven results. Some of these programs, such as Nurse Family Partnership, Multisystemic Therapy, and Functional Family Therapy are currently in operation on a pilot level in the County. Within the basic infrastructure for service delivery described below, the Advancement Project strongly recommends that the City consider implementing these existing and proven models that have already demonstrated successful outcomes.<sup>99</sup>

## **Page 82: Evidence Based Prevention and Intervention Programs**

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<sup>99</sup> See Appendix 6, Individual Development Factors. For more information on best practices, see <<http://www.colorado.edu/cspv/blueprints/index.html>> and <<http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/04-07-3901.pdf>>.

## Evidence Based Prevention and Intervention Programs

Program Type:	Best Practice:	Program Description:
Early Childhood Prevention	Nurse-Family Partnership	Consists of intensive and comprehensive home visitation by nurses during a woman's pregnancy and the first two years after birth of the woman's first child. The program also depends upon a variety of other health and human services in order to achieve its positive effects.
Early Childhood Prevention	Perry Pre-School Program	Provides high-quality early childhood education to disadvantaged children in order to improve their later school and life performances. The intervention combats the relationship between childhood poverty and school failure by promoting young children's intellectual, social and physical development.
Early Childhood and At-Risk Prevention	The Incredible Years Series	A set of three comprehensive, multi-faceted, and developmentally-based curriculums for parents, teachers and children designed to promote emotional and social competence and to prevent, reduce, and treat behavior and emotion problems in young children.
At-Risk Prevention	Promoting Alternative Thinking Strategies (PATHS)	A comprehensive program for promoting emotional and social competencies and reducing aggression and behavior problems in elementary school-aged children while simultaneously enhancing the educational process in the classroom.
Intervention	Functional Family Therapy (FFT)	An outcome-driven prevention and intervention program for youth who have demonstrated the entire range of maladaptive, acting out behaviors and related syndromes.
Intervention	Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care (MTFC)	A cost effective alternative to group or residential treatment, incarceration, and hospitalization for adolescents who have problems with chronic antisocial behavior, emotional disturbance, and delinquency. Community families are recruited, trained, and closely supervised to provide MTFC-placed adolescents with treatment and intensive supervision.
Intervention	Multisystemic Therapy (MST)	An intensive family and community-based treatment that addresses the multiple determinants of serious antisocial behavior in juvenile offenders. This approach views individuals as being nested within a complex network of interconnected systems that encompass individual, family, and extrafamilial factors.
Intervention	Juvenile Offender Interagency Coordination Programs	Programs for juvenile offenders where services in the community are coordinated among several agencies. Sometimes called "wraparound services," this approach is intended to allow more individualized services, as well as more efficient resource allocation.
Intervention	Adolescent Diversion Project	Youth are diverted from juvenile court to prevent being labeled "delinquent." Program mentors work with youth in their environment to provide community resources and initiate behavioral change. Mentors are trained in a behavioral model and to become advocates for community resources.

To meet the needs of the diverse communities of Los Angeles, the City must ensure that its services are culturally competent and linguistically accessible. In addition to staffing for bilingual and bicultural capacity, service providers contracting with the City should demonstrate their capacity to serve the diverse groups residing in their service area. Moreover, the City can tap into existing network of service delivery targeting specific ethnic and/or linguistic groups. A good example of such a network is the recently created Countywide Family Preservation service infrastructure that serves Asian Pacific Islander and American Indian communities.

It is important to distinguish among different kinds of prevention, intervention and youth development programs. A survey of expert research on gangs confirms that only programs specifically designed to address the combination of risk factors and group processes that are uniquely associated with street gang membership should be considered “gang prevention” or “gang intervention” programs.<sup>100</sup> Accordingly, only programs specially developed to prevent at-risk young children and youth from joining a street gang should be designated as “gang prevention” programs, and only programs expertly designed to interrupt ongoing gang activity, reduce violent gang activity, help young people exit a street gang, or otherwise try to reduce hard core gang behavior should be called “gang intervention” programs. All other programs that are not based on the specialized research for reversing street gang involvement, but that address general youth development or the needs of troubled youth at risk of delinquent behavior, or that indirectly divert non-gang involved youth from negative lifestyles by offering alternative activities, should be designated or viewed as general prevention programs.

In this report, the Advancement Project uses the broader term “prevention” to capture all efforts geared toward keeping children safe from violence and all destructive lifestyles. But the report refers to the specific terms “gang prevention” and “gang intervention” for efforts needed to impact the special attributes of gang conduct and gang violence. In this sense, in selecting the particular programs for implementation, the City must consider not only the best practices mentioned above, but also the distinctions among general youth development, delinquency focused programs, gang focused programs, and the respective differences between gang violence and other violence problems like spousal abuse, child abuse, bullying, etc. In the areas where gang violence dominates the neighborhood dynamics, it is imperative that prevention efforts for all age groups, even the youngest population, be focused to prevent gang activity.

## **D. Services and Programs**

### **1. Prevention**

As noted in the Phase I Report, every dollar invested in prevention saves seven dollars in costs related to crime, yet the City invests far less in prevention than it does in

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<sup>100</sup> Klein and Maxson.

suppression.<sup>101</sup> As a core element in the citywide strategy, the Advancement Project recommends the creation of a *seamless prevention network* in the highest risk communities first and eventually citywide. Prevention services largely target those children, youth and families who would benefit from expanded enrichment, after-school, recreational, and educational opportunities in the community but do not necessarily require on-going case management or specific support. The goal of all prevention services is to keep children and youth safe, help them to thrive at schools and at home, and keep them away from violence and high risk activities.

**a. School-Park Based Prevention Network**

As the examples of Summer of Success and Beacon Centers show, the City needs to achieve a true, seamless prevention network by utilizing community based organizations, faith based institutions, schools, and parks as strategic assets. This means that in the highest risk areas, every elementary and middle school must offer after school programming to cover the hours of 3 pm to 7 pm. The high school in the area would become a Beacon Center by operating from the hours of 3 pm to 10 pm with full community access to the facility. These services are to be City administered in collaboration with schools and community based organizations. Finally, the Department of Recreation and Parks would ensure that parks located in the area would function at full capacity with staffing until 12 am on weekdays and 2 am on the weekends, intersession, and summer.


**Page 85: Community Programmatic Coverage**

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<sup>101</sup> Karoly, Lynn A., et al.

# COMMUNITY PROGRAMMATIC COVERAGE

*Risk of Youth Delinquency (By Hour)* - *Increased Risk During After School* - *Highest Risk (Including Weekends)*





After school programs will have tutoring, enrichment, snack and parenting education components. The Beacon Center would expand on this basic level of services to include career counseling, employment services, and library and computer access. The prevention network is designed to work in coordination so that children transitioning from elementary to middle to high school are tracked by program staff and can receive appropriate support. In addition, prevention program staff would be trained to assess the risk levels of participants so that timely referrals can be made to the CVPC for more intensive case management and intervention services.

This prevention network calls for the Department of Recreation and Parks to operate its CLASS Parks model at a much higher capacity than it currently does. The additional hours of operation will mean not only a significant investment into personnel costs, but also a restructuring of existing programs to augment use by children, youth, and families in the area. At a minimum, there needs to be a mix of organized sport and support activities available during all hours of operation with the goal that no youth wanting to access services will be turned away.

The prevention network will only have impact if maximum utilization by the community occurs. To ensure community access and utilization, the City will initially have to conduct a public education campaign as well as continuous community outreach. As barriers to access are identified, concerted efforts must be made to eliminate them. One anticipated barrier is transportation due to the geographic spread of the City. Both the Department of Transportation and MTA need to actively assist to eliminate this barrier.

Lastly, it is important to recognize that children and youth do not go to school when they cannot be assured safety on the way to and from school. Programs like Safe Passages are critical to a school-centric prevention network that targets children and youth in the school. While maximizing community volunteers, Safe Passages must not be an after thought, but rather a program element with its own funding and staffing. A well functioning Safe Passages program would work in collaboration with other prevention aspects as well as with Community Action Team, gang intervention workers, MTA and LAPD.

## **2. Gang Intervention**

The goal of the prevention network is to close “entry ramps” into gangs for children and youth. It makes common and economic sense for the City to invest heavily in prevention to stop gangs from proliferating and expanding. Although research points to the generalized fact that most gang members exit a gang in a year’s time, the City must deal with the fact that at any given point in time, there are more than 720 active gangs in the City with a tiny minority of gang members responsible for the majority of violence. The City needs to design a research based intervention model as a part of an effective comprehensive strategy to stem the violence resulting from gangs.

Gang intervention has been loosely defined as any activity designed to help an active gang member become a functional member of the larger society. This definition also incorporates efforts to keep gang members from degrading their communities through violent acts. Therefore gang intervention includes efforts directed at both the individual and the group. Gang intervention workers strive to replace anti-social values and behavior with those that are pro-social. This process is known as alternation.<sup>102</sup> While gang intervention workers mentor and guide gang members and gangs through this process of alternation, helping them to take steps toward redirecting their lives toward positive life outcomes, they also work on alternating the neighborhoods where gang members live and operate. By building gang peace and youth development infrastructure through youth and adult organizing efforts, gang intervention contributes to the transformation of the socio-economic conditions that give rise to the formation and continued existence of gangs.

Los Angeles has been experimenting with gang intervention programs for at least the past 20 years. Much progress has been made during this time. For example, what was a hostile relationship between LAPD and gang intervention workers has evolved into a recognition among top leaders of LAPD that gang intervention workers are needed to quell emerging violence and reduce retaliation actions. This strategy is being effectively employed in multiple jurisdictions including Chicago and Boston. The gang intervention field is complicated and still developing with many different perspectives, particularly on the operational side of the work. Despite these differences, there is consensus on the core elements of a successful intervention targeted at gang violence.<sup>103</sup>

**a. Emergency rapid response** to situations that can devolve into gang warfare is necessary because in highly tense situations where violence is imminent or ongoing, there is no possibility of developing strategies for individual gang members to eventually exit the gang. Typically this requires "putting out fires," to limit retaliation to an act or to mediate an on-going feud. Intervention workers use shuttle diplomacy, going between various neighborhoods to resolve disagreements so that tensions are reduced. Often, the best that can be done is to create agreements on how two groups can effectively avoid each other. In some cases, however, intervention workers are able to create 'understandings' between groups that effectively help both sides understand that the other is the same in all aspects except in the turf they claim.

An advanced form of the group process is the peace process that has been used effectively in Los Angeles for over a decade. This approach relies on the formation of peace agreements or other formal or semi-formal relations between a number of gangs. The early 1990s saw several such opportunities, including the Watts Peace

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<sup>102</sup> Alternation, or replacing existent realities and worldviews with alternative structures and perceptions, is derived from a branch of sociology known as Sociology of Knowledge or Phenomenology which explains how reality and/or knowledge is created. In gang intervention, 6 stages of alternation are recognized starting at the institutional level and moving to the individual level. These are: license to operate, preliminary reality challenging; preliminary alternation and mediation; mid-stage alternation; full group alternation and full individual alternation. For more detailed explanation, see Appendix 5, Gang Prevention and Intervention.

<sup>103</sup> Additional recommendations and more detail are available in Appendix 5, Gang Prevention and Intervention.

Treaty, Harbor Area Truce and Valley Unity Peace Treaty. Significant components of the latter two remain in effect today and are maintaining that same methodology.

- b. Effective exit strategies** for individual gang members who are ready and willing to seek another path need to offer sufficient resources for the former gang member to successfully and safely leave the gang. Individual reclamation includes getting a youth back into school or an alternative educational institution, helping with pending court cases, providing job readiness skills and job placement, counseling, therapy, family support and a myriad of other services. In many cases, intervention workers are also mentors to the adolescents with whom they work with regularly. These efforts can be directed to any ethnic group although specific approaches may vary. These varying approaches must be adaptable to the special issues that girls in gangs face.
- c. Training and professional development of gang intervention workers** needs to expand. It is widely recognized that only ex-gang members who have exited the gang life successfully have the “license to operate” and secure the trust and support of gang leaders and therefore, the members. Intervention workers act as mentors guiding the gang members through a process of change, or alternation and can be successful in doing so because they offer insights into the thinking and actions of gang members from their own experience. For these intervention workers to be successful, on-going training that builds on their basic skills and enhances their professional development to collaborate with other service providers, schools, City and County entities is necessary.

LA Bridges II, the City’s only gang intervention program, is woefully underfunded. As a result, the program reaches perhaps two to three percent of the number of gang members and 25 percent of gangs in the group processes described above. With the number and size of gangs in Los Angeles, the City cannot expect to invest enough resources to reach the kind of capacity available in other cities. For example, in Boston, there are 40 gang intervention workers for 1,400 gang members, a ratio of 1 to 35. For a similar ratio to be achieved in Los Angeles, there would have to be over 1,100 gang intervention workers. Nevertheless, the Advancement Project recommends the following to enhance the capacity of Los Angeles gang intervention efforts:

- Funding for gang intervention program should be increased to reach at least 75 percent of the gangs.
- The City should focus gang intervention resources specifically on hard core intervention. Each contracted program should follow the peace-building model but also incorporate best practices from other models including CeaseFire Chicago.
- Each funded intervention agency should be required to submit an annual workplan that identifies the gangs that they will be working with in the coming year.

- Gang intervention programs should have priority in directing the actions of graffiti removal programs. Also, the City should require that graffiti removal services be on-call to the LAPD and gang intervention programs seven days a week.
- All staff of City contracted hard-core gang intervention programs need to adhere to minimum levels of qualification and training requirements.
- The City should form a “Gang Intervention Advisory Board” who can work with the gang intervention programs in establishing annual outcome targets. This board should include a representative from each intervention program, along with a LAPD representative and at least one individual from the academic sector competent both in the realm of the Public Health model, youth violence, and outcome measures.

### 3. General Intervention Services

Intervention services, or secondary prevention services, are generally geared toward children and youth identified with active risk factors. Many services in this arena, including mental health services, child welfare services, substance abuse treatment services, and mandated youth community service hours by the juvenile courts are services currently funded through County agencies. The key function that City programs will need to perform is coordinating these services through the case management of identified at-risk children, youth and their families and a targeted crisis intervention team.

Referrals would result from the prevention network, schools, families, and County agencies. In order to target limited resources to have the greatest impact, individual family case management services would be reserved for high risk children, youth and their families. Case management is used to define an overall picture of a youth’s preparation to function in the larger society. Individual interests, risk factors, and environmental conditions are used to create an individual profile. Personal achievement is used to set a plan for establishing and achieving one’s life goals. The goal of case management would be stabilization through service coordination, including testing for learning difficulties, life skill training, job preparedness, counseling, substance abuse treatment/counseling, and educational attainment. Case managers will work with the client to map out the best ways to achieve the designated goals, and then diligently monitor progress toward that end.

Case management must ensure at a minimum that the following services are provided where appropriate:

- a. Health and Mental Health Services:** These services are particularly important for high risk youth who benefit from evidence based family and individual counseling methodologies such as Functional Family Therapy and Multi-Systemic Therapy, both models in use through a pilot project between the Los Angeles County Probation Department and the Department of Mental Health. In partnership with the Los Angeles County Department of Public Health and the Department of Mental Health, the center should be fully staffed with preventive health services, including screening

for mental and physical health by staff with the knowledge and expertise to refer those children and families to appropriate mental and physical health services, as needed. Evidence suggests that those children exposed to violence at a very early age actually have changes in their brain structure as a result of such exposure, including exhibiting symptoms of PTSD. In order to interrupt the next cycle of gang joining and violent behavior, early intervention with mental health treatment is critical.

- b. Child Welfare Services:** Violence in the home threatens not only the safety of the children in the home but also precipitates violent behavior from the child. Although the Office of Family Violence Prevention with the new department will oversee direct City programming around domestic violence and sexual assault, it is imperative that there is a timely connection to child abuse prevention and intervention treatment services in cases of violence in the home. In addition, foster youth services, and independent living programs for emancipated youth should be coordinated with the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services.
- c. Substance Abuse Treatment:** It is estimated that the majority of high risk youth are addicted to illegal substances. Effective intervention must involve substance abuse treatment and education to rehabilitate addicted and habitually using youth.
- d. Life Skills Training:** Many youths never receive a functional understanding of what it takes to live day to day, let alone thrive. Life skill curricula typically include the most common sense, day-to-day behaviors that these youth nonetheless have not learned. Communications, responsibility, money management, and other concepts are laid out, usually in very straightforward language. Generally, life skill curricula provide the tools for one to simply survive in the larger world outside of the neighborhood.<sup>104</sup>
- e. Parenting Education and Support:** Parenting training enables the parent(s) to resume/assume control of the family unit and become a positive factor in moving their children past the gang and other negatives associated with street life. Parenting training mimics life skills training in many ways, while focusing primarily on family dynamics. Communications and internal responsibilities are prime components of these programs. Goal setting, joint decision-making and other practices are used to build a family's resiliency while helping them as a unit to thrive despite obstacles.<sup>105</sup>
- f. Crisis Intervention:** The Advancement Project recommends at least one clinical professional crisis intervention team per service area that would coordinate with a pool of volunteers, LAPD, and other crisis response mechanisms in the County (i.e. PMRT through the Department of Mental Health; Emergency Response Team through Department of Children and Family Services).

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<sup>104</sup> Life skills training is also an important component to Gang Intervention case management. Please refer to Appendix 5, Gang Prevention and Intervention.

<sup>105</sup> See Appendix 8, Safe and Healthy Families.

- g. Basic Supportive Services:** High-risk youth, particularly those being released from probation facilities, often need basic necessities such as food, clothing and transportation to even begin to think about being linked to educational institutions or jobs. It is imperative that case management include the capacity to offer this type of support to solidify the trust relationship with the youth and thereby strengthening their engagement over the long run.
- h. Transition Planning and Follow-Up for Probation Youth:** Research shows that premature involvement with the juvenile justice system and lack of appropriate support thereafter greatly increases the recidivism rate among high risk youth. By providing intensive transition support and planning for probation youth that focuses on building on the youth's assets and providing educational and vocational opportunities greatly enhances the chance that the youth will be resilient to risk factors once they return to the community.

#### **4. Employment Services**

As this report has noted, jobs are a key element to violence prevention and gang intervention. For many gang members, particularly those 17 years and older, getting a job can be *transformative*. Not only does it provide an opportunity for stability, a job also offers an *alternative* to the violence associated with the illegal activities of the underground economy. As Father Greg Boyle from Homeboy Industries is renowned for stating, "Nothing stops a bullet like a job." An addendum to this truth comes from many youth agree that, "Nothing stops a bullet like a **meaningful** job." Employment services are effective, like YO! Watts Students for Higher Education Program, when training and educational opportunities are melded with entry into vocations and careers that hold the potential for a financially stable future.

In this sense, the Mayor's efforts to bring more summer jobs for youth in 2006 with the goal of reaching 10,000 youth summer jobs by 2010, the potential pooling of federal resources between City, County and LAUSD as well as Councilman Reyes' focus on local hiring and contracting for City expenditures are all headed in the right direction. Additional efforts toward creating permanent full-time employment for out of school and out of work youth will be necessary. Nevertheless, the City's investment into youth employment program is dependent on declining federal dollars. In contrast, the City of New York has maintained the level of funding for youth programs over the years by committing city dollars to meet the gap.<sup>106</sup> A similar effort is necessary for employment programs to be a significant component in a violence prevention strategy. In addition, opportunities existing throughout City departments, including proprietary departments must be coordinated and focused to meet the needs of the highest risk youth, including gang involved youth.

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<sup>106</sup> New York City Independent Budget Office, "Since 2000, Funding Changes Cause Annual Uncertainty for Summer Jobs Program," June 2006. The City of New York has increased funding for the Summer Youth Employment Program (SYEP) in the last five years to cover the budget shortfall created by diminishing federal support for the program. In 2005, the City spent \$26.4 million on SYEP, more than double what they on it spent in 2001.

## **5. Law Enforcement**

Law enforcement efforts must be coordinated with the prevention and intervention network being proposed in this report. As Chief Bratton has noted, “We cannot arrest ourselves out of this problem.” Nor can police officers become social workers who deal directly with youth to solve the conditions precipitating the delinquent behavior. By developing clear and consistent referral guidelines between suppression efforts and prevention/intervention network activities, as is being attempted between GRP Boyle Heights and CLEAR, law enforcement can assist in putting youth on the right track. But law enforcement’s primary contribution to an effective comprehensive strategy will be smart targeted suppression that does not increase gang cohesion and activity and to develop fluid and supportive coordination with neighborhood prevention and intervention campaigns. In this sense, designated representatives from LAPD and City Attorney’s Office consistently participating in neighborhood based Community Violence Prevention Centers’ Interagency Intervention Teams will be critical. For such a referral and collaboration system to work well it is critical that police officers are rewarded for employing a problem solving approach that seeks to avoid youth arrests whenever possible.

Second, strategic deployment of law enforcement resources, particularly in the violence hot zones of the City is necessary and plays an important part in an overall strategy. For example, in Boston as well as in Chicago, coordination between intervention workers and police officers was key in not only reinforcing the message that violence will not be tolerated but also in deploying suppression efforts to specifically target those who were the source of violence. As better violence and gang activity reduction strategies start to produce results, prosecutors and police need to become more flexible in the enforcement of gang injunctions. The overbroad enforcement of the injunctions creates animosity between community and police and hinders the process of building trust and credibility needed for community-police collaboration. Part of Boston’s success was due to its focused effort to remove guns from the equation of youth violence. Los Angeles has not thus far focused on curbing access to guns but it must do so as part of a citywide violence prevention strategy. Finally, law enforcement needs to learn more about the violence as a public health problem model and consider how its current approach to gang crime needs to change to enhance broader gang activity and violence reduction plans.

Fortunately, LAPD is in the process of moving toward community based, problem solving policing and is seeking ways to work with intervention workers and community safety projects like the Los Angeles Urban League’s Crenshaw Initiative. It will take a substantial period of time before communities see these changes in their streets, but top LAPD leaders have signaled a willingness to work with gang intervention workers and to cooperate with neighborhood based strategies. Los Angeles County’s Sheriff Lee Baca has issued similar assurances.

## **6. Data, Research, and Evaluation<sup>107</sup>**

Lack of consistent and reliable data has been cited multiple times in this report as a key barrier to understanding the scale of the problem, to adopting appropriate programs designed to specifically address the needs of youth, to measuring performance, to assessing the impact of programs, and to build accountability throughout the City's efforts. Elsewhere in this report, the Advancement Project has noted that the new department will house a Strategic Research and Initiatives section, integrating its work to the actual delivery of services on the ground. This section should also be supported by an external Research, Evaluation, and Policy Institute that focuses on regional issues of violence and youth development. Because of the pivotal role that data, research and evaluation has, more detail is provided here on data gathering, maintenance and research on gang crime geographic patterns.

To conduct neighborhood level analysis of gang activity, violence, and the impact of potential interventions, it is necessary to assemble six groups of data:

- Socio-demographics (e.g. population, demographic profile, educational attainment, poverty, labor force participation)
- Economic Activities (e.g. number of worksites, employee population)
- Community Infrastructure/Social Capital (e.g. community based organizations, schools, parks, libraries, hospitals, transit services)
- Gang and Overall Crime Activities (e.g. all crime, all gang crimes, all violent gang crimes, domestic violence crimes, hate crimes)
- Policing/Police Beats
- Land Use and Development Patterns
- Intervention Efforts

This information should be aggregated to a census tract level for neighborhood level analysis. To achieve the greatest value from analysis of these data sets, it is important that LAPD and LASD data become standardized with good definitions of gang crime and gang members. Therefore, an important aspect of data gathering for the monitoring of gang crime activity patterns is to create a standardized definition of gang crimes and train police officers and analysts about how these definitions ought to be codified. Data standardization is especially important for analysis of violent crimes, since the movement of a specific type of crime in or out of the violent crime category could make a multi-year comparison impossible.<sup>108</sup>

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<sup>107</sup> See Appendix 9, Demographic Analysis and Appendix 10, Evaluation.

<sup>108</sup> See Appendix 9, Demographic Analysis.



In addition to data collection, the City must institute rigorous evaluation strategies at two levels. The first level is individual program evaluation geared to provide quality control. Each program will develop measurable goals and objectives, consistent with the expected feasible outcomes of the program. Templates for individual program evaluation need to be developed by the Strategic Research and Initiatives section in collaboration with the external Research, Evaluation and Policy Institute. Training and technical assistance will be provided to all programs and collaboratives to assure that the program goals and objectives are reasonable. It is highly recommended that intake forms be standardized to the extent that they collect similar demographic data, attendance criteria, initial assessment, and on-going program monitoring components. Individual program level evaluation is likely to be process oriented to provide monitoring and accountability for programs, training, and policy development.

Spatial evaluation, the second level, will be conducted for the overall outcome of the citywide strategy. Similar to the geographic profiles conducted in Phase I of this project this will serve as baseline data. Data will be collected and reviewed annually. After five years of implementation, evaluation data analysis will be conducted using the regression and mapping models developed during the baseline phase. The study design is intervention versus control in which the targeted intervention sites will be compared to their baseline data and to the entire City to determine changes in violent crime and violent gang crime.

## **VII. Additional Regional Policy Actions**

We reiterate that the City cannot solve the problem of community violence and gangs by itself. Business, schools, Los Angeles County and its agencies, philanthropy, civic and faith based institutions, individuals, families, and communities must all become agents of change. The report has already touched on some of these sectors, particularly community and the City. The following section focuses on the other necessary regional transformations.

### **A. Economic Development**

The relationship between poverty, economic deprivation and violence is well documented. Importance of meaningful jobs and economic revitalization as both an intervention strategy for individuals, families and communities has been discussed. The Advancement Project returns to this issue to suggest that the Los Angeles region needs a comprehensive economic development plan that will rebuild and sustain the middle class through living wage jobs.

After the 1992 civil unrest, McKinsey & Company reported that the region would need an infusion of \$6 billion and the creation of 75,000 to 94,000 jobs to revitalize the economy of Los Angeles' neglected areas.<sup>109</sup> Rebuild LA was the entity formed to draw private

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<sup>109</sup> Los Angeles Times, "LA May Need \$6 Billion to Rebuild, Analyst Says," July 29, 1992.

investment and to implement such a strategy. After several years of trying, Rebuild LA folded after raising a fraction of the amount needed, about \$500 million that resulted in minimal impact on the ground level. Much of the dollars raised ended up helping contractors and other business interests rather than providing living wage jobs for the residents of the impoverished areas. That was ten years ago. We have not had another attempt at addressing the core issue of poverty and economic deprivation in the region since then.

The City entities such as Community Reinvestment Agency and others can play a critical role in developing targeted strategies for highest need areas as well as job development strategies for targeted populations including high risk and gang involved youth. The City should also immediately convene regional stakeholders and policy groups such as the Economic Roundtable and the Southern California Association of Governments (SCAG) that have relevant expertise to develop a regional plan.

Opportunities exist in the Los Angeles region for creating living wage jobs. The region is rich in intellectual know-how, particularly around bio med, digital information technology, and environmental technology. At the same time, the region is the nation's largest hub of international trade totaling \$293.9 billion in 2005. With 198 college and university campuses, there are exceptional intellectual assets in the region. These assets and others make it possible to consider a strategic initiative to develop an industry based job development strategy.<sup>110</sup>

In this regard, one particular industry of great potential is the "green industry." Building on a diverse green technology base in the area, as well as on a history of developing new environmental markets and ambitious environmental policy goals, Los Angeles can help to build an industrial base for green technology thereby creating jobs. The most encouraging aspect about the green industry is that many of the jobs have low skill requirements but pay living wages and therefore represent good opportunities for workers to make economic progress after relatively short intervals of training.<sup>111</sup>

## **B. Schools**

Great changes have taken place in LAUSD in recent years. After decades of ignoring overcrowding, schools are being built on time and on budget. Student achievement has improved through rigorous curriculum standards and emphasis on testing. But the schools must do more. Despite laudable efforts under way inside LAUSD, there are still too many ways in which schools are not part of the solution. Collaboration with external resources including community based organizations is shunned rather than welcomed. Teachers lack training and resources to engage students. Violence prevention is an after thought. Community access to school facilities is discouraged.

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<sup>110</sup> *Los Angeles County Economic Development Corporation*, Los Angeles County Profile, May 2006.

<sup>111</sup> Burns, Patrick and Daniel Flaming, "Jobs in LA's Green Technology Sector," Economic Roundtable, March 2006.

The school-centric prevention network proposed by the Advancement Project can only work if LAUSD chooses to become an active partner that breaks down existing barriers for partnership with the community and the City. It is no longer enough for schools to only think in terms of academic achievement of students or about the school day only. Schools must become partners with the City, County, communities and families to address the needs of the whole child. Changes within LAUSD should mirror developmental needs in providing instruction that promotes resiliency and positive health models, beginning in Kindergarten. Similar to the type of top to bottom organizational transformation described above for the LAPD and other City entities, LAUSD must come to the table with a new way of engaging in the regional strategy to end community violence and ensure safety and vitality of all children and youth.

Some of the critical roles that LAUSD should play in this regional strategy are:

- Taking leadership on **ensuring school safety**. In this regard, the efforts of the Working Group on Safe School Communities, particularly their attempts to develop data around student perception of safety to and from school as well as on school campuses. The Advancement Project looks forward to LAUSD developing policy actions to address the findings.
- **In-service training for all teachers, teachers aides, parents and caretakers** to assure that the developmental needs of children and youth are understood and incorporated into all programs and services.
- Violence prevention curriculum implementation is currently haphazard and reactive, but with some new initiatives, the Advancement Project looks forward to district wide and sustainable efforts to implement **best practices in school based violence prevention curriculum that is developmentally appropriate**.
- **Facility joint use agreements** with City, County and community entities to allow access onto school facilities during out of school time is a pre-requisite to the implementation of the prevention network described in this report. A speedy and collaborative process to reach agreement must occur and will require leadership from the top.
- Schools offer a unique opportunity to conduct a **comprehensive assessment** of each and every child to open the door for early intervention and prevention to be effective. There is currently a unique opportunity for funding prevention and youth development. Funds from the Mental Health Services Act can be accessed to assure that mental and emotional health screening and treatment is implemented for very young children (pre-school age), those 10-14, and youth between 14 and 21. Many of the very young children living in high risk, disorganized areas are witnesses or/and victims of community and family violence. Currently, these children are not routinely screened at school entry for school readiness or for symptoms of posttraumatic stress syndrome disorder or other mental health problems. It is our recommendation that all children entering school for the first time be screened and again at the 3<sup>rd</sup> grade. Those found to need mental health services are referred to or

provided those services in their community. In addition, it is recommended that children be screened again upon entrance to middle and high school. Children suffering mental and emotional health deficits cannot learn and are not likely to be successful in school. Such an ongoing strategy would help to reduce the dropout rate in Los Angeles schools and positively increase educational attainment.

- Effective coordination between the City, County, communities and schools cannot occur without **timely and complete sharing of student information**. County and City entities systematically prohibited from collaborating with each other because of the way they interpret regulations that govern them. A primary example of this is the on-going debate about whether schools can share information with the other entities to improve educational outcomes for probation and foster youth. LAUSD and Los Angeles County Office of Education (LACOE) interpret Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), the federal law guiding release of educational information on individual students to mean that no sharing of information can occur. In other jurisdictions, different interpretations have prevailed and information sharing does occur across entities.

### C. Juvenile Justice in Crisis

Los Angeles' juvenile justice system is in crisis. It is a broken system with a revolving door, where youth go back again and again, and after each detention end up—not rehabilitated—but worse off. In a 2001 investigation of the County's three juvenile halls, the U.S. Department of Justice found that conditions in LA County juvenile facilities were so bad that minors, "suffered from harm or the risk of serious harm from the deficiencies in the facilities' medical and mental health care, sanitation, use of chemical spray, and insufficient protection from harm." This crisis required an immediate action plan by the County to overhaul the system in 2001, but five years later the County is still failing to address this crisis.<sup>112</sup>

Overcrowding of Probation facilities, inadequate supervision of probation youth, wholly deficient mental health and educational services in the camps and juvenile hall, high recidivism rates, high rates of youth on youth violence in the facilities, inappropriate use of force by staff, inadequate representation during adjudication, and juvenile cases routinely decided without complete educational and other records are all manifestations of an ill conceived and overloaded system.<sup>113</sup>

#### *Juvenile Incarceration Policy Needs to Be Re-examined:*

As the County and City address the crisis in juvenile detention and justice systems, they should seek to reverse a troubling trend in American juvenile justice that views and treats a majority of youth offenders, even very young ones, as adult criminals deserving adult

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<sup>112</sup> In a recent attempt to hire a consultant to help reform the county's juvenile justice system the County failed and was not able to do so. Steve Lopez, Los Angeles Times, "Reform Bid Fades Away Amid Hems and Haws."

<sup>113</sup> United States Department of Justice Report, Second Semi-Annual Monitoring Report for the Memorandum of Agreement between the United States, Los Angeles County and the Los Angeles County Office of Education, October 4, 2005. The California Youth Authority is equally problematic with recidivism rates as high at 91 percent at one point and currently at 75 percent.

penalties. This categorical abandonment of the traditional ethos of American juvenile justice, which viewed and treated child offenders as youth in need of rehabilitation, needs to be re-examined.<sup>114</sup> Children are not adults and crimes by children are so influenced by group activity that principles of adult culpability and responsibility cannot reasonably apply to juvenile crime.<sup>115</sup> These principles that distinguish adolescent behavior from adult behavior are routinely reflected in our traffic laws which account for the risks of youth development. This is not to suggest that serious juvenile crime should go without criminal penalty; it is to suggest that juvenile justice has lost sight of the importance of developmentally appropriate, youth-oriented and proportionate punishment that is designed to “preserve the future life chances of young offenders.”<sup>116</sup> The system we have now in effect ends those life chances.

Today’s punitive juvenile justice trends are driven by the five to ten percent of violent juvenile offenders who exceed the parameters of traditional rehabilitative juvenile justice. “[B]etween 90 percent and 95 percent of all juveniles arrested for offenses of violence do not substantially diverge from the types of youths and crimes that can be processed and sanctioned by the modern American juvenile court.”<sup>117</sup> In other words, the tiny percentage of youth offenders who present egregiously serious, violent and/or homicidal threat and who must be subject to a more rigorous system than the traditional rehabilitative juvenile justice framework, has triggered a punitive drive to prosecute and punish as adults vast numbers of juveniles who should receive rehabilitation, education, and development.

The alarm sounded over a new breed of violent youth for many decades now, which has supported the punitive juvenile justice mindset, also fails to take into account the central role of guns in youth violence. As one research reviewing youth homicide from 1976 to 1995 found, all of the increases in youth homicide rates were gun related homicides. Easy access to guns, rather than a fundamental change in the youth population, accounts for the lethality of youth violence today. In this sense, a system that punishes youth for violent behavior, does not rehabilitate them, and does not systematically curtail the availability of guns on the street can only fail to stem the tide of youth violence.<sup>118</sup>

The punitive, non-rehabilitative, adult-oriented juvenile justice paradigm needs re-examination along with the adequacy of County facilities and programs for young offenders.

From the perspective of prevention and intervention, a critical opportunity for engagement should be offered when a youth enters the probation system. This is particularly true for gang prevention because a majority, 56 percent, of the youth in the Los Angeles County Probation Department facilities are gang affiliated.<sup>119</sup> Nationally, many states and cities have rejected

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<sup>114</sup> Zimring, p. 8.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid, p. 80.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid, p. 86.

<sup>117</sup> Ibid, p. 186.

<sup>118</sup> The same research also noted that increase in youth arrests for aggravated assaults seem to result more from changes in police practices and reporting standards. Zimring, Franklin E., *American Youth Violence*, Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 31-47.

<sup>119</sup> Correspondence with Gina Byrnes, Administrative Services Bureau, Los Angeles County Probation Department. October 20, 2006.

large prison like facilities and have moved toward smaller, community based rehabilitation centers for youth offenders with impressive decreases in recidivism rate.<sup>120</sup> Experts note, for example, the relatively smaller gang problem that Boston experiences, compared to Los Angeles, is not only attributable to difference in size but also to the fact that Massachusetts was one of the first states to move towards a community based, small rehabilitation centers for youth offenders.

There are limited reforms under way. The former Chief Probation Officer, Paul Higa, presented a comprehensive reform plan in September of 2006 that provides a good beginning to transform the department.<sup>121</sup> Some recent actions taken include:

- The Probation Department has implemented a research-based risk and needs assessment instrument and is now in the process of developing specific guidelines as to how it should be used in making placements.
- The County has contracted for additional training to increase the number of MST teams available to serve youth in the system.
- Over the next five years the California Institute for Mental Health will be coordinating a large-scale test of Treatment Foster Care to determine the best way to help counties implement that program.

While the City must wholeheartedly support these reforms, it must also connect with programs with the existing probation system to ensure that youth in the system are being assessed and referred appropriately. In every one of the cases in which a petition is filed, the Probation Department is supposed to have conducted a risk and needs assessment, recording the results in a system known as the Los Angeles Risk and Resiliency Checkup (LARRC). The City would link with this system and request that the Probation Department provide it with sufficient data to analyze the disposition pattern of all City initiated cases, down to the level of what kinds of services and supervision were provided, and including any subsequent arrests, controlling for the risk and needs assessment contained in the LARRC report. The data would also be the basis for collaboration at the neighborhood level between the proposed City's Community Violence Prevention Centers and local probation officers for transition planning and re-entry services.<sup>122</sup>

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<sup>120</sup> Shelden, R.G., "Detention Diversion Advocacy: An Evaluation," *Juvenile Justice Bulletin*, 1999. Young people in San Francisco's Detention Diversion Advocacy Program, for example, have about half the recidivism rate of young people who remained in detention or in the juvenile justice system.

<sup>121</sup> Paul Higa, "Reaching for Higher Ground – A Redesigned Camp System in Los Angeles County," September 22, 2006.

<sup>122</sup> See Appendix 7, Public Safety.

## D. Business and Philanthropy

Business and philanthropic sectors have played important roles in advancing major policy initiatives such as health, homelessness, and violence prevention. Similar leadership is needed as the City and the region moves toward a comprehensive strategy for violence prevention and community revitalization.

One clear arena where business and private sector entities can contribute is the development of and participation in regional economic development strategies with the ultimate goal of creating living wage jobs. Business and philanthropy also can play an important role in making funding available for specific one-time capacity building costs. Such costs may be related to establishing a research institute, management information system, evaluation, and staff training.

Focused investment may also play a role in a “place based” strategy where the private sector contributes to the revitalization of a particular neighborhood or area as a pilot demonstration. Such an attempt was successfully carried out in San Diego around the City Heights community. Price Charities, a philanthropic organization associated with Sol and Robert Price, founders of Price Club, and CityLink, a for-profit real estate development company, developed an approach to revitalization “focused on developing and enhancing public services, private enterprises, and physical facilities.”<sup>123</sup> The approach followed in City Heights is now known as a holistic approach to redevelopment.

## VIII. Sustainability

### A. Cost Benefit Analysis

The question that needs to be answered at this point is: How much will this cost? And how will the City pay for it? Before these questions are considered, however, the City needs to consider what the current level of gang violence is costing the City.

Utilizing the data that was available from various City, County and State entities, the Vera Institute of Justice has calculated that ***gang violence in the City of Los Angeles is costing taxpayers and crime victims over \$2 billion a year.*** Of this amount, more than \$1 billion are attributable to direct government costs related to gang violence in the form of prosecution, incarceration, defense, courts and probation. The remaining \$1 billion are victim related costs including direct monetary costs to victims such as loss of wages, property damage, and medical expenses as well as quality of life costs such as pain and suffering of the victim. Approximately 21 percent of these costs, or \$247 million, are direct costs to the City. This amount does not include the other programming costs associated with prevention and intervention efforts of the City. ***Adding these costs, the total amount directly costing the***

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<sup>123</sup> Galuppo, Louis A., “Building a Healthy Community: The Holistic Community Driven Approach to Redevelopment,” National Housing Conference Affordable Housing Policy Review, Vol. 3, Issue 2, June 2004, pp. 28-34.

*City due to gang related crime is about \$270 million a year.*<sup>124</sup> These are conservative estimates and do not account for crime and youth violence that are not captured in the official data. The full costs are higher.

To prevent further expenditure of taxpayer dollars into ineffective strategies, the City must at least utilize its existing dollars in a coordinated, more effective strategy. Throughout this project, the Advancement Project has repeatedly quoted research that states that investing one dollar in prevention results in seven dollars in savings of future crime costs.<sup>125</sup> Other research has said that saving a high risk youth from a life of crime saves \$1.7 to \$2.3 million.<sup>126</sup> These savings are not realized immediately but manifest over a period of time as outcomes from prevention and intervention programs take hold and can be measured.

It is difficult to estimate exactly how much the strategy outlined in this report would cost the City and eventually save the City without more accurate data on impact and service parameters of the programs. Nevertheless, a relevant analysis is available through research conducted with evidence based programs with validated outcome data that measures how many of the youth participating in a program are successful.<sup>127</sup> Taking one evidence based program that promotes inter-agency collaboration toward better outcomes for high risk youth, this analysis suggests that by investing \$1.7 million into program costs serving 8,500 youths, taxpayers may realize more than \$17 million in benefits over time. Granted that these benefits would not be immediate, the analysis still shows the potential benefit from simply enhancing coordination among programs.

Looked at another way, Los Angeles County Sheriff's office has estimated the investigation, prosecution, adjudication and incarceration cost of individual gang related homicide as \$1.67 million dollars. There were a total of 249 gang related homicide in 2005 in the City. If only 25% of the gang related homicides could be prevented, the savings to taxpayers would be nearly \$104 million dollars. If the cost of saving a high risk youth from a life of crime is \$1.7 million, diverting 200 youth toward more gainful opportunities would result in savings of \$340 million dollars. Such estimates do not account for the positive effect on tourism and locally based business resulting from improved perceptions of public safety. These are crude estimates that only serve to illustrate the potential fiscal magnitude of the benefits resulting from adopting a coherent and coordinated prevention and intervention strategy.

More reliable outcome data from programs to be implemented would allow for a precise benefits calculation in the future.<sup>128</sup> In addition, accurate accounting procedures must be implemented to capture the full cost of the strategy adopted and resulting savings. The Advancement Project highly recommends that City contracts with expert consultants to continue a rigorous cost benefit analysis of the strategy that it adopts.<sup>129</sup>

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<sup>124</sup> See Appendix 11, Funding Analysis "Cost Benefit Analysis."

<sup>125</sup> Karoly, Lynn A., et al.

<sup>126</sup> Cohen, Mark A., "The Monetary Value of Saving a High-Risk Youth," Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 1998.

<sup>127</sup> See Appendix 11, Funding Analysis "Vera Institute of Justice: Cost Benefit Analysis" and Washington State Institute for Public Policy's report, "Benefits and Costs of Prevention and Early Intervention Programs for Youth," 2004.

<sup>128</sup> See Appendix 11, Funding Analysis "Vera Institute of Justice: Cost Benefit Analysis: Next Steps."

<sup>129</sup> See Appendix 11, Funding Analysis "Vera Institute of Justice: Cost Benefit Analysis: Next Steps."



In addition, utilizing a rough measure of costs associated with the basic infrastructure required to implement the prevention/intervention network recommended by this report in one hot zone, we estimate the costs as follows:

**Page 103: Estimated Annual Costs of Implementing Basic Prevention/Intervention Network in One High School Cluster**

## Estimated Annual Costs of Implementing Basic Prevention/Intervention Network in One High School Cluster

Cluster	Population Served	Rec and Parks <sup>a</sup>	Beacon <sup>b</sup> Center	CVPC <sup>c</sup>	After School Program <sup>d</sup> \$2,120 per participant	OneSource <sup>e</sup> \$5,625 per participant	Gang Intervention <sup>f</sup>	Total:
Manual Arts High School (Enrollment 4,113)								
25% Coverage	5,581	\$1,000,000	\$450,000	\$2,000,000	\$11,831,720	\$1,164,375 <sup>g</sup>	\$375,000	\$16,821,095
50% Coverage	11,162	\$1,000,000	\$450,000	\$2,000,000	\$23,663,440	\$2,311,875	\$375,000	\$29,800,315
100% Coverage	22,323	\$1,000,000	\$450,000	\$2,000,000	\$47,324,760	\$4,623,750	\$375,000	\$55,773,510

### *Determining the population served:*

Using the Manual Arts High School cluster as defined by the LAUSD and school enrollment data from the California Department of Education, we project the estimated costs of providing services to 25 percent, 50 percent, and all enrolled school aged youths in the cluster. To determine how many participants would take part in OneSource (youth employment program), we used the Northeastern University's "The Teen Disconnection in Los Angeles and its Neighborhoods" finding that one in five 16 to 24 year olds are out of school or out of work, to roughly estimate the number of enrolled students at Manual Arts High School that are in need of a job. **The estimated costs are provided for informational purposes only.**

a To calculate the costs of extending Department of Recreation and Parks' hours of services and programming, we used budget information from Baldwin Village's Summer of Success (SOS) in 2003 as a base figure. Using the 2003, SOS nine week cost of \$120,000 and an additional \$300,000 for overhead and inflation costs, we estimate that it would cost approximately \$1 million to provide *year round* extended operational coverage.

b The annual budget of a Beacon Center run by New York City's Department of Youth and Community Development is \$450,000, which covers programming and facility related costs. Although New York and Los Angeles vary in operational costs, we feel that \$450,000 is a rough estimate of the minimum cost of operating a Beacon Center.

c We used the Orange County Department of Probation's annual budget of \$2 million per Youth and Family Resource Center as the approximate annual cost of operating one Community Violence Prevention Center.

d After school programming costs were calculated using the statewide budget standard of \$10 a day to provide quality after school programming. We estimate that after school programming will be provided 212 days a year (180 school instruction days and 32 school year Saturdays).

e The current Youth Opportunities System/One Source annual cost per participant with a measurable positive outcome, including employment and training, is \$5,625.

f Enhanced gang intervention services would cost approximately \$375,000 per cluster in the Harbor and South LA area (12 City high school clusters) if the City's current investment in gang intervention was tripled.

<sup>g</sup> 25 % coverage would entail providing One Source programming to 206 participants, 50 percent coverage would be 411 participants and 100 percent coverage would be 822 participants

This chart indicates that the City would expend at least \$50 million in each of the highest risk areas over several years to provide 100 percent coverage for all at-risk children and youth, to stabilize the situation and to work towards a revitalization strategy. The highest cost element is by far the provision of after school programs to cover at-risk children and youth and the figures vary drastically depending on the type of coverage sought. The implementation of Proposition 49 may subsidize these after school related costs. These are extremely rough figures and need further refinement by the City. However, two conclusions can be made from this analysis:

- The City needs a strategy to target its current resources to the areas where the need is greatest because these areas are not receiving nearly enough resources the solution requires.
- The City needs to develop a short and long term strategy to develop more dedicated resources towards violence prevention.

Some of the short term strategies include a focused and organized effort to tap all available funding sources including federal, state and private foundations. This would include not only tapping new funding streams such as federal youth development funds flowing from multiple sources but also better leveraging of existing streams. Despite the declining federal funds towards gang related initiatives, with Los Angeles being the primary urban center with the greatest gang problem, a proactive initiative by the City to begin discussions with federal entities to seek out federal support on the new comprehensive strategy would be highly recommended. With a single City entity accountable for the entire spectrum of prevention and intervention efforts, fund development efforts can also be coordinated and strategic.

Overall scarcity of federal funding means that the new City entity must also diligently pursue state resources. As the cost-benefit analysis shows, the state has a substantial interest in reducing gang violence, specifically in Los Angeles, given that 52 percent of the gang related crime costs, or nearly \$600 million, are born by state agencies. Several cities including Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago, and Minneapolis depend heavily on state resources for their gang and community violence prevention efforts in the form of dedicated anti-gang or anti-violence legislation.

It will also be important to work with existing local and state funding streams. Some of these include First 5, Mental Health Services Act, and California Department of Justice's Gang Suppression Enforcement Teams. Becoming strategic partners to these on-going efforts and utilizing a network of providers who will receive support through these funding streams as a part of the prevention/intervention network will also be beneficial. On a related note, some jurisdictions have found that assisting smaller non-profit organization to access various funding sources as helpful to the overall strategy.

Finally, law enforcement agencies can access funds that are exclusively for law enforcement. Although the bulk of these dollars is primarily focused on suppression activities, creative funding strategies may be able to redirect at least some of this money. For example, the Southern Nevada Gang Task Force coordinates anti-gang programs through Department of Juvenile Justice and has been able to make sub-grants to over 160 community based

prevention and intervention organizations using federal grant money that is available to law enforcement.<sup>130</sup>

Another recommended strategy is to build a coalition of national and local philanthropic organizations to fund strategic components of the comprehensive strategy. As mentioned above, the most likely areas would be one-time capacity building efforts such as building research capacity, data collection, information management system, evaluation, and staff training.

## **B. Robust Sustained Funding Stream**

While the coordination of above strategies by a single entity will enhance the City's ability to tap and leverage funding sources, the magnitude of the problem in the City and regionally requires that a new dedicated funding stream be developed. There are several examples of this approach.

### **1. The Proposition 10 Approach**

In 1998, voters passed Proposition 10, creating a new funding stream dedicated for early childhood services by taxing tobacco products. This new stream is administered by First 5 California and filtered to each of the 58 California counties based on the live birth rate. Los Angeles receives roughly one-third of the total dollars or \$138 million annually. In addition to funding various new early childhood services, the funding has been a catalyst for efforts to address the needs of children birth to age five systemically. For example, First 5 Los Angeles committed \$600 million over five years to ensuring the availability of quality preschool for all four year olds in the County. In addition, the amount of new available resources has brought a variety of public and private stakeholders to the table with the clear intent to collaborate towards improving early childhood education and developmental services throughout the region.

### **2. Oakland Measure Y**

On a smaller scale, new funding and new strategy for violence prevention was implemented in Oakland in the form of the Violence Prevention and Public Safety Act, otherwise known as Measure Y. Measure Y instituted a commercial parking tax and a parcel tax in Oakland in order to raise a projected \$20 million per year to fund public safety measures and violence prevention programming targeted at at-risk youth. Approximately \$9.5 million of this funding goes to hiring and training police officers; \$6.4 million goes to specific Measure Y programming including a violence prevention curriculum in elementary and middle schools, case management for at-risk middle schoolers, and mentoring for youth on probation; and the remainder of the funding goes to smaller grantees conducting outreach.<sup>131</sup>

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<sup>130</sup> See Appendix 11, Funding Analysis, "Vera Institute of Justice: Phase II Deliverable."


<sup>131</sup> See Appendix 11, Funding Analysis, "Vera Institute of Justice: Phase II Deliverable."

### **3. Los Angeles County Violence Prevention Initiative**

The Advancement Project recommends a similar measure in Los Angeles County to develop a new stream of funding dedicated to ensuring public safety through a comprehensive prevention, intervention, and suppression strategy. The initiative would result in a regional entity that would coordinate efforts between the City, County, LAUSD, LACOE and other stakeholder entities as well as broaden the community action teams to implement a sustainable strategy across the region.

#### **Page 107: Regional Violence Prevention Entity**

# Regional Violence Prevention Entity



In much of the same way as Proposition 10, the new initiative would bring stakeholders to the table who would collaboratively develop a coordinated regional strategy that is informed by reliable data, research and evaluation.

### **Conclusion**

The City of Los Angeles needs to replace its small scale, uncoordinated, and siloed prevention and gang intervention programs with a comprehensive strategy that keeps safe neighborhoods safe, returns sliding neighborhoods to safety, prevents tipping point communities from tipping over into persistent violence, and in high crime neighborhoods reverses entrenched gang activity and violence and positions the community for development. The City needs creative leadership and centralized accountability that is free from bureaucratic constraints to solve this problem with external entities, schools and neighborhoods. But more than anything the City needs the public to engage this issue through public campaigns against violence and youth access to guns. Los Angeles will defeat its enduring epidemic of youth gang violence only when its leaders commit to this mission and the public decides that not another LA child should see gangs as their most viable rite of passage into adulthood. The time for studies is over. The time for effective action is here.

## **Summary of Recommendations**

### **Recommendation 1: Political Mandate**

Los Angeles City leaders must issue a strong and sustained political mandate to prioritize the mission of competently reducing gang activity and violence.

### **Recommendation 2: Comprehensive Strategy**

The City should move from the current approach of small, uncoordinated, low impact programs to a strategy of comprehensive prevention, intervention, and community investment that is linked to strategic community policing suppression and designed to have neighborhood level impact. This comprehensive strategy requires:

- Jointly planned, highly coordinated, expertise driven, multi-jurisdictional, and interdisciplinary implementation.
- Expert design, extremely careful implementation, and a capacity for skillful coordination that the City currently does not have. The City must create a new framework that will permit innovative on the ground exploration and documentation of effective strategies.
- Public health and healing, child development, job development, and community development models to effectively address underlying conditions that spawn gangs and violence.
- Linkage to strategic suppression and community policing.
- Capacity to address the scope of the problem.

#### ***Comprehensive Strategy: Prevention***

The comprehensive prevention strategy offers jointly planned and highly coordinated services that counter the conditions and risk factors that spawn violence and gangs, and alternatives to destructive lifestyles, while promoting healthy communities and families.

The comprehensive strategy should focus on both general prevention, intervention, and community investment as well as targeted gang focused prevention, jobs, and intervention programs that are not crime control oriented. It is important to distinguish between general and gang focused programming and it also is important that gang focused programs not reinforce gang identity and cohesion.



The comprehensive strategy should address precursors to violence that may originate in the home such as domestic violence, negative parenting, and acceptance of gang culture.

***Comprehensive Strategy: Intervention***

The comprehensive intervention strategy includes hard core gang intervention programs with fair evaluation and metrics systems, minimum qualifications for intervention workers, and differentiated exit strategies linked to robust job development for gang involved youth. Gang intervention leaders, like law enforcement, will need to cooperate in explorations of new approaches during the development of the comprehensive strategy.

***Comprehensive Strategy: Community Development and Investment***

The City must include a community development and investment plan in neighborhood violence and gang activity reduction strategy. Communities without jobs and basic infrastructure for economic, cultural, civic, and social development cannot sustain a long term violence and gang activity reduction strategy.

***Comprehensive Strategy: Community Policing and Strategic Suppression***

The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (LASD), and other regional law enforcement agencies will be central partners in any comprehensive strategy. LAPD will need to accelerate its transition to problem solving community policing, develop the capacity to work with neighborhoods in executing a comprehensive gang activity and violence reduction strategy, and cooperate in developing better data and crime fighting and gang intervention models.

**Action Items**

- 2.1** Create an expert planning process to develop the comprehensive strategy and its components described above and to assess how existing City programs and resources can be coordinated and integrated to achieve violence and gang activity reduction.

**Prevention:**

- 2.2** Create a seamless prevention network that is school centric with after school opportunities for elementary and middle school students, extended community access at high schools, and around-the-clock operation of park facilities.

- 2.3 Substantially increase funding and resources for after school programs, building on and investing in existing programs that are effective and developing with the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) additional resources.
- 2.4 Develop training for program staff and other City personnel to identify risk factors to facilitate prevention and early intervention.
- 2.5 Dedicate resources to ensure safe passages to and from school.
- 2.6 Focus gang prevention strategies that work on research identified risk factors for hard core gang activity, and specially developed prevention programs for young children and girls in gang saturated neighborhoods.

**Intervention:**

- 2.7 Create expert advisory and planning group to develop comprehensive strategies for intervention programs and a permanent Gang Intervention Advisory Board.
- 2.8 Increase investment for hard-core gang intervention programs to achieve 75% coverage of gangs in Los Angeles, equivalent to three times of the current investment.
- 2.9 Focus hard core gang intervention strategies on addressing gang group processes and the specific dynamics and culture of individual gangs.
- 2.10 Develop minimum levels of qualification and training requirements for gang intervention workers.
- 2.11 Develop tiered professional development and training for gang intervention workers with rigorous protocols for oversight.
- 2.12 Coordinate and integrate support services and programs to provide effective and safe exit strategies for gang members.
- 2.13 Coordinate and collaborate with law enforcement agencies.
- 2.14 Create a Chicago-LA collaboration that explores the experiences and expertise of gang intervention and violence interruption strategies used in both cities and that develops improved programs.

**Community Development and Investment:**

- 2.15 Create expert group to develop citywide short term and long term strategies to develop entry level and living wage jobs; industry based economic development plan for neglected areas and better use of Workforce Investment Act funds and similar resources.
- 2.16 Enact policy measures that require City hiring and contracting practices to prioritize hiring youth and contributing to violence reduction strategies.
- 2.17 Develop and allocate resources for a long term summer youth employment plan that matches the scale of jobs needed.
- 2.18 Examine and eliminate unnecessary barriers to City employment and education opportunities for ex-offenders and gang members, including unnecessary criminal background requirements.
- 2.19 Examine City development projects for opportunities to increase resources for community investment that aids violence and gang activity reduction strategies.

### **Recommendation 3: Scale and Scope of the Solution**

City approaches to reducing gang activity and violence should stop focusing on small programs that address less than five percent of key populations and design a comprehensive strategy capable of confronting the size of the gang and violence problem.

Planning for implementation of a comprehensive strategy should be done in phases to eventually address the full scale of community violence with the goal of keeping safe areas safe, pull sliding communities with emerging violence back to safety, strategic intervention in tipping point areas to achieve safety, and saturating violent hot zones to achieve stabilization.

#### **Action Items:**

- 3.1** Establish a more accurate picture of the scale of the problem by developing and collecting standardized data variables and definitions of gangs, gang members, gang crime, spousal abuse, and child abuse.
- 3.2** Adopt a comprehensive, phased citywide strategy that is designed to address the scale of the problem.
- 3.3** Get a fuller understanding of the real scope of community violence and gangs by incorporating the impact of emerging trends such as the increased involvement of girls in violent behavior, evolving research on the impact of exposure to violence on child and youth development, and the apparent evolving trends in gang crime.

### **Recommendation 4: Entrepreneurial Department with Oversight**

**The City should create an innovative entrepreneurial Department of Neighborhood Safety to get accountability and results. *Accountability for results requires centralized responsibility.***

A new entrepreneurial governmental structure must be created because traditional bureaucracies do not have the agility, capacity, or freedom needed to carry out a comprehensive strategy. A comprehensive strategy requires expert design, extremely careful implementation, and a great capacity for innovation, exploration, rapid response, coordination, and cross-silo execution to have any chance of avoiding chaos and making a measurable impact.

The City needs an entity with sufficient power and institutional clout to streamline bureaucracy; command cooperation across City departments, external jurisdictions and LAUSD; and execute neighborhood based comprehensive strategy.

If the entrepreneurial department does not document substantial and sustained reductions in gang activity and violence in selected high crime neighborhoods within set time periods, the City should terminate it or change its strategy.

**Action Items: Governance**

- 4.1** Allocate resources to form the new entrepreneurial department.
- 4.2** Form an Expert Action Committee led by the City Administrative Officer (CAO), Chief Legislative Analyst (CLA), and the City Attorney with outside advisors to develop this new entity.
- 4.3** Appoint a new Deputy Mayor of Neighborhood Safety.
- 4.4** Form a Permanent Oversight Committee.
- 4.5** Form an Expert Policy Advisory Board.
- 4.6** Enact a measure that directs all legislation and policies related to the mission of gang activity and violence reduction to be channeled through the new department for coordination and policy consistency.
- 4.7** Include provisions for a ten year “perform or end” clause and an expertly developed rigorous research design and evaluation framework.
- 4.8** Enact measures that create an agile operation framework that frees the entity from traditional City department constraints. Examples may include but are not limited to hiring specialized exempt staff at all levels, using accountable but much more flexible contracting and hiring procedures that ensure the right specialists will be hired, developing creative communications strategies, and experimenting to find out what works.
- 4.9** Include a Strategic Research and Initiatives section to drive continuous high quality research, program development, improvement, and evaluation, as well as capacity to adjust and change strategies.
- 4.10** Enact a policy measure to compel mission alignment, and contributions to and participation in the mission across all departments.
- 4.11** Annual review of departmental programs falling under the City’s Children and Family Budget with performance measures by the Permanent Oversight Committee.

**Action Items: Operations and Service Delivery**

- 4.12** Tailor solutions to each neighborhood.
- 4.13** Develop all plans in consultation with neighborhood leaders and civic groups.
- 4.14** Conduct neighborhood by neighborhood assessment of violence, needs and assets with community stakeholders.
- 4.15** Define service areas by high school clusters for most prevention and intervention services with flexibility for gang intervention services and for probation and foster youth.
- 4.16** Establish Community Violence Prevention Centers in each service area as the basic infrastructure to coordinate comprehensive prevention and intervention services, track children and youth served, coordinate with suppression efforts and develop community and youth organizing strategies.

- 4.17** Coordinate City and County services in a neighborhood through creation of Interagency Intervention Team.
- 4.18** Maximize use of existing, functional and effective resources, networks, service capacity, and assets in a neighborhood.
- 4.19** Create access to key service elements including health and mental health, child welfare, substance abuse treatment, life skills training, parenting education and support, crisis intervention, basic supportive services, and transition planning for probation youth.
- 4.20** Focus on helping to maximize services for families of high risk children and youth.
- 4.21** Acquire expert assistance to provide culturally competent, linguistically fluent, developmentally appropriate services that improve program performance, facilitate communication, and improve access to services for immigrant and/or isolated and alienated communities.
- 4.22** Integrate youth and communities in all phases of assessment, planning, implementation and evaluation.
- 4.23** Develop Community Action Teams in each service area, representative of those who live and work in the area with a concerted effort to include immigrant communities.
- 4.24** Maximize existing community networks, councils, and collaboratives where possible.

### **Recommendation 5: Leadership**

The Mayor and the City will have to find and appoint a high powered, politically skilled, and independent leader for the entrepreneurial Department of Neighborhood Safety.

The leadership of this entity will have to be bold; unafraid to take risks; willing to explore or conduct carefully designed experiments; have extraordinary political skills; have credibility with divergent sectors ranging from law enforcement to gang intervention workers to academics; and possess working familiarity with the many points of contention in the multiple disciplines and areas of expertise that come to bear in the development of a comprehensive strategy. There are few individuals who can do this job and they are unlikely to be found on civil service lists.

#### **Action Items:**

- 5.1** The Mayor, Deputy Mayors for Neighborhood Safety and Homeland Security, and the City Council should jointly appoint a search team that has the help of outside advisers to develop the qualifications profile, job description, and parameter for the leadership of this new department and citywide comprehensive strategy to reduce gang activity and neighborhood violence.

## **Recommendation 6: Think Tank**

The City and other entities should jointly create a state-of-the-art Research, Evaluation, and Policy Institute that offers accurate and independent data development, program evaluation design, and policy analysis support. The City must move from politically driven policy to research driven policy, must build evaluation into all programs, and develop greater capacity for policy analysis.

### **Action Items:**

- 6.1** Enact a measure that funds an expert team to work with the CLA to develop a Research, Evaluation, and Policy Institute.
- 6.2** Direct the expert team and CLA to seek joint venture agreements with universities, foundations, and think tanks.
- 6.3** Ensure that the Institute develops reliable data, good research protocols and practices, excellent evaluation, and state-of-the-art program design.
- 6.4** Ensure that the Institute is designed to help develop training for City staff and service providers on youth development, child development, violence prevention, human relations, and family violence prevention to increase subject matter expertise needed for gang activity and violence reduction strategies.
- 6.5** Integrate the Strategic Research and Initiatives section in the new City department with the Policy Institute.
- 6.6** Standardize data variables and collection procedures (e.g. intake forms) across City departments.
- 6.7** Train and provide technical assistance for City staff and service providers on evaluation.
- 6.8** Develop reliable assessment tools to identify high risk youth and gang involved youth using best research on risk factors.
- 6.9** Develop an information management system to track children served across City and County departments.
- 6.10** Develop departmental ability to provide timely data release to Research, Evaluation, and Policy Institute for annual evaluation.
- 6.11** Develop program level evaluation templates.
- 6.12** Develop evaluation protocols for the comprehensive strategy.

## **Recommendation 7: The Money**

The City's gang crime costs taxpayers and crime victims over \$2 billion a year, with many of those costs paid from State and County coffers. The City should maximize impact from and get documented results for current expenditures. After eliminating wasteful and ineffective approaches, the City should obtain new streams of funding for general prevention, intervention, and suppression and gang specific prevention, intervention, and suppression. Additional funds will be needed but should not be sought until competent strategies, rigorous oversight, and accountability frameworks for expenditure of new funds are in place.

**Action Items:**

- 7.1** Stop the dissipation and lack of impact with current funds by placing small and isolated programs into comprehensive and coordinated neighborhood violence reduction strategies that are efficient and generate results.
- 7.2** Conduct a thorough cost benefit analysis of the proposed entrepreneurial department's impact on governmental and victim costs.
- 7.3** Eliminate duplicative administrative costs.
- 7.4** Find and end practices that consume hundreds of thousands of dollars for relatively little benefit to the public—for example, the costs of subsidizing take-home City cars for hundreds of City workers, unnecessary round-the-clock staffing, wasteful overtime practices, and idle City owned properties—and redeploy those dollars into a gang activity and violence reduction strategy.
- 7.5** Reinvest cost savings into the comprehensive gang activity and violence reduction strategy and in increased support and investment for effective community based service providers, neighborhood organizations and other civic and faith based groups that can contribute to gang activity reduction, violence reduction, and community investment strategies.
- 7.6** Seek joint funding as well as joint investment and action with the State and County government to solve the gang violence problem. A joint investment among entities of the State, County, City, and LAUSD will increase the pooled funding and effectiveness for all government agencies.
- 7.7** Centralize efforts to determine whether the City is maximizing its eligible use of federal and state resources for youth development and other programs.
- 7.8** Examine existing funding streams for law enforcement and other specific funding sources to determine whether they would be better deployed into the comprehensive strategy.
- 7.9** Develop a coalition of national and local philanthropic organizations to fund strategic components of the comprehensive strategy.
- 7.10** Improve use of and levels of support for established local provider networks and the development of new local networks as needed.
- 7.11** Support, to the extent legally permissible, independent efforts to mount ballot initiative funding strategies for a regional comprehensive violence and gang activity reduction plan.

**Recommendation 8: The Regional Solution**

The City must design all gang activity and violence reduction programs in full recognition of the important fact that gangs and violence are a regional phenomenon that require regional strategies and cooperation with entities throughout the County.

**Action Items:**

- 8.1** Develop Memoranda of Understanding or other agreements for collaboration and joint planning with key County departments and other regional entities for continuous and structured collaboration at the neighborhood and inter jurisdictional levels.
- 8.2** Participate actively in developing a regional strategy for gang activity and violence reduction.
- 8.3** Actively support ongoing reform measures in LAUSD, LAPD, and County Probation.
- 8.4** Expand participation in and cooperation with regional efforts to improve information sharing between regional and local entities serving children and youth.
- 8.5** Improve monitoring of service provision for City's children and youth involved in the County child welfare, mental health, and juvenile justice systems.
- 8.6** Help develop an initiative to create a Los Angeles County Violence Prevention Initiative with a dedicated stream of funding to carry out the comprehensive region-wide strategy that will be needed for sustained reductions.

### **Recommendation 9: Suppression**

In some divisions, LAPD and LASD are beginning to make important transitions to problem-oriented community policing that will be needed if suppression is to be a productive part of the comprehensive neighborhood gang activity and violence reduction strategy suggested in this report.

#### **Action Items:**

- 9.1** Expedite community policing and problem solving approaches that facilitate effective officer collaboration with community members to reduce gang activity and violence.
- 9.2** Cooperate with experts, the neighborhood safety department, and the proposed Research, Evaluation, and Policy Institute to develop reliable gang data and other crime data.
- 9.3** Increase use of strategic, targeted crime fighting strategies that focus on violent offenders and avoid overbroad suppression tactics and aggressive policing that focuses on maximizing arrests across the board.
- 9.4** Increase resources to protect witnesses, and punish retaliation against and intimidation of community members who participate in gang activity reduction or law enforcement activity.
- 9.5** Develop partnerships with prevention and intervention programs under clear and consistent referral guidelines that do not hinder appropriate law enforcement and suppression.
- 9.6** Develop protocols with gang prevention and intervention networks to coordinate delivery of effective strategies that reduce gang activity, violence, and the numbers of youth ensnared in the broken juvenile justice system.



### **Recommendation 10: LAUSD as a Key Partner**

LAUSD is a key partner for the City in gang activity reduction because schools are the one institution that has sustained contact with children, facilities, and the educational resources to develop the courses and counseling that are central to teaching violence prevention curriculum.

The City should begin immediately creating mechanisms and structures for joint planning with LAUSD on how to have schools play a central and leading role in several aspects of the comprehensive violence and gang activity reduction strategies recommended in this report.

#### **Action Items:**

- 10.1** Develop ways to assist LAUSD to transform schools into a central and strategic asset for violence and gang activity reduction, academic achievement, mental and physical health of children, and community vitality.
- 10.2** Form a team to begin discussions on the viability of potential funding for the LAUSD-City violence reduction collaboration.
- 10.3** Coordinate safe passage to and from school with the District.
- 10.4** Expedite facility joint use agreements with City, County, and community entities to allow access on schools during after school hours.
- 10.5** Develop age appropriate violence prevention curriculum for in school instruction.
- 10.6** Consult with district and charter school principals who have successfully developed campus-wide conflict mediation and violence reduction plans.
- 10.7** Develop comprehensive assessment strategies to identify and address needs of children facing multiple risk factors.
- 10.8** Facilitate timely and complete sharing of educational and other information with City and County entities to ensure delivery of appropriate services.

### **Recommendation 11: Juvenile Justice**

The City's efforts will continue to be hindered by debilitating and counter productive fallout from failures in the State Corrections, County Probation and juvenile adjudication systems. The City should seek ways to expedite extensive reforms needed in the regional criminal justice systems for juveniles and adults.

#### **Action Items:**

The City should seek ways to encourage and/or facilitate:

- 11.1** Formation of a task force to develop a master reform plan of the County Probation Department facilities to address the severe problems highlighted in the 2001 United States Department of Justice investigation.
- 11.2** An implementation plan that shifts juvenile justice away from large scale adult prosecution system for large numbers of juveniles towards a community-based rehabilitative model designed to give young people the resources they need to change behavior.
- 11.3** Improved engagement with parents and caretakers of youth involved in the juvenile justice system.
- 11.4** Adequate transition planning and coordination with City, other County and community entities for follow-up services that seek to protect children who are re-entering from detention or face dangerous circumstances and obstacles to rehabilitation.

## **Recommendation 12: The Public Campaigns Against Violence and Youth Access to Guns**

Public campaigns against violence and youth access to guns involving broad sectors of Los Angeles will be important in generating the essential public movement that will be pivotal in a region-wide strategy to end youth gang involvement and neighborhood violence.

### **Action Items:**

The City should help coordinate, raise funds, allocate planning funds, and generally support the following campaigns:

- 12.1** Los Angeles' civic and faith-based sectors should be funded to lead a public campaign against violence and against youth access to guns—a civic movement against the culture of destruction that is engulfing LA's poorest areas will be essential to turning this problem around.
- 12.2** Los Angeles' philanthropic sector should help fund the formation of the independent Research, Evaluation, and Policy Institute, intervention training, and programs that develop neighborhood leadership and community organizations dedicated to creating violence-free, healthy neighborhoods.
- 12.3** The region's universities, think tanks and academic experts should contribute policy and evaluation expertise for the City's comprehensive strategy and policy, including the formation of the Research, Evaluation, and Policy Institute.
- 12.4** The Business sector should help provide jobs and technical assistance to the City as it moves to create a competent, entrepreneurial model of government.
- 12.5** The entertainment and media sectors should offer substantial help in countering the glorification of gangs, violence and guns that fuels attraction to gang life, by helping to design and fund public campaigns against violence and youth access to guns.

- 12.6** The City should allocate planning funds to help recruit and coordinate leadership from the different sectors needed for these campaigns and to work with CeaseFire Chicago which pioneered such campaigns to jumpstart the civic movement needed to counter LA's violence epidemic.